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2.1. Introduct on i
 
In order to investigate the influence of social policies on parenthood choices, we have analyzed 
those state interventions that are likely to affect women’s fertility decisions: provisions supportive 
of maternal employment such as public childcare and early childhood education but also more 
general family policies such as child allowances, tax deductions. Moreover, the specter of policies 
regarding maternity as well as opportunities to take parental leave have also been studied. 
This chapter summarizes all of the information that was gathered and treated throughout this 
research. It is based on a detailed and in-depth collection and analysis of available accurate 
quantitative and qualitative data covering the former 15 European countries. These data have 
given rise to an extremely rich data base which we have consequently used in order to build 
synthetic indicators. 
Based on a large number of underlying criteria which describe the systems in place we have 
aggregated information in order to compute summarizing indicators that measure each EU-15 
member state’s generosity in each of the three fields of family-friendly policies. Based on their 
respective scores, countries were then ranked to allow for a better comparison.  
Taken together, the three country rankings shed important insight into the way public policy 
facilitates today’s families’ choices as to time allocation, labor participation, leisure, etc. Note also 
that in evaluating a country’s efforts we have particularly paid attention to the implications for 
gender equality that result from the existing support schemes.  
In this paper, the aim is to present the indicators and country rankings obtained in the three fields 
of public childcare, parental leave and child tax and cash benefits first separately and next, put 
together in order to get a final global view on the EU-15 member states’ generosity towards 
families with children. See Appendix figure A.1. for the steps of the index construction. 
The outline of this chapter is the following. The first section summarizes the analysis of existing 
welfare state typologies that will serve as the reference point to which we will confront our 
results.  
The following sections present the data that were gathered as well as the synthetic indicators that 
were derived from these in the following order. We start with the analysis of public child care 
systems in Europe, for children aged 0-3 and 3-6 respectively, taking into account the availability 
of places, the quality of the services and their cost. Secondly, we present our analysis of child cash 
allowances for working families at different income levels and put forward the particular features 
of the different systems in terms of the variation of benefits according to family type and the 
child’s rank in the family. Thirdly, we analyze tax advantages according to criteria such as the 
level of parents’ income, the family size , etc. Fourthly, we investigate the systems of maternity 
leave focusing on the wage replacement rate and the conditions involved in the take-up of this 
leave. Finally, we objectively outline the systems of parental leave that are implemented 
throughout the 15 countries studied. Note, however, that, in our opinion, these systems should 
be assessed very cautiously given the negative effects they entail for female employment. 
The conclusion of this chapter confronts our results to existing welfare state typologies. We find 
that our methodology of looking into a very wide range of different elements that are likely to 
 43
                                                                                                                                      Chapter II 
affect parenthood choices and summarizing this information into synthetic indicators as well as 
the fact that we essentially use very precise quantitative data or quantify qualitative information 
produces results that are considerably more subtle than those put forward by less targeted and 
less detailed studies that risk giving a false picture of the real-life situation of working mothers 
throughout Europe.  
 
 
2.2. Overview of wel are states and gender regimes typologies f
 
In recent decades, several typologies of welfare states were established in order to provide an 
answer to the question whether real welfare states are quite similar to others or whether instead 
they are rather unique specimens. Welfare state typologies have needed to develop or, in other 
words, typology-builders have gradually needed to incorporate an ever increasing number of 
variables into their analysis of welfare states in order to stay in line with social attitudes and ideas 
as well as with political and economic reality.  
Until the seminal contribution of Esping-Andersen (1990), typologies were built around the 
concept of redistribution, ranking countries according to measures such as the state’s level of 
social expenditures, the proportion of transfers to GDP, the proportion of tax receipts to GDP, 
etc. (Mac Farlan and Oxley, 1996 and Adema, 1996) This first generation of typologies already 
unraveled a clear dichotomy between the very redistributive welfare systems of the Scandinavian 
countries and the underdeveloped welfare states of the South of Europe.  
With Esping-Andersen (1990) the central object of analysis is broadened to the state-market 
nexus or the relationship between paid work and welfare. His threefold typology of conservative-
corporatist (AT, BE, FR, GE, EL, IT, LUX, NL and ES), liberal (IE and the UK), and social-
democratic (DK, FI and SE) welfare state regimes is based on the criteria of decommodification, 
social stratification, and the state-market nexus (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Esping-Andersen has 
been the catalyst for a new vague of typologies centered around the respective welfare roles of 
the state and the market. However, the omission of the gender dimension in these typologies has 
triggered a fierce reaction in the feminist literature.  
Indeed, feminists have pointed out that, in comparative welfare state research, women only enter 
the analysis as they become more visible as paid workers. Unfortunately, they are just granted a 
place within the same paid work/welfare schedule that was primarily designed with male 
breadwinners in mind. The concept of decommodification presupposes that individuals are 
commodified. Therefore, it may adequately describe the relationship between welfare states and 
the standard, full-career male worker, but it is not easily applicable to women, considering that 
their economic role is often non-commodified. Much of the welfare work undertaken by women 
within the household has never been part of the market, and continues to be performed outside 
the purview of the welfare state (Sainsbury, 1994) The concept of decommodification is 
inoperable for women unless welfare states, to begin with, help them become commodified. The 
concept of familialism has received special attention, particularly in Esping-Andersen’s later work 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999). According to Esping-Andersen (1999), a familialistic welfare regime is 
one that assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the household. As a consequence, the 
concept of ‘de-familialization’ serves to capture policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on the 
family, that maximize individuals’ command over economic resources independently of familial 
or conjugal reciprocities. Given that women’s, or at least mothers’, family responsibilities easily 
restrict their ability to gain full economic independence solely via work, their de-familialisation 
depends uniquely on the welfare state. Women carefully weigh the gains and losses of work given 
their time-consuming childcare responsibilities. Part-time employment, although enabling women 
to deal with their double burden, is hardly ever enough to guarantee full economic independence. 
In other words, it was feminist critique that led Esping-Andersen (1999) to realize that female 
independence necessitates ‘de-familializing’ welfare obligations rather than ‘de-commodifying’ 
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them.  
These reflections have marked an important step in comparative welfare state research. A new 
generation of typologies has been far more open to gendered dimensions of the welfare state as 
well as to women’s multiple welfare roles. (Lewis and Ostner, 1994; Gornick, Meyers and Ross, 
1997; Letablier, 1998; Forssén and Hakovirta, 2000; Walby, 2001; Pfau-Effinger, 2000) An 
analysis of this more recent wave of welfare state research shows that when the specific situation 
of mothers is considered, welfare states are hardly ever pure types and are usually hybrid cases 
that foster mothers’ welfare in different forms and to different extents. Some degree of 
abstraction needs to be made to retrieve groups of countries with similar welfare systems. The 
closest to our object of analysis are the typologies by Lewis and Ostner (1994), Gornick, Meyers 
and Ross (1997), Letablier (1998) and Forssén and Hakovirta (2000). We will therefore confront 
our results to theirs.  
Regardless of the typology considered, several countries are always found in the top category: 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Belgium and France. In these countries, family life and employment 
seem to be more compatible thanks to supportive public policies. Northern European states first 
and foremost pursue gender equality as the main policy objective and within this framework do 
not distinguish between women with or without children. Therefore, generous state provision of 
child care has to be understood as a measure to support women’s access to the labor market 
besides its role to increase child well-being. Day care coverage and state subsidies for day care 
costs are both relatively high in those countries, especially in Denmark. In France and Belgium, 
the focus tends to be more hybrid combining both elements of gender equality and familialism, 
thus addressing the specific situation of women as mothers. 
A middle group of countries includes Germany, Austria and Luxembourg. Rather than combine 
family and professional responsibilities women in these countries alternate child care and 
employment meaning that they drop out of the labor market completely during their child’s first 
years of life. These countries are considered strong male breadwinner states confining women to 
the home. Public policies therefore focus on long maternity and parental leaves but limited public 
child care provision for very young children. Although they also belong to this groups of 
countries, the Netherlands form an important exception to this general pattern of female activity. 
Indeed, the substantial increase in their activity rates over recent years is entirely due to the 
growth in part-time employment. In this country the male breadwinner/female part-time carer 
model prevails (Pfau-Effinger, 2000). 
Finally, the Southern European countries and the liberal welfare states of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland are ranked lowest. In the liberal countries, child care is considered a private matter in 
which the state should not intervene. Public child care is aimed at protecting children in need but 
should not be concerned with allowing mothers to engage in paid work. As a result, these 
countries are characterized by numerous movements in and out of employment around 
childbirth. In the Mediterranean countries, family life and employment are in fierce competition. 
Women face a trade-off between having children or pursuing a career, a combination of both 
being generally quite difficult. Financial constraints put heavy pressure on public support forcing 
the enlarged family to substitute for the state. Fertility rates significantly decline in the South as 
more women choose to enter the labor force. 
Table 2.1. briefly presents an overview of existing typologies most relevant to working women 
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Table 2.1. Summary of related welfare state typologies 
 
ANALYSIS FIRST GROUP SECOND GROUP THIRD GROUP 
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999)
« decommodification, social 
stratification and state-market-
family nexus » 
DK, FI, SE AT, BE, FR, GE, EL, 
IT, LUX, NL, ES 
IE, UK 
    
Lewis and Ostner (1994) 




FR GE, IE, UK, NL 
    
Walby (2001) 
« gender regimes » 
DK, FI, SE, USA, UK, 
CA, CZ, HU, PL 
AT, BE, FR, GE, CH, 
LUX 
EL, IT, ES, PT, (IE) 
    
Letablier (1998) a 
« family policy models : 
explicitly family-oriented, less 
explicitly family-oriented, 
implicit state support » 
FR, BE, LUX DK, SE, GE, NL UK, ES, IT 
    
Korpi (2000) 
« gender policy models 
(services/transfers balance) 
and political tendencies » 
NO, DK, FI, SE IE, IT, NL, BE, GE, 
AT, FR 
CH, CA, USA, JP, NZ, 
UK, AU 
    
Gornick, Meyers and Ross 
(1997) 
« policies supportive of the 
employment of mothers of 
small children » 
SE, DK, FI, FR, BE AT, AU, W-GE, IT, NL, 
NO 
CA, EL, IE, LUX, PT, 
ES, UK, USA 
    
Forssén and Hakovirta (2000) 
« family policy index » 
FI, SE, BE, IT DK, FR, NO, GE, ES NL, UK, USA, AU 
 
 FIRST GROUP SECOND GROUP THIRD GROUP FOURTH GROUP 
Letablier (1998) b 
« family-employment 
relationship» 
FR, BE, SE, DK, 
FI 
AT, GE, LUX, NL IE, UK IT, ES, PT, EL 
 
 
2.3. Building a child care indicator 
 
The Barcelona European Council of March 2002 put forward the improvement of childcare 
provisions as an important instrument within the set of active policies aimed at full employment. 
The Council acknowledged the need to improve public and private childcare provisions in order 
to increase female participation rates in order to meet the Lisbon targets. Moreover, accessible 
and high-quality childcare is considered of prime importance to enhance social inclusion of all 
vulnerable groups in society. Two very precise targets were adopted: by 2010, member states 
should provide care facilities to cover, first, at least 90% of children aged between three and the 
age at which compulsory schooling begins and, second, at least 33% of children below three years 
of age. These objectives have appealed to governments to substantially improve their childcare 
systems.  
As far as outside childcare options are concerned, countries have generally implemented a two-
fold system: 
Collective childcare systems (crèches, kindergartens, play-schools) : these are public or private 
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reception facilities with skilled staff providing care for young children during the day. 
Subsidized professional childminders who receive children at their home (family day care). 
Moreover, most countries distinguish two periods of pre-primary care and education, an earlier 
period being more related to care (from birth to the child’s third birthday ) and a later one to 
education (from three years of age until the age of compulsory education ). The locus of authority 
usually shifts from one period to the other: infants fall under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs while pre-school children are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The 
institutional aspects of childcare tend to be different across and within both age groups. The 
differences across groups have been accounted for in our analysis by the systematic breakdown 
of all indicators by age group whereas within the age groups we have been cautious so as to 
harmonize the different institutional childcare settings.  
The criteria on the ground of which we have assessed the different countries’ family support 
systems have been grouped into two main categories that adequately and exhaustively describe a 
public childcare system. These categories are: (i) the coverage rate of the childcare system 
measured by four indicators (proportion of children covered, opening hours, public share in the 
costs, and the child/staff ratio) and (ii) criteria of a financial nature, the cost of childcare for 
parents with infants and public spending on education for children aged three to six. 
The assumptions underlying each of the childcare components are the following: (i) the higher 
the coverage rate, the longer the opening hours and the larger the public share of the cost, the 
greater the proportion of children in public (and publicly funded) full-time free care and therefore 
the easier it is for parents to engage in paid work even at atypical hours, (ii) the smaller the 
number of children per trained carer, the higher the level of professionalism of a country’s public 
childcare system and the better its quality (iii) the lower the cost of childcare and the more 
advantages available for lower-income families, the more universal the system and, finally, (iv) the 
higher the level of public spending per child in education, the better the system’s infrastructure, 
the more attractive employment in this branch, and the higher the quality of child development. 
 
2.3.1. Coverage rate 
First we focused on the coverage rate of public childcare systems. Three indicators were 
combined to evaluate the coverage rate, each broken down by age groups. First, what is 
commonly denoted as the “coverage rate”: it measures the proportion of children of a given age 
group receiving some form of public or publicly-funded childcare. A second element determining 
overall coverage of the childcare system is “daily coverage”: it refers to the spread of opening 
hours of formal childcare arrangements. Finally, a third important element to measure public 
commitment to offer quality childcare is the way in which the cost of childcare is shared between 
public funds and parent or employer fees. All three components were considered to be equally 
essential in measuring the actual degree of coverage of a country’s childcare system.  
 
2.3.2. Child/staff ratio 
In order to evaluate the quality of public childcare provisions, the child/staff ratio was chosen as 
our next criterion (given that qualifications are difficult to harmonize and that staff generally have 
some degree of higher education in care or education fields). Since for children of both age 
groups different forms of formal care exist in different contexts (such as kindergartens, play 
groups, crèches, nursery schools, and so on...), our indicator is often a weighted average number 
of children per childminder over the different types of care solutions. 
For infants, according to Fiene (2002) there should ideally be three or four children per 
childminder in centers (crèches or family day care centers) and two staff members per group. For 
older children, aged three to six, the preferred ratio increases to eight children per carer, but this 
is still not attained in many European countries. 
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2.3.3. The cost of childcare for infants (0-3 year-olds) 
Countries can apply different mechanisms to subsidize the market cost of childcare. First, they 
may subsidize childcare itself so that charges fall below market costs for all parents. Second, they 
may reduce or rebate charges for childcare according to income, family type, age, or number of 
children in childcare. Charges for childcare exist everywhere for couples, but for single parents 
most countries provide free or heavily subsidized childcare places. Third, the extra costs of 
childcare in some countries are mitigated by higher cash benefits with respect to a child of pre-
school age as compared to a school-age child . When all direct and indirect subsidies have been 
taken into account to adjust the household’s childcare cost downwards and when all taxes and 
benefits have been considered, what do different types of households really pay for childcare? 
This criterion has been broken down by level of income and family type as was done by 
Bradshaw and Finch (2002). 
 
2.3.4. Public spending for pre-school aged children (3-6 year-olds) 
Another indicator of the financial aspects of childcare is the amount spent by governments on 
early childhood education and care. The goal is to compare countries according to their level of 
spending per child enrolled in an education program of any kind or form, whether private or 
public, in order to conclude on various elements such as the quality of care, the earnings level of 
care staff, capital investment in the sector, material issues, etc. Obviously, public spending per 
child depends on the public share in the costs of childcare (and also on the coverage rate in 
public and publicly-funded childcare) and, moreover on the child/staff ratio given that the largest 
share of expenditure on education and care goes to childminders’ wages. In sum, public 
expenditure allows us to get a better picture of the level of earnings in the sector as well as of 
other aspects such as quality (material, infrastructure, etc.) and public involvement in the field. 
 
2.3.5. The final childcare indicator and country ranking 
We used two methods to compute a synthetic indicator for each of the two age groups 
considered for each country. First, we used the methodology applied by the UN to construct the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and rank countries according to their score on this index . 
Second, we compared this ranking of countries to the one obtained using a software called 





















                                                                                                                                      Chapter II 
Table 2.2. Final ranking of EU-15 member states according to the degree to which 
their childcare system is supportive of the dual-earner model and young child 
development 
 
Final score 0-3 
(UN) 
Final score 0-3 
(DL) 
  Final score 3-6 
(UN) 
Final score 3-6 
(DL) 
 Final score all 
(UN) 
Final score all 
(DL) 
DK 95.55 DK 1.00   DK 86.57 DK 0.80  DK 91.06 0.67 
SE 59.66 FI 0.73   SE 78.52 SE  SE 69.09 SE 0.53 




FR 51.28 BE 0.57   IT 37.73 IT 0.52  FR 45.50 FR 0.38 
BE 47.49 FR 0.51   FI 34.50 FI 0.38  IT 37.56 BE 0.23 
LUX 39.60 GE -0.02   LUX 33.75 AT 0.33  BE 36.94 IT 0.20 
NL 38.41 LUX -0.04   AT 32.73 BE 0.12  LUX 36.67 AT 0.06 
IT 37.40 IT -0.12   BE 26.39 LUX 0.07  AT 33.38 GE 0.05 
GE 37.00 AT -0.18   GE 23.03 GE -0.01  GE 30.01 LUX 0.05 
AT 34.02 NL -0.25   UK 17.52 NL -0.23  NL 27.97 NL -0.22
PT 33.66 PT -0.25   NL 15.51 UK -0.26  UK 24.31 PT -0.31
UK 33.10 UK -0.44   PT 10.60 PT -0.52  PT 22.13 UK -0.32
EL 27.52 EL -0.63   ES 8.46 ES -0.70  ES 16.39 IE -0.54
ES 24.32 IE -0.64   IE 4.36 IE -0.79  EL 14.03 ES -0.58
IE 9.32 ES -0.91   EL 0.54 EL -0.94  IE 6.84 EL -0.59
Note : “UN” for Human Development Index method, “DL” for Decision Lab method (see Appendix) 
Source : own calculations based on most recent data (see Appendix). 
Key to read the table : Concerning the final score for children aged zero to three, the UN method is explained 
as follows : on a scale from zero (worst performer on all variables) to 100 (best performer), Sweden is located 
at sixty on average for all variables. The DL method is somewhat more complex to interpret but the figures 
reflect the relative position of each country on a scale from –1 (no country scores worse) to 1(no country 
scores better). 
 
Note that for each age category, four groups of countries can be distinguished although some 
countries change between groups according to the age category considered. Four countries are 
always to be found at the head of the ranking: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and France. These 
countries consistently score well on all separate criteria, with Denmark at the very top. Belgium 
gives up its place in the top group to Italy when pre-school aged children instead of infants are 
looked at. This has everything to do with a better child/staff ratio and a higher level of public 
spending for three to six year olds in Italy.  
A second group of countries includes Luxembourg, Germany, Austria (except for zero to three 
year olds in the UN ranking), and either Belgium or Italy as explained above. The Netherlands 
usually appear in the third group. The Dutch particularity of widespread part-time employment 
might explain the state’s relative disinterest in the field of childcare. The fact that the Netherlands 
move up to the second group at one instance is probably due to the long opening hours of the 
few public care facilities that exist for infants. The UK and Portugal also form part of this third 
group of countries when we look at children aged zero to three although Portugal moves to the 
very bottom ranking when three to six year olds are considered. The mediocre rankings of these 
two countries should come as no surprise given that coverage of infants in public care is close to 
zero, at least in the UK where the emphasis is rather on granting cash benefits and tax credits to 
enable families to purchase private childcare solutions on the market (infra). In Portugal, 
although a larger share of children is covered, opening hours are very limited, especially for pre-
primary children, and public spending for this age group is the lowest throughout Europe. 
Finally, a bottom group of countries includes Spain, Greece, and Ireland for which no further 
explanation is needed given the poor performance of these countries in all the aspects analyzed 
within the framework of this section. 
The global picture put forward by table 2.2. is in line with existing childcare-oriented welfare state 
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typologies (e.g. Gustafsson, 1994; Gornick, Meyers and Ross, 1997). The most noticeable 
exception is Luxembourg which in our ranking comes out as part of the upper middle group of 
countries whereas Gornick, Meyers and Ross rank it at the very bottom. Nevertheless, given that 
it ranks first in terms of public spending on child care, that public funds cover a large part of the 
cost of childcare for parents and that child/staff ratios as well as coverage rates of pre-school 
aged children are not so bad, in our analysis, Luxembourg deserves to be ranked in the middle. 
To conclude, it seems that our ranking is quite robust and adequately presents the relative 
positions of each country with respect to the first dimension of our analysis of public 
intervention, that is in the field of childcare.  
 
 
2.4. Building a child cash benefit indicator 
 
A second component, besides public childcare, has been proved to have a considerable impact on 
households’ choices to have children at all or on their number, and that is the system of family 
support through child cash benefits (Gauthier and Hatzius, 1997; Letablier, 2003).  
The amount of cash benefits varies according to the age and rank of the children in the 
household and to the type of family (lone parents, dual-earner and one-earner couples, etc.). 
There is a clear tendency towards universalism in all countries (lump-sum payments made for 
each family or for each child independently of parents’ income ) except for the Southern 
European countries of Italy, Spain and Portugal where they are means-tested and thus vary 
according to the family’s income level. In those countries, family policy relies not on the idea of 
universalism but rather on that of vertical redistribution in order to concentrate means on the 
most needy. In Greece, most employers proportionally raise the wages of those employees who 
are heads of family.  
The pursuit of universalism in their systems of family cash benefits by most countries serves an 
important cause. Indeed, universally granted cash benefits are considered an important tool in the 
fight against child poverty. Firstly, they avoid stigmatizing specific vulnerable groups, are easy to 
take up given the absence of eligibility conditions and, as a result, efficiently reach all families 
concerned. Secondly, since benefits are granted on a monthly basis, simultaneously with earnings, 
they are more easily perceived by parents as a regular financial aid to cover expenses of everyday 
life, whereas tax relief, given that it is collected with a year’s time lag, is tied much less to the 
expenses that it is supposed to cover but seen more as a bonus. A third reason refers to the so-
called wallet to purse phenomenon (Lundberg and Pollack, 1993; 1996). Tax relief is generally 
paid either to the household head or to the highest-earning working parent (in Belgium, for 
example), in many instances the father. However, it has been shown that fathers and mothers 
tend to spend very differently the benefits they receive thanks to their status as parents: mothers 
are more inclined to spend on behalf of the child while fathers often use the money for personal 
purposes, especially in the case of a yearly payment. On the contrary, cash benefits are directly 
linked to the child and mostly granted to the mother which increases the probability of an 
effective use (see Micklewright, 2003; Bradbury et alii, 2000; Unicef, 2000). 
 
At the outset of our exercise to rank countries according to their score on a synthetic indicator 
representing the generosity of child cash benefits in a given country, note that we focused on 
children who are not disabled nor students above the standard age limit applied in the country. 
We studied the systems for different types of households in order to reflect all possible sources 
of variation in the benefit systems (according to age and number of children and to account for 
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2.4.1. Income variation 
Only Southern European countries are influenced by the level of household income. Portugal 
and Italy both provide lower amounts as income increases. Spanish policy is quite similar: only 
households with income below a fixed ceiling can receive benefits. This ceiling – although 
increasing with the number of children – is so low that only households earning at most half of 
average female earnings qualify for child benefits. They are granted just a mere 24.25 EUR per 
child. It follows that Spain holds a position at the lowest end of the ranking. Greece has adopted 
a flat rate benefit. Moreover, given that almost all employers grant gross wage rises to employed 
married fathers and lone parents, we have treated these wage supplements as taxable cash 
benefits that derive from the presence of children. 
 
 
Table 2.3. Monthly amount of cash benefits per child for working females at 0.5 
AFE (+ 0.5 AME for couples) (in % of the corresponding wage, 2003) 
 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 11 
months 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 6 years 
Lone parent with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 11 months 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 6 years 
Couple with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 3 
children aged 16, 12 
& 6 years 
PT 26.5% AT 19.2% AT 21.8% PT 9.7% AT 7.3% AT 8.3% LUX 9.5% 
AT 18.4% DK 15.1% LUX 17.3% AT 7.0% LUX 6.3% LUX 7.9% AT 9.1% 
DK 16.1% IE 14.5% IE 14.5% GE 6.0% GE 6.0% GE 6.0% BE 6.4% 
IE 14.5% GE 14.1% GE 14.1% LUX 5.8% IE 5.8% IE 5.8% IE 6.2% 
GE 14.1% LUX 13.8% FI 13.9% IE 5.8% SE 4.2% BE 5.0% GE 6.0% 
FI 12.9% FI 12.9% DK 12.6% DK 4.4% FI 4.1% FI 4.6% FR 5.2% 
LUX 12.7% IT 11.9% BE 11.2% SE 4.2% DK 4.0% SE 4.2% FI 5.1% 
IT 11.9% SE 9.6% IT 11.1% FI 4.1% BE 3.8% DK 3.6% SE 4.6% 
SE 9.6% BE 8.4% SE 9.6% UK 3.4% UK 3.4% NL 3.3% IT 4.4% 
UK 8.0% UK 8.0% NL 8.4% BE 3.2% EL 2.9% EL 3.2% EL 3.7% 
BE 7.2% PT 8.0% PT 8.0% EL 2.9% NL 2.9% IT 3.1% NL 3.6% 
NL 6.0% NL 7.2% UK 6.7% IT 2.4% PT 2.6% UK 2.9% DK 3.4% 
EL 5.5% EL 5.5% EL 6.2% NL 2.4% IT 2.4% PT 2.6% PT 3.0% 
ES 3.6% ES 3.6% FR 5.7% ES 0.0% ES 0.0% FR 2.5% UK 2.7% 
FR 0.0% FR 0.0% ES 3.6% FR 0.0% FR 0.0% ES 0.0% ES 0.0% 
Source: own calculations based on MISSOC 2003. 
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Table 2.4. Monthly amount of cash benefits per child for working females at 1 
AFE (+ 1 AME for couples) (in % of the corresponding wage, 2003) 
 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 11 
months 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 6 years 
Lone parent with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 11 months 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 6 years 
Couple with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 3 
children aged 16, 12 
& 6 years 
PT 11.6% AT 9.6% AT 10.9% AT 3.5% AT 3.6% AT 4.1% LUX 4.8% 
AT 9.2% DK 7.6% LUX 8.7% GE 3.0% LUX 3.1% LUX 3.9% AT 4.6% 
DK 8.0% IE 7.2% IE 7.2% LUX 2.9% GE 3.0% GE 3.0% BE 3.2% 
IE 7.2% GE 7.0% GE 7.0% IE 2.9% IE 2.9% IE 2.9% IE 3.1% 
GE 7.0% LUX 6.9% FI 7.0% EL 2.6% EL 2.6% EL 2.8% GE 3.0% 
FI 6.4% FI 6.4% DK 6.3% PT 2.6% SE 2.1% BE 2.5% EL 3.0% 
LUX 6.4% EL 4.9% BE 5.6% DK 2.2% FI 2.1% FI 2.3% FR 2.6% 
EL 4.9% SE 4.8% EL 5.2% SE 2.1% DK 2.0% SE 2.1% FI 2.5% 
SE 4.8% BE 4.2% SE 4.8% FI 2.1% BE 1.9% DK 1.8% SE 2.3% 
UK 4.0% UK 4.0% NL 4.2% UK 1.7% UK 1.7% NL 1.7% NL 1.8% 
BE 3.6% NL 3.6% UK 3.3% BE 1.6% NL 1.4% UK 1.4% DK 1.7% 
NL 3.0% PT 3.1% PT 3.1% NL 1.2% PT 1.0% FR 1.3% UK 1.3% 
IT 1.4% IT 1.4% IT 3.1% ES 0.0% ES 0.0% PT 1.0% PT 1.1% 
ES 0.0% ES 0.0% FR 2.8% FR 0.0% FR 0.0% IT 0.3% IT 0.7% 
FR 0.0% FR 0.0% ES 0.0% IT 0.0% IT 0.0% ES 0.0% ES 0.0% 
Source: own calculations based on MISSOC 2003. 
Note: “AFE” for National Average Female Earnings and “AME” for National Average Male Earnings. 
 
 
Table 2.5. Monthly amount of cash benefits per child for working females at 1.5 
AFE (+ 1.5 AME for couples) (in % of the corresponding wage, 2003) 
 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 11 
months 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 6 years 
Lone parent with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 11 months 
Couple  with 1 child 
aged 6 years 
Couple with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 3 
children aged 16, 12 
& 6 years 
PT 7.7% AT 6.4% AT 7.3% EL 2.5% EL 2.5% AT 2.8% LUX 3.2% 
AT 6.1% DK 5.0% LUX 5.8% AT 2.3% AT 2.4% EL 2.6% AT 3.0% 
DK 5.4% IE 4.8% EL 4.9% GE 2.0% LUX 2.1% LUX 2.6% EL 2.8% 
IE 4.8% GE 4.7% IE 4.8% LUX 1.9% GE 2.0% GE 2.0% BE 2.1% 
GE 4.7% EL 4.7% GE 4.7% IE 1.9% IE 1.9% IE 1.9% IE 2.1% 
EL 4.7% LUX 4.6% FI 4.6% PT 1.7% SE 1.4% BE 1.7% GE 2.0% 
FI 4.3% FI 4.3% DK 4.2% DK 1.5% FI 1.4% FI 1.5% FR 1.7% 
LUX 4.2% SE 3.2% BE 3.7% SE 1.4% DK 1.3% SE 1.4% FI 1.7% 
SE 3.2% BE 2.8% SE 3.2% FI 1.4% BE 1.3% DK 1.2% SE 1.5% 
UK 2.7% UK 2.7% NL 2.8% UK 1.1% UK 1.1% NL 1.1% NL 1.2% 
BE 2.4% NL 2.4% UK 2.2% BE 1.1% NL 1.0% UK 1.0% DK 1.1% 
NL 2.0% PT 2.1% PT 2.1% NL 0.8% PT 0.7% FR 0.8% UK 0.9% 
ES 0.0% ES 0.0% FR 1.9% ES 0.0% ES 0.0% PT 0.7% PT 0.7% 
FR 0.0% FR 0.0% IT 0.7% FR 0.0% FR 0.0% ES 0.0% ES 0.0% 
IT 0.0% IT 0.0% ES 0.0% IT 0.0% IT 0.0% IT 0.0% IT 0.0% 
Source: own calculations based on MISSOC 2003. 
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2.4.2. Lone parent allowances 
i
Supplements for lone parents are explicitly granted only in Denmark and Finland, i.e. an 
additional amount of benefits per household in the former country and per child in the latter one. 
Given that Italy has an income-related system that is based on the number of household 
members, lone parents necessarily receive different amounts of benefit than couples. In Ireland, it 
is possible for lone parents to draw extra money from social assistance although, properly 
speaking, this is not a supplement for lone parents since the main goal of this measure is to 
guarantee a minimum income for families in need. A similar point of view is reflected in the 
French system which guarantees a minimum of 521.52 EUR per lone parent plus 173.54 EUR 
per child. The Single Parent Allowance (API) is paid out if the beneficiary’s income is below this 
threshold and it covers the observed difference between the guaranteed minimum and his/her 
income. 
 
2.4.3. Variation with child’s age 
Some countries have opted to grant a supplement (or lower the amount) according to the child’s 
age (applied either to all children or only to the first qualified child, like in Belgium). A cross-
country comparison is quite difficult because of both the differences in the systems that are in 
place and the reforms that are occurring. For example in France, the age supplement depends on 
the number of children since it is granted for the 1st child but only if there are at least three 
children in the family. In the Netherlands and in Belgium, the amount of child benefits is 
gradually changed according to children’s birth date.  
In order to reflect these differences in the design of systems across the countries considered we 
have focused on four ages that separate the age groups within which all first, second and 
consecutive age-specific adjustments of the amount of child benefits take place in all countries. 
Although most countries that apply variation with age (AT, BE, NL, FR and LUX) raise the 
amount with the age of the child, Denmark and Portugal do the opposite, privileging the 
youngest children. 
 
2.4.4. Combined effect of number and age of children 
The greatest changes in family cash benefits are induced by the number of children, not only 
because of proportionally increasing amounts but also because in most countries, an additional 
child (until or from a certain rank) provides an extra amount of benefit. Our tables show the total 
amount per family, divided by the number of children, and take into account the age supplement 
for those countries that apply it. It can be seen that countries’ rankings change dramatically as the 
number of children (and therefore the age of the eldest) rises. Belgium and Denmark are opposite 
cases as the former sees its rank improved as number and age of children rise while the latter 
drops (due to age variation only). Note also that although France grants benefits only from the 
2nd child onwards, it becomes quite generous from the 3rd child. This special feature of the 
French system was inherited from the past when the key issue was not to encourage women to 
have their first child but rather to provide them with incentives to have three children or more. 
As a result, family allowances in France are conceived so as to cover the cost of children. This 
conception contrasts sharply with what is now being put forward as the main objective of family 
cash support by numerous experts: the fight against child poverty, starting with the first child. 
Moreover, nowadays it has indeed become an important challenge to provide women with 
enough incentives to have at least one or preferably two children. 
 
2.4.5. F nal score for cash benefits 
In order to build a final indicator that summarizes the information for the seven types of families 
we studied, we have weighted these types according to their share in the overall population of 
each country. 
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Table 2.6. shows the final scores. Except for the Southern European countries and especially 
Greece, rankings do not change according to the level of family income given that cash benefits 
are mostly universal. At the top we find Austria and Luxembourg which are very generous for all 
types of families , as are Germany and Ireland, although to a lesser extent (the benefit amount per 
child is lower for larger German families). A second group of fairly generous countries includes 
Belgium and Finland, both of which grant supplements to larger families and Finland also to lone 
parents. Denmark and Sweden follow, with lower amounts quite constants across family types, 
the former giving supplement for lone parent’s families and the latter for larger families. The 
amount granted by the UK is low compared to the average level of earnings in this country. 
France lags behind because benefits are granted only from the second child onwards and become 
very generous only from fourth child onwards. 
 
 
Table 2.6. Final indicator for cash benefits according to 3 income levels (family-
type weighted by country) and overall 
 
Final score 0.5 AFE + 
0.5 AME (population 
weighted) 
Final score 1 AFE + 1 
AME (population weighted)
Final score 1.5 AFE + 
1.5 AME (population 
weighted) 
Final indicator all incomes 
(non income weighted) 
AT 92.6 AT 98.9 AT 96.2 AT 95.9 
LUX 87.0 LUX 91.2 EL 94.6 LUX 89.2 
GE 70.0 GE 74.2 LUX 89.4 GE 72.2 
IE 67.2 IE 69.3 GE 72.5 IE 68.3 
BE 56.3 EL 67.6 IE 68.6 EL 66.4 
FI 54.0 BE 58.4 BE 57.7 BE 57.4 
SE 47.5 FI 56.3 FI 55.5 FI 55.2 
DK 44.6 SE 50.5 SE 49.8 SE 49.3 
PT 41.7 DK 47.5 DK 46.4 DK 46.2 
EL 37.1 NL 38.5 NL 38.0 NL 37.7 
NL 36.6 UK 36.7 UK 35.9 UK 35.3 
IT 35.6 PT 31.5 PT 30.5 PT 34.6 
UK 33.4 FR 26.0 FR 26.0 FR 25.8 
FR 25.4 IT 6.1 IT 0.1 IT 14.0 
ES 0.3 ES 0.0 ES 0.0 ES 0.1 
Source: own calculations based on MISSOC 2003. See appendix for details on the linear scaling technique 
used 
Note: “AFE” for National Average Female Earnings and “AME” for National Average Male Earnings. 
 
The most relevant typologies to compare our results with are those established by Forssén and 
Hakovirta (2000) and Letablier (1998). A comparison of table 2.6. with these typologies shows 
that our results are much more in line with those obtained by Letablier (1998) than with Forssén 
and Hakovirta (2000). A few countries are nevertheless ranked differently and merit some 
attention. France, for example, is ranked at the very top by Letablier whereas we find it scores 
particularly low on the child cash indicator. This is probably due to the penalty that we have 
given to France for not granting any benefits to the first child in the family thus continuing to 
adhere to an outdated conception that women need not be encouraged to have a first child and 
that family allowances serve to cover the cost of children. 
On the contrary, in our ranking, Germany comes out at the top whereas it is ranked in the middle 
by Letablier (1998), probably due to our distinction between cash and tax benefits in this country 
(infra). The German system appears to be generous over the whole line although slightly less for 
larger families. We suspect differences in the methodologies used as well as in the criteria 
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considered to be at the source of the different positions of Germany and the Netherlands in both 
of the rankings, while the positions of Denmark and Sweden remain the same. 
 
 
2.5. Building a child tax benef t indicatori  
 
For some countries, cash benefits are not the only form of financial public support for families 
with children. Even though they do not immediately increase the amount of cash available to 
families and they do not have the same universal character as standard family allowances, we have 
been careful not to neglect tax benefits as part of our analysis of cash transfers to families with 
children. Tax benefits are granted by either one of two means: tax allowances or tax credits. Tax 
allowances allow for deductions to be made from taxable income thus reducing the final amount 
of taxes to be paid. Tax credits directly affect the amount of tax due. They are subtracted after 
gross tax has been assessed. 
 
Tax benefits raise a very important redistributive question. Households not paying taxes because 
they do not have sufficient resources are excluded from any public support the government 
decides to offer through the tax system and as a result, only better-off families take advantage of 
such measures. For example, a tax allowance to cover childcare costs is of no use to parents who 
although active do not pay taxes (or not enough). Such parents cannot or not entirely benefit 
from any government support of this form. On the contrary, refundable tax credits, such as the 
ones implemented in the UK and Belgium, function as negative taxes and do allow to expand 
help to families not liable to pay taxes. Indeed, in this case, if the amount of support offered 
turns out to be greater that the amount of taxes due by the household in question then not only 
are no taxes paid but the tax administration reimburses the difference to this household. The tax 
system is thus effectively used to pass on support to families. Moreover, in the UK, the tax credit 
is paid out monthly at the same time as family allowances.  
Tax benefits in the form of tax allowances raise another problem in terms of fairness, especially 
in France, Spain and Germany. They tend to increase with family income although this is limited 
thanks to the existence of ceilings on support offered. However, this means that the richer the 
family the more help it receives. Such a system based on the questionable principle of horizontal 
fairness – which requires a household’s standard of living to be constant regardless of the 
presence of children – has therefore been the subject of fierce criticism (Atkinson, 1999). The 
French family ratio system (‘quotient familial’) was designed completely in line with this idea that 
the cost of children stricto sensu increases with family income: better-off children receive more 
and more expensive leisure and consumption goods compared to children from less well-off 
families (Ollier, 1999).  
 
Family allowances present a number of clear advantages compared to tax benefits. They are 
direct and simultaneous whereas tax measures necessarily refer to last year’s income and thus can 
only have a lagged effect. Moreover, a system entirely based on family allowances offers a very 
high level of transparency compared to the more complicated nature of mixed systems or those 
transiting by the tax system. It is also important to note that family allowances can be conceived 
as deriving from the child’s own right rather than from that of the surrounding family. Welfare 
states of the Nordic countries hold high the principle of individual rights. Each person is 
individually granted a set of social rights. Moreover, the fact that the child does not depend on its 
parents but is itself entitled to benefits safeguards its rights in case of divorce, shared custody, etc. 
On the contrary, on the old continent, for example in France, the family is considered to be the 
unit opening up the right to public support.  
 
In sum, direct cash allowances seem to be the most appropriate, transparent and just means for 
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the state to financially help families with children.  
 
The tables below present the amounts of tax benefits that are granted to couples with children 
(lone parents) as compared to the amount of tax due by couples without children (singles): a 
positive (negative) amount means that taxes are lower (higher) for a given family type than for a 
couple (or single) without children. We have considered only those tax elements that are likely to 
influence differently all of our family types (see appendix for more details). Again amounts are 
expressed in percentage of the corresponding level of mean gross earnings. 
 
The tax system in the three Northern European countries does not distinguish between different 
types of families. Therefore, the tables below show no tax benefit at any level of income for these 
countries. 
Austria and Ireland make a distinction only between singles and lone parents, whatever the 
number of children, granting a non wastable tax credit of 364 EUR per family for the former and  
a wastable credit of 1520 EUR for the latter. In the Netherlands, there is no distinction between 
couples and singles but for parents, regardless of the number of children they have, a wastable 
(means-tested) credit is granted. The fact that the amount of the benefit does not vary with family 
size clearly presents a disadvantage for larger families. 
 
 
2.5.1. Low earner families 
 
Table 2.7. Monthly amount of tax benefits per child for working females at 0.5 
AFE (+ 0.5 AME for couples) (in % of the corresponding wage, 2003) 
 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 11 
months 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 6 years 
Lone parent with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 11 months 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 6 years 
Couple with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 3 
children aged 16, 12 
& 6 years 
UK 82.7% UK 32.2% UK 22.8% UK 14.2% IT 2.4% IT 2.3% BE 2.6% 
BE 10.1% BE 5.3% BE 5.0% BE 5.7% UK 2.1% BE 1.5% IT 1.9% 
ES 7.4% IT 4.7% IT 2.3% ES 4.2% NL 1.6% UK 1.1% UK 1.3% 
IT 4.7% AT 3.6% AT 1.8% IT 2.4% BE 1.1% ES 0.8% ES 0.8% 
AT 3.6% LUX 1.3% LUX 0.6% NL 1.6% ES 1.0% NL 0.8% NL 0.5% 
LUX 1.3% ES 1.1% ES 0.5% FR 1.3% FR 1.0% FR 0.7% FR 0.5% 
FR 0.6% FR 0.6% FR 0.4% LUX 0.7% LUX 0.7% LUX 0.4% LUX 0.2% 
DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% PT 0.5% PT 0.5% PT 0.2% PT 0.2% 
GE 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% 
EL 0.0% EL 0.0% EL 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% 
IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% EL 0.0% EL 0.0% EL 0.0% EL 0.0% 
NL 0.0% NL 0.0% NL 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% 
PT 0.0% PT 0.0% PT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% 
FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% 
SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2004), Bradshaw and Finch (2002), Inland Revenue (2002) for UK, Ministère 
des Finances (2004) for Belgium, Administration des contributions directes (2004) for Luxembourg, Ministère des 
Finances (2004) for France and  Law 46/2002 of January 18th for Spain. 
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At this level of income, the UK clearly stands out from the other countries because of its 
exceptionally generous child and working tax credits, both of which are refundable. Note that the 
huge advantage for lone parents with very young children stems from the generous child care 
element of the working tax credit. This element amounts to maximum 7126 EUR a year for one 
child if registered forms of child care are used, compared to the similar credit of max. 575 EUR 
in France. 
The tax allowance for young children (care) in Spain and Belgium explains why, at the same 
income level, families with a single child aged 11 months receive a more substantial tax benefit 
than families with one child aged 6. Note, however, that this child care allowance is highly 
regressive: it increases with income (infra). 
Table 2.7. also shows that most countries do not grant any tax benefits at this low level of 
income. Families in Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal do not earn enough to benefit 
from the wastable child tax credits applied in those countries. 
In Germany the explanation is different : the 154 EUR cash benefit per child is the only benefit 
granted to families with children, at least up to a certain level of income. In fact, in the German 
system a trade-off continuously takes place between this cash benefit (formally it is a tax credit) 
and a tax allowance which is computed according to the number of children and parents’ marital 
status. Both types of support are confronted and the most advantageous is retained and offered 
to the family in question. As already mentioned, up until a very high level of income, the cash 
benefit always wins the plead. However, at a certain income threshold the reduction in payable 
taxes due to the tax allowance becomes greater than the 154 EUR cash benefit. As soon as this 
becomes the case, parents can choose to trade in their cash benefits for this new form of 
support, a tax allowance that reduces their taxable income. Keep to mind that this concerns only 
the richest families though, in all other cases the standard cash benefit remains the most 
generous option. Only couples in which both partners earn 1.5 times the corresponding average 
wage begin to reach the point where it becomes genuinely interesting to trade in their cash 
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2.5.2. Average earner families 
 
Table 2.8. Monthly amount of tax benefits per child for working females at 1 AFE 
(+ 1 AME for couples) (in % of the corresponding wage, 2003) 
 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 11 
months 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 6 years 
Lone parent with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 11 months 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 6 years 
Couple with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 3 
children aged 16, 12 
& 6 years 
UK 22.9% LUX 8.9% LUX 4.4% ES 4.4% FR 1.5% FR 1.4% FR 1.7% 
ES 13.5% IE 7.8% IE 3.9% BE 3.4% LUX 1.3% LUX 1.3% BE 1.3% 
LUX 8.9% ES 5.3% ES 3.8% FR 2.6% IT 1.2% IT 1.2% LUX 1.3% 
IE 7.8% FR 3.1% FR 2.6% UK 2.0% UK 1.0% ES 0.9% IT 1.2% 
BE 7.2% BE 2.7% IT 2.6% LUX 1.3% ES 0.9% BE 0.7% ES 1.1% 
FR 5.5% PT 2.6% BE 2.5% IT 1.2% PT 0.7% PT 0.7% PT 0.7% 
PT 2.6% IT 2.6% PT 2.2% PT 0.7% NL 0.7% UK 0.5% EL 0.4% 
IT 2.6% UK 2.5% UK 2.1% NL 0.7% BE 0.5% NL 0.4% UK 0.3% 
AT 1.8% AT 1.8% AT 0.9% EL 0.3% EL 0.3% EL 0.3% NL 0.2% 
NL 0.9% NL 0.9% NL 0.5% GE 0.1% GE 0.1% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% 
DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% 
GE 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% 
EL 0.0% EL 0.0% EL 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% 
FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% 
SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2004), Bradshaw and Finch (2002), Inland Revenue (2002) for UK, Ministère 
des Finances (2004) for Belgium, Administration des contributions directes (2004) for Luxembourg, Ministère des 
Finances (2004) for France and  Law 46/2002 of January 18th for Spain. 
Note: “AFE” for National Average Female Earnings and “AME” for National Average Male Earnings. 
 
 
This average income level falls within the brackets within which the UK’s child tax credit no 
longer varies with income or remains constant (family element). As a result, without the child 
element of the tax credit which is paid according to the number of children and the family 
supplement paid in case there is a child under 1 year of age and in the absence of extra 
advantages for lone parents, the UK’s system for couples is no longer the most generous (also 
because the number of children is no longer taken into account). Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, 
France and especially Luxembourg (despite its relatively higher level of average earnings) turn out 
to offer substantial support to couples with children and lone parents. Austria, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Luxembourg grant an equal amount for lone parents with one or two children. With 
a system mostly based on tax allowances, Spain and France become very generous as the income 
increases (and number of children), while Italy and the UK whose system is based on means-
tested tax credits follow the opposite trend, although in our range of earnings, Italy keeps its 
generous position (maximum credit threshold based on individual income as opposed to UK, 
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2.5.3. H gher earner families i
 
Table 2.9. Monthly amount of tax benefits per child for working females at 1.5 
AFE (+ 1.5 AME for couples) (in % of the corresponding wage, 2003) 
 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 11 
months 
Lone parent with 1 
child aged 6 years 
Lone parent with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 1 child 
aged 11 months 
Couple  with 1 child 
aged 6 years 
Couple with 2 
children aged 12 & 
6 years 
Couple with 3 
children aged 16, 12 
& 6 years 
ES 10.2% LUX 5.8% LUX 3.8% ES 3.5% FR 1.7% FR 1.7% EL 2.1% 
LUX 5.8% IE 5.2% ES 2.8% FR 2.4% LUX 0.9% LUX 0.9% FR 1.9% 
IE 5.2% ES 4.0% FR 2.8% BE 2.3% IT 0.8% IT 0.8% BE 0.9% 
FR 5.1% FR 3.5% IE 2.6% LUX 0.9% ES 0.7% ES 0.7% LUX 0.9% 
BE 4.8% BE 1.8% IT 1.7% IT 0.8% GE 0.6% GE 0.5% ES 0.9% 
UK 3.4% PT 1.8% BE 1.7% GE 0.6% PT 0.5% BE 0.5% IT 0.8% 
PT 1.8% IT 1.7% PT 1.5% PT 0.5% NL 0.5% PT 0.5% PT 0.5% 
IT 1.7% UK 1.7% UK 0.8% NL 0.5% BE 0.4% NL 0.2% GE 0.5% 
AT 1.2% AT 1.2% AT 0.6% EL 0.1% EL 0.1% EL 0.1% NL 0.2% 
NL 0.6% NL 0.6% NL 0.3% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% 
DK 0.0% DK 0.0% DK 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% 
GE 0.0% GE 0.0% GE 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% AT 0.0% 
FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% FI 0.0% 
SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% SE 0.0% 
EL -1.1% EL -1.1% EL -1.2% UK 0.0% UK 0.0% UK 0.0% UK 0.0% 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2004), Bradshaw and Finch (2002), Inland Revenue (2002) for UK, Ministère 
des Finances (2004) for Belgium, Administration des contributions directes (2004) for Luxembourg, Ministère des 
Finances (2004) for France and  Law 46/2002 of January 18th for Spain. 
Note: “AFE” for National Average Female Earnings and “AME” for National Average Male Earnings. 
 
 
Nothing has changed in the amount of the benefits as compared to the previous level for a 
certain number of countries, whose credits have reached their full effect (LUX, NL, BE, AT, PT). 
Italy is in the same situation but only because this level of income is under the first threshold  
after which credit is reduced. France and Spain keep their rising of benefits while German 
couples start to benefit from the tax allowance for children. British couples do no longer benefit 
from the child credit and lone parents in this country have reached the family element floor of 
this same credit. Finally, Greece stands out as very atypical at this level (in fact, already at the 
previous level) : while the effect of the taxation of the benefits granted by employers to heads of 
family is negative for singles with one or two children, despite the tax exemption applied to their 
income (the same holding for couples with less than three children but still around zero), couples 
with at least three children greatly benefit from the tax exemption applied individually on earned 
incomes which is much higher than for 2 children (see Appendix table A.2.8). 
 
The final scores in Table 2.10. (column 4) show a relatively clear picture: only a few countries rely 
on the tax system to support families with children (the UK, BE, IT, FR, ES and to a lesser 
extent, LUX). The UK, Italy and Belgium by far outnumber the other countries as far as families 
at lower income levels are concerned but they have to clear way to other countries like Spain, 
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Table 2.10. Final indicator for tax benefits, in general and according to 3 income 
levels (family-type weighted by country)  
 
Final score 0.5 AFE + 
0.5 AME (population 
weighted) 
Final score 1 AFE + 1 
AME (population weighted)
Final score 1.5 AFE + 
1.5 AME (population 
weighted) 
Final indicator all incomes 
(non income weighted) 
Final indicator all incomes 
+ regressivity index (non 
income weighted) 
IT 75.4 FR 89.0 FR 90.3 FR 67.9 IT 63.8 
UK 69.4 LUX 75.3 ES 53.9 IT 60.6 BE 58.3 
BE 65.4 ES 71.7 LUX 45.7 BE 54.0 FR 52.1 
ES 35.1 IT 66.5 IT 39.9 ES 53.6 UK 52.0 
NL 28.7 BE 58.7 BE 37.8 LUX 45.1 ES 49.5 
FR 24.3 PT 44.4 GE 26.4 UK 38.7 LUX 39.0 
LUX 14.4 UK 39.9 PT 26.3 PT 26.6 NL 29.7 
PT 9.1 NL 22.3 EL 22.8 NL 22.1 PT 27.2 
AT 0.6 EL 18.1 NL 15.3 EL 13.6 EL 15.7 
DK 0.0 IE 5.1 UK 6.8 GE 9.1 IE 12.8 
GE 0.0 AT 1.3 IE 5.2 IE 3.4 GE 11.3 
EL 0.0 GE 0.8 SE 3.9 AT 1.4 FI 9.7 
IE 0.0 DK 0.0 AT 2.4 SE 1.3 SE 9.2 
FI 0.0 FI 0.0 FI 1.6 FI 0.5 DK 9.0 
SE 0.0 SE 0.0 DK 1.0 DK 0.3 AT 8.6 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2004), Bradshaw and Finch (2002), Inland Revenue (2002) for UK, Ministère 
des Finances (2004) for Belgium, Administration des contributions directes (2004) for Luxembourg, Ministère des 
Finances (2004) for France and  Law 46/2002 of January 18th for Spain. See appendix for details on the linear scaling 
technique used. 
Note: “AFE” for National Average Female Earnings and “AME” for National Average Male Earnings. 
 
However, the main problem with our aggregated indicator in column four is that it does not 
account for the strong degree of regressivity that is built into the tax systems of some countries 
(mostly Spain and France but also Germany) given that it is a simple average over all income 
levels (first three columns). Therefore, we have built a second indicator that does take into 
consideration the regressive character of the system in those countries that rely on tax allowances 
or wastable tax credits. The UK comes out at the top of this new ranking while France and 
Luxembourg, due to their tax allowances for lone parents, move slightly downwards. At the 
opposite end of the ranking, countries like Austria, Ireland and Nordic countries, given that they 
do not distinguish between income levels, obtain improved scores.  
 
Again we think it is most appropriate to compare our results with those obtained by Letablier 
(1998). As regards the continental European countries, both typologies are exactly the same. On 
the contrary, the Scandinavian countries as well as Germany are better ranked in Letablier’s study. 
This is probably due to the fact that we specifically looked at the difference in tax benefits 
between families with and without children and that neither Denmark nor Sweden apply tax 
advantages related to parenthood. As regards Germany, our indicator has penalized the high rate 
of regressivity of its child tax benefits which are far more advantageous for richer families. 
Finally, the sharpest contrast between our typology and Letablier’s concerns Spain and Italy, 
ranked at the very bottom by Letablier, while we find Italy to come in third and Spain fifth. Italy’s 
high rank is due to its particular generosity towards low-earners. Spain on the other hand, 
implements extremely generous tax benefits all along but is somewhat penalized because of the 
regressivity of its system. In order to get a clearer picture of the joint impact of cash and tax 
benefits, and knowing that amounts of cash benefits are generally higher than tax relief in most 
countries, we should compare Letablier’s typology to the one that results from a combination of 
our tax and cash indices. 
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2.5.4. Combined indicator of cash and tax benefits 
 
Table 2.11. Final indicator for cash and tax benefits, in general and according to 3 
income levels (family-type weighted by country)  
 
Final score 0.5 AFE + 
0.5 AME (population 
weighted) 
Final score 1 AFE + 1 
AME (population weighted)
Final score 1.5 AFE + 
1.5 AME (population 
weighted) 
Final indicator all incomes 
(non income weighted) 
Final indicator all incomes 
+ regressivity index (non 
income weighted) 
LUX 84.0 LUX 95.6 LUX 91.3 LUX 90.3 LUX 80.3 
AT 81.3 AT 70.5 EL 78.2 AT 73.3 AT 67.1 
BE 71.8 BE 60.6 AT 68.0 BE 62.9 BE 64.0 
UK 61.8 EL 48.1 GE 61.6 GE 56.1 GE 50.6 
GE 59.6 GE 46.9 FR 59.9 EL 51.4 IE 47.6 
IE 59.0 IE 45.9 BE 56.2 IE 48.7 EL 47.2 
IT 51.4 FR 39.7 IE 41.3 FR 41.9 UK 43.3 
FI 44.3 UK 32.2 FI 26.5 UK 35.2 FR 36.6 
NL 37.5 FI 29.6 SE 21.3 FI 33.5 FI 34.0 
SE 36.7 PT 23.2 PT 20.7 SE 27.0 NL 30.3 
DK 33.7 SE 22.9 ES 19.9 NL 26.5 IT 28.4 
PT 30.9 NL 22.2 NL 19.9 PT 24.9 SE 27.8 
EL 27.9 DK 21.0 DK 18.8 DK 24.5 DK 26.0 
FR 26.1 ES 16.5 UK 11.7 IT 20.9 PT 25.5 
ES 3.8 IT 9.5 IT 1.7 ES 13.4 ES 16.8 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2004), Bradshaw and Finch (2002), Inland Revenue (2002) for UK, Ministère 
des Finances (2004) for Belgium, Administration des contributions directes (2004) for Luxembourg, Ministère des 
Finances (2004) for France and  Law 46/2002 of January 18th for Spain. See appendix for details on the linear scaling 
technique used. 
Note: “AFE” for National Average Female Earnings and “AME” for National Average Male Earnings. 
 
 
A combined comparison of tax and cash benefit systems across the EU-15 allows us to confront 
countries as to their financial generosity towards families with children, keeping to mind that 
both systems have different advantages and drawbacks, as discussed above. It follows that the 
result of this assimilation should be interpreted with great caution (for example, by adding both 
indicators we obtain a total amount which ignores the time lag which necessarily affects most tax 
benefits). A final indicator accounting for all family types at different income levels has been 
computed in the exact same way, based on total monthly amounts of benefits (cash + tax) paid 
out in the different countries. 
Three countries lead the overall ranking (fifth column), Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium, all of 
which offer very generous cash benefits or tax reductions (child care relief or support specifically 
targeting lone parents). The UK, Germany, Ireland and Greece form part of a second group, the 
UK offering extremely generous tax cuts to low and average earners (and lone parents) while the 
other three focus more on cash benefits. Note that France is penalized since it does not grant 
cash benefits to families with only one child. Southern European countries except for Greece 
systematically hold positions at the bottom end of the ranking. And as far as low income families 
are concerned, France scores no better. Italy on the other hand turns out to be much more 
generous at their account thanks to the means-tested cash benefits. Finally, Northern European 
countries do not score particularly well, neither do the Netherlands, because of the absence of tax 
relief and the lower average benefit amount compared to the relatively high level of average 
earnings (especially Denmark and Sweden). 
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2.6. Building a maternity leave indicator 
 












AT 0 IT 21.7 GE 100% FI 18 EL 100% 
FI 0 DK 18 ES 100% FR 14 ES 100% 
IT 0 IE 18 FR 100% BE 10 FR 100% 
NL 0 UK 18 LUX 100% DK 10 LUX 100% 
UK 0 SE 18 NL 100% SE 10 NL 100% 
DK 21 FI 17.5 AT 100% PT 5 PT 100% 
GE 84 PT 17.1 PT 100% ES 2 FI 100% 
ES 180 EL 17 IT 80% LUX 2 BE 87% 
BE 182.5 ES 16 SE 80% NL 2 SE 80% 
LUX 182.5 FR 16 BE 77% EL 1 DK 51% 
PT 182.5 LUX 16 IE 70% GE 0 GE 0% 
SE 182.5 NL 16 FI 66% IE 0 IE 0% 
EL 200 AT 16 DK 62% IT 0 IT 0% 
IE 273 BE 15 EL 50% AT 0 AT 0% 
FR 304 GE 14 UK1 43% UK 0 UK 0% 
Note: In the UK, women who have been employed for one year by the same employer are entitled to twenty-
nine weeks, compensated at 90% of their earnings for six weeks and at a flat-rate for a further twelve weeks 
(Moss and Deven, 1999). 
Source: See Appendix Table A.2.4. 
Key to read the table: In Belgium, in 2003, maternity leave lasts for fifteen weeks during which wage is replaced 
at 77% on average; there is a ten-day paternity leave paid at 87% of fathers’ wages.  
 
 
We have compared different regulatory settings for maternity leave according to three basic 
criteria. The first is the implementation of a qualification period and its length. Indeed, the right 
to maternity leave (mostly payment) is in some countries made conditional upon a former period 
of employment or payment of social contributions. The longer this period, the more limited the 
access to maternity leave. Therefore, countries such as France, Ireland, and Greece score very 
badly on this indicator. The length of the leave is necessarily equal or above 14 weeks, the 
minimum period required by the EC. A leave of this length (total period before and after birth) is 
believed to be necessary in medical terms to allow women to recover fully (physically and 
mentally) after having given birth. The table shows that maternity leave is longest in Italy. All 
EU-15 member states but Germany offer a longer leave than that set forward by the EC. The 
length of the maternity leave reflects different views as to the benefits and drawbacks of 
children’s early socialization although parental leave provisions are even more appropriate signals 
of these ideas (infra). From our point of view in which women’s labor market position is of 
utmost importance, we are not in favor of extending the maternity leave beyond the period that is 
actually needed from a medical perspective. Such a practice obscures the difference between 
maternity and parental leave which we believe is crucial. Therefore, we have chosen to neglect the 
leave that exceeds 18 weeks6. Note that only Italy is concerned given its very long maternity leave. 
As far as this maximum period is concerned, our indicator accounts for the wage replacement 
rate that is applied during this period. The wage replacement rate of the maternity leave is 
                                                 
6 Note that for Sweden, there is no paid post-natal maternity leave because it is integrated in the general parental leave 
scheme. However since we must take into account that Swedish working women are protected during this period and 
receive a wage replacement rate of 80%, we have considered 18 weeks of paid leave as the duration of maternity leave so 
that comparisons with the other countries are made possible. See infra for more details and a discussion of the 
disadvantages inherent to an integrated system as the Swedish one. 
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important to assess the quality of the different countries’ systems. This rate is quite high in most 
countries, except in the UK and Greece where it reaches only around 50%. In Denmark, 
maternity leaves are compensated at the full rate unemployment insurance benefit as is the case 
for parental leave. This corresponds to 60% of average previous female earnings. The length of 
the leave as well as the replacement rate have been combined to obtain a new indicator that 
expresses the 18-week maternity leave in an equivalent number of working days that are fully 
paid. Similarly, information regarding the length of the paternity leave and the wage replacement 
rate were combined to obtain the equivalent of the leave in fully paid working days (Table 2.12.). 
For fathers, only a few countries offer real paternity leaves,  between five days in Portugal and 
eighteen working days in Finland, the famous “father’s month”. In Finland despite full wage 
replacement only 64% eligible fathers took paternity leave in 1998. The reason for this is that the 
Finish paternity leave is conceived more like a parental leave discouraging many fathers by its 
length (one month). During the first year following its implementation, 59% of eligible men in 
France used their right to an eleven-day paternity leave . It is reasonable to believe that this 
percentage will rise in time. In Denmark, the low compensation explains why only 58% of eligible 
men took paternity leave (1998) while in Sweden with its more generous system, 75% took leave 
in 2002 (cfr. Appendix table A.2.6 for details).  
The scores on the indicators that measure the equivalent of both leaves in number of fully paid 
days differ noticeably across the countries. Denmark, the UK, and Finland fall in the new ranking 
due to the relatively low wage replacement rate during maternity leave. 
 
 
Table 2.13. Equivalent fully paid maternity/paternity leave and ranking of 
countries  
 
Maternity leave fully 
paid working days 
Paternity leave fully 
paid working days 
Final score for maternity 
leave 
Final score for paternity 
leave 
Final score for birth 
leaves 
86 FI 18 NL 92.21 FI 100.00 FR 80.84 
80 FR 14 AT 92.21 FR 77.78 FI 78.10 
80 BE 9 IT 80.87 BE 48.56 PT 73.87 
The construction of this equivalent fully paid period has paved the way for a ranking of countries 
with respect to each leave as well as for a final classification based on countries’ generosity in the  
combined domains of maternity and paternity leaves. Finland and France stand out quite clearly 
from the other countries while Ireland, the UK, and Greece share particularly low ranks which 
result, at least for the latter two countries, from the absence of a paternity leave and the low level 




LUX 80 SE 8 PT 79.99 SE 44.44 NL 70.96 
NL 80 PT 5 ES 72.47 PT 27.78 AT 66.53 
AT 80 DK 5 LUX 72.20 DK 26.97 SE 63.73 
IT 72 ES 2 GE 68.83 ES 11.11 ES 61.09 
SE 72 LUX 2 SE 60.86 LUX 11.11 LUX 60.95 
GE 70 NL 2 FI 60.69 NL 11.11 IT 56.93 
IE 63 EL 1 FR 58.87 EL 5.56 GE 49.93 
BE 58 GE 0 DK 52.47 GE 0.00 BE 49.78 
FI 58 IE 0 BE 40.70 IE 0.00 DK 43.87 
DK 54 IT 0 IE 38.19 IT 0.00 IE 31.17 
EL 43 AT 0 UK 33.33 AT 0.00 UK 16.67 
UK 39 UK 0 EL 17.15 UK 0.00 EL 12.72 
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Although there is no appropriate typology to compare our results with, our ranking based on the 
generosity of the different countries’ birth leave systems does suggest to question the widespread 
conception that the Nordic countries should serve as examples for good care leave policies. 
Indeed,  in terms of maternity leave or equivalent leave around birth, they offer replacement rates 
that are below 100%, provided by many of the other EU-15. They seem to emphasize their 
support either on longer leave (parental leave, infra) or on child care facilities (most developed 
with France and Belgium).  
 
 
2.7. Taking into consideration parental leave? 
 
Parental leave is characterized by a gender bias that strengthens the traditional role models of 
mothers and fathers (Fagnani and Letablier, 2003; Périvier, 2003). In general, different factors 
may help to explain this finding. First, in some countries, traditional family norms are still more 
binding than in others. Second, full-time employment often remains a male virtue. Third, 
employers of typically male-dominated industry branches are likely to be less in favour of an 
employee taking parental leave than employers in typically female-dominated sectors. For 
example, in Denmark and in France, of all men taking up parental leaves the majority are 
employed in typically female sectors of activity (Meilland, 2001, Boyer and Renouard, 2003). 
Economic reasons also play a role, more precisely with respect to the amount of the parental 
leave allowance. Moreover, within a couple, it is most often the woman who is the least well paid 
and thus intra-household financial motivations generally go at the expense of women’s level of 
activity. Such financial motivations are of course less powerful when parental leaves are wage-
related such as in Sweden, Finland, and Italy. A wage-related payment allows alleviating the effect 
of the wage differential between men and women on the decision of who is to take the parental 
leave. Moreover, amounts differ substantially across those countries that apply lump-sum 
payments (they are four times as high in Luxembourg compared to Austria). In France, fathers 
who benefit from the child-raising allowance (APE) most often form part of atypical couples in 
which the female has the highest earnings. Moreover, their unemployment rate is three times as 
high as that of other men (Boyer and Renouard, 2003). The more women interrupt their 
professional career the more their wages and the quality of jobs to which they have access 
deteriorate (Pylkänen and Smith, 2003, Stoiber, 1990). This is a vicious circle reinforcing families’ 
choice to let the woman take the leave which again enhances her unequal treatment in the labour 
market (Périvier, 2004a). Part of the gender wage gap (17% in Denmark (Meilland, 2001) ; 27% in 
France (Meurs and Ponthieux, 2000), 14% in the United Kingdom (Chambaz, 2003)) can be 
explained by the more frequent career interruptions of women in the form of parental leave 
(Pylkänen and Smith, 2003). Leave-taking is anticipated by employers and makes them more 
reluctant to hire women (at least for some types of jobs as Fagnani (1999) shows for 
supermarkets in France and Germany and de Henau and Meulders (2003) for university 
researchers across Europe). 
There is only one way to alleviate the negative effect of parental leave on mothers’ employment’  
and that is by having fathers take this leave more frequently and for a longer period than they 
currently do. Although we have not included Norway in our study, the father quota, introduced 
in 1993, pushed fathers’ leave taking rate up from 3% to 70% in 1995. This measure consists in 
four additional weeks of parental leave for fathers. In case they do not take this leave, the total 
parental leave period is reduced by one month (Bruning et Plantenga, 1999). The overall length 
of such periods of inactivity should be reduced and systematically combined with training courses 
that enhance the re-entry of beneficiaries in the labour market.  In all other cases, parental leave is 
inevitably bound to reduce workers’ employability (Périvier, 2004b). Moreover, leaves risk having 
a reputation effect on the whole of the female population in general: employers possibly take into 
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account the high probability that young women (vs. young men) will go on parental leave 
(Fagnani, 1996; Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman, 2001; Eiro, 2001b). De facto, they might 
consider women to constitute a less stable work force than men which is very likely to be 
reflected in their wages.  
From the above discussion it should be clear that parental leave is, to say the least, a very 
ambiguous form of public support. Compared to its goal of facilitating the conciliation of work 
and family life, we suspect that its price in terms of professional segregation and gender inequality 
is one that is too high to pay. As a result, we have preferred to objectively present the way 
parental leave schemes are organized throughout the EU-15 and have not attempted to evaluate 
and compare the countries in order to build a classification. 
 
The length of the parental leave substantially differs across countries: from the minimum period 
required by the EC directive of three months per parent (Belgium, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands) to a very long leave until the child reaches the age of three (France, Germany, 
Spain, Austria, and Finland).  
More important than the absolute length of parental leave available to parents is the period 
during which they receive wage compensation. Relative to total leave duration, table 2.13. shows 
that in some countries the whole leave is paid (Belgium, France , Austria, Finland, and 
Luxembourg) whereas in others it is completely unpaid (Greece, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and the UK). In the Netherlands, leave indemnification is to be negotiated with the employer. 
For example, in the public sector, parental leave beneficiaries receive 75% of their wages (NIDI, 
2003). However, in the private sector, only few collective agreements (6% in 2000) include 
payment of the parental leave (replacement rate up to 30%). Parental leave is compensated either 
by means of a lump-sum payment (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and 
Austria) or proportionally to parents’ wages (30% in Italy compared to 66% in Finland and 80% 
in Sweden). Moreover, the latter two countries offer a flat-rate payment during the last part of the 
leave (ninety days in Sweden and more than two years in Finland) (Math and Meilland, 2004).  
Whether or not parental leave is paid, women’s attachment to the labour market greatly depends 
on the existence of job protection during the leave. The European Directive requires that a job 
guarantee be offered, that is the right to return to the same or an equivalent job. In Spain, job 
protection covers only the first year of parental leave, and in the Netherlands, an employment 
guarantee is included only in some collective agreements, especially in the social services sector. 
In the other countries, the whole leave is protected. However, the same cannot be said for 
pension and seniority rights: France and Austria offer guarantees only for half of the leave while 
in Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK these rights are not legally safeguarded but left to the 
discretion of the employer. In Greece, pension and seniority rights are suspended unless the 
employee bears the total sum of social contributions due (employer’s and employee’s).
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Table 2.14a. Features of parental leave schemes throughout the EU-15 
 
total leave duration 
(months) 
job-protected period 
(% of total leave) 
Seniority-protected  
period (% of total leave)
paid period (% of 
total leave) 
father period  
(months) 
transferable months min. leave to be taken 
up as a % of usual 
working time 
child age limit (years)
FI               36 BE 100% BE 100% BE 100% IT 7 BE 0 DK 8% DK 9
GE                36 DK 100% DK 100% FR 100% LUX 6 EL 0 IE 10% GE 8
FR               36 GE 100% GE 100% LUX 100% AT 6 IE 0 NL 10% IT 8
AT                36 EL 100% IT 100% AT 100% UK 4.15 IT 0 SE 13% NL 8
ES                36 FR 100% LUX 100% FI 100% EL 3.5 LUX 0 FI 15% SE 8
SE                18 IE 100% PT 100% SE 79% IE 3.23 NL 0 BE 20% PT 6
LUX                12 IT 100% FI 100% DK 70% BE 3 PT 0 FR 20% IE 5
IT                11 LUX 100% SE 100% GE 67% NL 3 UK 0 UK 20% LUX 5
DK                10.6 AT 100% FR 50% IT 55% PT 3 DK 10.6 GE 25% UK 5
UK                8.3 PT 100% AT 50% PT 8% SE 2 SE 11.8 IT 25% BE 4
EL                7 FI 100% ES 33% EL 0% DK 0 AT 24 ES 33% EL 3.5
IE                6.5 SE 100% EL 0% ES 0% GE 0 FI 36 PT 33% ES 3
BE                6 UK 100% IE 0% IE 0% ES 0 GE 36 LUX 50% FR 3
NL                6 ES 33% NL 0% NL 0% FR 0 FR 36 AT 50% AT 3
PT                6 NL 0% UK 0% UK 0% FI 0 ES 36 EL 100% FI 3
Source: see Appendix table A.2.5 
Key to read the table: In Belgium in 2003, the total period of parental leave available for both parents is six months. The whole leave is paid, and the job is protected safeguarding 
parents’ future return to their post. Moreover, pension and seniority rights are safeguarded as opposed to the Netherlands, for example, where they are suspended. Leave has to be 
taken before the child reaches the age of four. Leave does not need to be taken at a full-time rate but can be taken by reducing working hours by 1/5 in which case total leave covers 
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Table 2.14b. Wage replacement rates during parental leave, by sex 
 
Average male replacement 
rate during 1st month 
Average female replacement 
rate during 1st month 
Average male replacement 
rate during paid father 
period 
Average female replacement 
rate during mother and/or 
transferable periods 
SE 80.0% SE 80.0% SE 80.0% LUX 62.5% 
PT 75.0% FI 66.0% LUX 52.0% SE 53.2% 
FI 66.0% LUX 62.5% IT 30.0% DK 41.4% 
LUX 52.0% DK 59.5% PT 23.1% BE 27.0% 
DK 48.5% IT 30.0% BE 22.1% AT 25.6% 
IT 30.0% BE 27.0% DK 0.0% FR 25.6% 
BE 22.1% AT 25.6% GE 0.0% FI 22.5% 
FR 20.6% FR 25.6% EL 0.0% GE 9.1% 
AT 15.6% GE 13.7% ES 0.0% EL 0.0% 
GE 10.3% EL 0.0% FR 0.0% ES 0.0% 
EL 0.0% ES 0.0% IE 0.0% IE 0.0% 
ES 0.0% IE 0.0% NL 0.0% IT 0.0% 
IE 0.0% NL 0.0% AT 0.0% NL 0.0% 
NL 0.0% PT 0.0% FI 0.0% PT 0.0% 
UK 0.0% UK 0.0% UK 0.0% UK 0.0% 
Source: own calculations and Appendix table A.2.5 
Key to read the table: In Belgium in 2003, the lump sum paid to parents in leave corresponds to 22.1% 
of  male average earnings and 27% of female average earnings during the first month. Note that this 
amount is maintained during the whole period which is not the case for Sweden, Portugal (for fathers) 
and Finland. 
 
With regard to qualification conditions, some parental leave schemes impose employment and 
seniority conditions, mainly one year of work most often with the same employer (Belgium, 
Greece, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK).  
The right to parental leave can be more or less flexible. In France, Spain, Austria, and Finland, 
parental leave policies are targeted at parents of young children (up to three years old). Leave 
thus needs to be taken immediately following childbirth. In Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Germany, it can be taken more freely before the child reaches the age of eight.  
The degree of flexibility is also translated in the possibility of dividing the leave in time. Most 
leaves are fractionable but to very different degrees. For example, in France, leave has to be 
taken in periods of at least one year while in Sweden, the UK and, Ireland, taking leave by the 
day is even possible (although the employer needs to agree in the latter two countries). In 
Germany, if only one year is taken instead of two or three, the monthly lump-sum payment of 
the leave is higher (by around 50%), which is quite an incentive for parents to opt for a shorter 
leave. 
In all countries but Greece, leave can be taken on a part-time basis with a proportional 
extension of its duration except for Austria and France where leave is bounded by a low child 
age limit. This part-time leave taking possibility exists in order to avoid parents becoming 
totally disconnected from the labor market. Nevertheless, the extent of flexibility varies greatly 
across countries. In Luxembourg, there is only the possibility of taking half-time leave, and 
this in one draw, and in Austria, the protective measures implemented through parental leave 
legislation (dismissal, etc.) do not extend to part-time work/leave. On the contrary, countries 
such as Sweden, Ireland, and the UK, and also Denmark, provide a very flexible system of 
working hours and leave arrangements allowing for half days to be taken or for a proportional 
reduction of working hours on all working days (Sweden), sometimes in agreement with the 
employer. In Denmark, parental leave could initially be taken on a part-time basis only in order 
to ensure that parents continuously stayed in touch with the labor market. In 1997, this 
measure was revised and hence it is possible to take three months of full-time leave provided 
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the employer agrees (Bruning et Plantenga, 1999). 
 
Recalling the country ranking we obtained after having analyzed birth leave systems, we find 
that France and Finland, two countries that scored excellently on the birth leave indicator, 
perform very badly in terms of parental leave because it is too long and poorly paid and as 
such a real employment trap. On the contrary, Denmark and Sweden come out as leaders in 
terms of parental leave although they held worse positions in the birth leave ranking. Indeed, 
parental leave policies are an important policy component in Denmark and Sweden. A 
generously paid and attractive leave scheme is offered during the first year of life of children 
after which the system of well-organized public child care takes over. However, we cannot 
stress enough that no matter how attractive the parental leave may be, it entails important 
career consequences because of mothers’ complete drop-out from the labor market during the 
first year following childbirth. This finding invites a serious reflection on conceptual 
frameworks in which the Nordic countries are treated as a homogeneous group and advanced 





Table 2.15. Final rankings of countries in the three fields of child policy 
 
Index of child care Index of birth leaves Index of cash and tax 
benefits 
DK 91.06 FR 80.84 LUX 80.3 
SE 69.09 FI 78.10 AT 67.1 
FI 46.34 PT 73.87 BE 64.0 
FR 45.50 NL 70.96 GE 50.6 
IT 37.56 AT 66.53 IE 47.6 
BE 36.94 SE 63.73 EL 47.2 
ES 61.09 UK 43.3 
AT 33.38 LUX 60.95 FR 36.6 
GE 30.01 IT 56.93 FI 34.0 
NL 27.97 GE 49.93 NL 30.3 
UK 24.31 BE 49.78 IT 28.4 
PT 22.13 DK 43.87 SE 27.8 
ES 16.39 IE 31.17 DK 26.0 
EL 14.03 UK 16.67 PT 25.5 
IE 6.84 EL 12.72 ES 16.8 
LUX 36.67 
Source: see Appendix for calculations. 
 
The country classification derived from the childcare indicator presents many similarities with 
some of the welfare state typologies, in particular those established by Gornick, Meyers and 
Ross (1997) and Letablier (1998). The same cannot systematically be said about the rankings 
based on our other indicators. 
While the Nordic countries are characterized by public childcare arrangements of the highest 
quality, in particular Denmark and Sweden, they drop to the middle of the ranking when the 
generosity of their system of cash benefits is considered and to the very bottom even when tax 
benefits are analyzed. These countries have clearly chosen to support working families with 
children by means of an individualized tax system and a major emphasis on public services. As 
regards maternity and paternity leaves, the three Nordic countries do not share a common 
behavior: Finland comes out second, Sweden in sixth position and Denmark twelfth. They are 
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all characterised by very developed systems of parental leave of around one year and paid at 
more than 50% of previous wage. However, at the same time they remain very gender-biased 
and generate negative effects on future earnings and gender segregation. 
The relative positions of France and Belgium, two countries that are also included in the top 
group in the ranking of Gornick, Meyers and Ross and in our child care indicator, follow 
different paths as far as the other dimensions are concerned. Belgium is respectively ranked 
sixth, sixth, second and eleventh on the childcare, cash benefit, tax benefit and maternity leave 
indicators. France is ranked fourth above Belgium in the childcare classification and especially 
first in the birth leave index. However, it is important to keep to mind that the French system 
has a major drawback: it grants no cash benefits to the first child in the family. Its scores then 
contrast sharply on the cash and tax benefit indicators: France is in the thirteenth position in 
terms of cash support compared to its third place when tax benefits are concerned. It holds 
true that both countries have very heterogeneous systems that offer a mix of different types of 
public support to working parents although it should be pointed out that in France 
intervention through the tax system plays a very important role despite all the flaws of such a 
type of support in terms of redistribution. In sum, note that in general both countries’ systems 
appear as very generous (France more than Belgium thanks to child care and birth). However, 
they are also very hybrid in that multiple tools are combined in providing support to working 
parents. 
The countries of the South of Europe are frequently grouped together at a low, if not the 
lowest, position in the different typologies. Italy is nevertheless distinguished from the others, 
for example in the classifications by Korpi (2000) and Gornick, Meyers and Ross (1997). Our 
indicators would suggest to do the same given that Italy can be found in fifth position in the 
childcare ranking, in first place when countries are ranked according to the generosity of their 
tax benefits and ninth when the system of maternity and paternity leave are considered 
(although behind Portugal and Spain for this latter). We therefore agree that it is wrong to 
amalgamate simplistically Italy on the one hand and Greece, Spain and Portugal on the other. 
Moreover, if these latter countries obtain very bad scores as regards their childcare and cash 
benefit systems, the same does not hold true when instead their tax benefits or maternity leave 
schemes are analyzed. Indeed, in the ranking based on tax support, Spain comes in fifth and 
Portugal eigth whereas with respect to birth leave, Portugal holds the third place and as such is 
outnumbered only by Finland and France. 
The United Kingdom and Ireland are usually to be found very close to the groups of Southern 
European countries. Note, nevertheless, that the living standard is much higher in the UK and 
that we would therefore expect it to perform better. Ireland and the UK obtain very low ranks 
in terms of childcare and maternity leave systems and can be found in the middle of the 
rankings based on the generosity of family cash and tax benefits together. 
We would especially like to draw attention to the case of Luxembourg. This country is ranked 
in the third group by Gornick, Meyers and Ross, a position we do not believe can be justified 
given that, although Luxembourg deserves a middle place with respect to childcare and 
maternity leave arrangements, its system of family cash and tax benefits is by far the most 
generous in Europe. Therefore, this country can and should not be ranked alongside the UK, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece. 
Another special case is that of Austria. This country tends to get close to the countries of the 
first group (SE, DK, FI, FR and BE) because of the high scores it obtains in terms of family 
cash and tax benefits and the organization of its maternity leave scheme. These two countries 
are nevertheless penalized by their poor score in term of child care policies towards infants. 
The Netherlands and Germany have very different profiles that are nevertheless both very 
mediocre. The Netherlands are more generous than Germany concerning maternity leave but 
have a worse position in our ranking based on public child care. 
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A combination of their scores on the indicators related to childcare, birth leave and cash and 
tax benefits yields a single final indicator by which countries can be ranked.  
The DL method accounts only for countries’ relative position without considering the level of 
generosity on the different sub-indicators whereas the UN method ranks countries according 
to their relative position and the size of the scores they obtain. Therefore in the table below, 
Sweden and Denmark on the one hand and France and Finland on the other hand come out 
differently depending on the method used: as far as the linear scaling technique (UN method) 
is concerned, Sweden’s and Denmark’s very high scores on the two child care dimensions 
compensate for their bad ranks in terms of birth leave and especially in terms of cash and tax 
benefits whereas according to the Decision Lab method, their positions in these latter two 
fields do not compensate for their respective first and second place on the child care 
indicators. France and Finland are favored by the Decision Lab method because on average 
they are better ranked in all fields. Despite these differences, all four belong to a top group and 
what is more, both methods rank the other countries in exactly the same way. In the first 
group we find the Northern European countries, France and Belgium, and also Luxembourg 
and Austria. In this group, the first four countries clearly prefer good child care provisions 
over child cash and tax benefits while the opposite holds true for the latter three. A second 
group, quite distinct from the first, includes by Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Italy offers generous tax relief as well as a good system of maternity leave and of child care for 
children aged 3-6 but it scores badly in terms of cash benefits and child care for infants. The 
same holds true for Germany although it relies more on cash benefits than on tax relief while 
the Netherlands and Portugal are ranked in the middle everywhere. 
Finally, as expected, public policies towards children in the UK and Ireland, as well as in Spain 
and Greece, are very limited, targeting just some particular groups.  
 
As we have shown, our final classification may rank countries in the same group although they 
perform very differently in the separate policy fields. Indeed, we have observed some 
substitution effects between cash and tax benefits on the one hand and either child care 
provisions or birth leave on the other hand. A confrontation of the cash and tax scores with 
child care indices put forward a group of countries that clearly score better in terms of child 
cash and tax benefits than in terms of child care (AT, GE, UK, IE, BE, LUX).  
 
To conclude, we believe the value of our study to lie in the extreme richness of our data set 
which provides very detailed and accurate quantified information on all relevant dimensions of 
child policies and allows for the construction of all sorts of indicators. Our final indicator in 
this paper is all-encompassing and thus is often difficult to compare with other typologies 
However, because of the richness of our underlying dataset, we effectively avoid those 
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Table 2.16. Country ranking according to their score on the synthetic final 
indicator 
 
Combined index of the 
three fields UN 
Combined index of the 
three fields DL 
DK 63.00 FR 0.51 
SE 57.43 FI 0.45 
LUX 53.65 LUX 0.39 
FR 52.11 SE 0.34 
FI 51.20 AT 0.29 
AT 50.09 BE 0.21 
BE 46.93 DK 0.19 
GE 40.15 NL -0.02 
IT 40.11 IT -0.02 
NL 39.29 GE -0.02 
PT 35.91 PT -0.23 
ES 27.66 UK -0.35 
UK 27.16 IE -0.55 
IE 23.11 EL -0.59 
EL 21.99 ES -0.60 
Source: see Appendix for calculations 
 
 
Box 2.1: Some suggestions for an ideal child policy system 
 
The child policy systems implemented throughout Europe are characterized by a great level of diversity and 
widely varying degrees of generosity. As a result, it is a difficult task to identify common features that could 
serve as the spine of a converging European system. To conclude this chapter, we will nevertheless attempt 
to propose a series of features that we would like to be included in the ideal system of policies designed to 
help parents combine typical work with parenthood. 
 
1. Child care systems 
 
We advocate widespread provision of public childcare facilities with coverage rates well above the Barcelona 
targets: each child of working parents should be guaranteed a place in outside care as soon as the 18-week 
maternity leave has ended.  
A wide range of opening hours tuned in to full-time work schedules are equally important. 
Moreover, the quality of childcare arrangements can be safeguarded on the one hand, by a guarantee of 
professionalism (child care provided by staff that are appropriately qualified) and on the other hand, by the 
guarantee of an appropriate child/staff ratio (sufficient staff per centre or group of children). 
Finally, child care should be provided at a low cost or be free even for the poorest households: the cost of 
child care should not work as a disincentive towards paid work 
 
2. Cash and tax benefits 
 
We prone a generous system of universal cash benefits that are granted independently of parents’ work status 
and their level of income. These benefits should be conceived as an individual right of each child.  
The political challenge is no longer to encourage women to have a third or fourth child but rather to provide 
young people with enough incentives to have a first and maybe a second child while they pursue their 
professional career. Such a conception necessarily affects the way public support is modulated. Therefore, 
the question of whether or not supplements should be granted to subsequent children has no straightforward 
answer. 
Countries should be encouraged to increasingly provide support in the form of direct cash benefits instead of 
through the tax system when the budget cost is held constant because these are more simple, transparent and 
closer to the idea of social justice and children’s own rights than are tax benefits. The individualization of the 
tax and social security system is in line with this logic and also helps avoid employment traps for spouses. 
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3. Maternity leave 
 
Ideally, the maternity leave should be an 18-week long leave which is compensated at a 100%. Eligibility 
conditions should preferably include a short qualification period (period of previous employment during 
which social contributions were paid). 
Most importantly, maternity leave should not be too long and should remain clearly distinguished from any 
system of parental leave. It is a leave period that is justified on medical grounds, for reasons of physical 
health, and should not stretch beyond the time that is health-wise necessary in order not to put at risk the 
future employability of mothers. 
Furthermore, employment should be protected during the leave guaranteeing the return to one’s previous job 
and to identical employment conditions. 
Paternity leaves should be extended within similar framework conditions and should also immediately follow 
childbirth as this would considerably reduce mothers’ work load and allow for a better sharing of family 
responsibilities. 
 
4. parental leave 
 
The necessary condition here is that the leave is short or can be taken up at a part-time rate in order not to 
hinder the employability of the beneficiary. Furthermore, it should be compulsory for parents to share the 
leave between them.  
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TECHNICAL ANNEX : METHODOLOGY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDEXES 
 
Weighting the criteria 
 
The aim is to attribute a single numerical value to each national childcare system. Beginning with 
several partial classifications obtained for each of the criteria, we must build a general 
classification. To do so, we need a criterion weighting system. How much relative weight must we 
place on the criteria? Although all criteria are pertinent they have different implications. The 
choice of weights is partly political. One possibility is to stay neutral by considering, at the outset, 
that each of the criteria has the same weight. That is exactly what we have done.  
 
Method and mechanism 
 
Technical description of the method 
 
The method used can be broken down into three successive phases. 
 
The first phase consists in collecting the initial data (statistical research and quantification of 
legislative information). 
These data are processed, if required, during the second phase. Criteria may not be expressed, at 
the outset, in the same units. This is typically the case of amounts expressed in national 
currencies. The introduction of the euro has simplified matters, conversion was usually only 
needed into PPS and into % of the APW salary. Other criteria have to be converted in order to 
obtain each time the highest value for the country in the most favorable situation for the criterion 
in question.  
Finally, the sub-indexes will be aggregated in this phase. The aggregation is obtained through two 
different methods (see below) and the criteria are all weighted equally. 
 
 
Two methods to compute synthetic indicators 
 
1. Decision Lab 
 
 
The opposite flow, named   computed using the same formula except that in this case we 
count the number of countries that outrank country A instead of the number that are outranked 
by A as above. Finally, the complete ranking (PROMETHEE II) results from the difference 
Decision Lab is a program that helps to untangle difficult multi-criteria decision making 
problems. In order to rank the different countries the program looks at the intensity with which 
one country is preferred over another on each criterion. To measure the preference intensity, we 
use two indicators computed for each country, + and -. + is computed as follows. For each 
criterion, we count the number of countries that are outranked by the country considered. We 
then sum up these values over the whole set of criteria. Finally, + corresponds to the ratio of 
this number to the product of the total number of countries less one and the number of criteria. 
For example, let us consider k criteria and fifteen countries. Then, + of country A, +(A), is 
computed as follows:  

+(A) = N1 + N2+ … +Nk /(14*k) 
with Ni = number of countries outranked by A in criterion i, i=1, …, n 
-, is
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+ and - or the net flow +.  
The way in which a country is preferred to the others in computing the  values depends on the 
preference structure chosen. For our criteria, we have chosen a V-shape preference structure. 
This means that if d corresponds to the distance between the scores of two countries on a given 
criterion, then preferences between the countries are established proportionally to this distance d. 
As long as d remains smaller than a fixed preference threshold p (in our case, fixed at 20% of d), 
the intensity with which one country is preferred over another increases linearly with d. Once the 
distance between two countries’ scores becomes sufficiently large and surpasses the threshold p, a 
strict preference of one country over the other is obtained.  
In counting the number of countries outranked by country A, we take into account the above 
mentioned intensity of preference:  
a country is given the value 1 if it is strictly outranked by A (or, in other words, A is strictly 
preferred over this country, d>p) 
a country is given the value |d|/p if dp 
The formula shows that the threshold p is of great importance to the value of the net flow  but 
its choice is not very likely to trigger changes in the ranking of countries. 
 
2. The Linear Scaling Technique applied by the UN 
 
We used the Linear Scaling Technique (LST) applied by the UN to construct the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and rank countries according to their score on this index. 
Linear Scaling Technique (LST) is a technique used to standardize the range of a variable.  To do 
this, the highest and lowest values of the range of a variable for all countries are denoted Max and 
Min, respectively.  The data is then scaled according to these values. A variable increase 
corresponds to an improvement in a country’s childcare system (see phase 2), so the variable, 
VALUE, is scaled according to the formula:   
  
[(Value-Min)/(Max-Min)]*100   
  
We see that increases in VALUE correspond to increases in scaled VALUE. Notice that if the 
Min is equal to zero, the formula above reduces to VALUE/Max. The obtained value is always in 
the range of 0-100.  
A final indicator is derived by averaging the different standardized sub-indicators which all have 
equal weight.  
 
This technique is used to scale all variables in many indices, including the Human Development 
Index produced by the UNDP, an Index of Social Health by Human Resources Development 
Canada (HRDC), the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Institute and Economic 
Freedom produced by the Cato Institute (Salzman, 2003).  
 
3. Decision Lab versus Linear Scaling Technique 
 
In the construction of our indices, both methods are justified although present different rankings. 
Decision Lab focuses more on the rank of the country while the Linear Scaling technique takes 
into consideration the values of the sub-scores. Therefore changes in the final rankings can occur 
depending on both rank and score of each country. An example is given by Denmark and 
Sweden vs France and Finland in the final index. 
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Building a child care index 
 
Two indices have been built : one concerning children aged 0 to 3, a second for children aged 3 
to 6. 
For each age bracket we have taken the criterion “Free, fully supervised, full-time equivalent 
childcare coverage” which is the combination of four criteria “coverage rate”, “opening hours” 
“public share of the cost” and “child/staff ratio”. 
For the age bracket 0-3, we have combined this last criterion to an indicator computing the 
average cost per family according to different levels of incomes and to the regressivity of the 
system. Five criteria were used to compute this “cost of child care” indicator: three income levels 
and two variation coefficients. 
Since both sides of the index account more or less for the same number of criteria (four and five 
respectively) we have taken the average of the two sides. 
 
For the age bracket 3-6, the first part of the index is based on the same four criteria computed for 
this age category, and the second is composed only by a “spending” indicator. Therefore the final 
index gives a weight of 4/5 to the first criterion (free, fully supervised, full-time equivalent 
childcare coverage  and 1/5 to the spendings. 
 
The final index is the average of the two sub-indicators 0-3 and 3-6. 
 
The same steps have been used to compute the index based on the Decision Lab method. 
 
Building a cash and tax index 
The computation of a cash benefits index on the one hand and a tax benefits index on the other 
is more or less based on the same procedure. Here under we describe the procedure for the tax 
system. 
We have computed for seven categories of households the monthly amount per child each family 
gets form the tax relief, expressed in percentage of the average earnings. Three earning levels 
were retained. 
For each type of household and at each earning level we have applied the linear scaling technique 
(seven times three criteria). Then, for each earning level, we have computed a sub-indicator that 
combines the seven criteria. This computation takes into account the proportion of each 
household type in the population of each country (independent of the income level), in order to 
control for the variable importance of one household in the country (e.g. larger families in 
Ireland, more lone parents in Denmark and Sweden). 
Once this done, we have computed a final score for the tax benefits, simple average of the three 
sub-indicators. 
A second final score has been computed in order to correct for the regressivity of certain tax 
systems (Franc,e Germany, Luxembourg). This second index is computed in two steps. First we 
have computed for each household type the difference between the amount granted to low 
earners and the one granted to higher earners. Second, each of the seven differences were 
transformed according to the linear scaling technique then a regressivity index has been 
computed in the exact same way of the sub-indicators. The final score is the simple average of the 
three sub-indicators and this last index. 
 
The cash benefits index is computed in the exact same way of the final tax index (the first one), 
except that we did not calculate a regressivity index. 
Finally, the combined tax and cash index is based on the computation of the same kind as 
previous two indices by taking the sum of the amounts granted as cash and as tax benefits. The 
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regressivity index is incorporated in the final score but its weigh is divided by two since it 
concerns only tax benefits in our analysis. 
 
Building a birth index 
Three indices were calculated: a maternity leave indicator, a paternity leave indicator and a birth 
index, combination of the previous two. 
The maternity index is the weighted average of two criteria. The first  (weigh of 2/3 since two sub 
criteria) is the fully paid equivalent working days (number of working days of leave multiplied by 
the replacement rate, with a maximum of 90 working days – 18 weeks). The second is the 
qualification period (weigh of 1/3). Both criteria have been previously expressed according to the 
linear scaling technique, as always. 
Paternity leave index is the expression of the linear scaling technique applied to the fully paid 
equivalent working days. 
The birth leave index takes into consideration the huge difference between both leaves in terms 
of length. It is the average of six units that have been applied the linear scaling technique. The 
first four units are the total number of fully paid equivalent working days of the maternity leave 
and the paternity leave (then given a weigh of four since based on four criteria), the fifth unit is 
the “paternity paid days” expressed as a percentage of the 90 maternity ideal days (even in the 
countries where the maternity leave is shorter) and finally, the sixth unit is the qualification 
period. 
 
Building a final index 
The final index based on the linear scaling technique is the simple average of four sub-indicators : 
child care index for 0-3, child care index for 3-6, birth index, and cash + tax index. In that sense 
we have given a doubled weight to the child care dimension since it is of greater importance and 
based on a more numerous number of criteria. 
The calculations for the Decision Lab are exactly the same, based on these four indices. 
 
 79
                                                                                                                                                                              
Appendix to Chapter II 









Cash and tax benefits
Cash benefits
Tax benefits
lone parent 2c 6y & 12y
couple 1c 11m
1 AFE (+AME) 
index
0.5 AFE (+AME) 
index
1 AFE (+AME) 
index
couple 3c 6y, 12y & 16y
Cash index
Tax index
1.5 AFE (+AME) 
index
lone parent 1c 11m
couple 1c 11m
couple 1c 6y
couple 2c 6y & 12y
couple 1c 6y
couple 2c 6y & 12y
couple 3c 6y, 12y & 16y
lone parent 2c 6y & 12y
lone parent 1c 6y
lone parent 1c 11m
lone parent 1c 6y
coverage rate
opening hours

















public share of cost
opening hours
1.5 AFE (+AME) 
index
FINAL INDEX
0.5 AFE (+AME) 
index
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Table A.2.1. Coverage and opening hours of childcare according to different 
sources 
 
Country Coverage Hours 
 0-3 year olds 3-6 year olds  (2000) 0-3 year olds 3-6 year olds   
Belgium 30% : 20.5% in 
crèches or Assist. 
mat. and 9.5% in 
schools (ONE and 
K&G, 2002) 
99% in (a) 
 
9 : 68% in crèches for 
10h and 32% in 
schools for 7h (ONE 
and K&G, 2002) 
7 in (f ) and (j) (8h30-
15h30) 
 
Denmark  58% in Statistics 
Denmark (2003) 
90% in (a) 11 in (g) and (h) 11 in (a) 
Germany  9% : 3% in WG & 
36% in EG in (c) 
73% in (a) 
 
10 in (c) and (e) 6.7 in (c) (weighted 
average of FT and 
PT) 
Greece  3% in (d) and (i) 48% in (a) 9 in (e) (full day) 4 in (e) 
Spain 5% in (d)  
 
77% in (a) (95% 
covered but 19% 
private) 
7 in (a) 5 in (c) and (e) 
France 39% : 20% Assist. 
mat., 9% crèches, 
10% nursery schools 
(Leprince, 2003) 
 
87% in (a) (100% 
covered but 12.5% 
private) 
 
10.2 in (c)& Leprince 
(2003) 
(10-12h in crèches or 
AM for 75% and 8h 
in schools for 25%) 
8 in (c) (8h30-16h30) 
2% in (e) and (j) 50% in (a) (75% from 
age of 4 at school) 
9 in (e) (full day) 
 
4 in (e) (9h-13h) 
 
Italy 6% in (d) and (f) 95% in (a) and  (e) 
(98% whose 11% 
private, 18% subs. 
church, 71% public) 
10 in (c), (d) and (e) 8 in (c), (d)and (j) 
(8h30-16h30) 
Luxembourg 3% in (f) 76% in (a) 9 in (e) 5 in (e) 
Netherlands 2.3% in Berg-Le 
Clercq et al. (2002) 
 
66%  in (a) and Berg-
Le Clercq et al. 
(2002) (100% from 
age of 4 at school and 
1.7% of 3y in DC) 
10.5 in Berg-Le 
Clercq et al. (2002) 
5.5 in Berg-Le Clercq 
et al. (2002) (8h30-
16h30 – 1h at lunch) 
Austria 9.8% in Kytir & 
Schrittwiezer (2003) 
 
70% in (a) 7.45 in Kytir & 
Schrittwiezer (2003) 
(weighted average of 
FT & PT) 
6.3 in Kytir & 
Schrittwiezer (2003) 
(weighted average of 
FT & PT) 
12% in (d) and (j) 
 
72% in (a) 7.5 in (e) and (j) 5 in (j) 
 
Finland  25%  in (e) 42%  in (a) 10 in (h ) 10 in (h ) 
Sweden 40% in (i) 72% in (a) 11.5 in (h) 11.5 in (h) 
UK 2% (public) in (f) 60% in (a) (85% but 
24% private, excl. 
play groups) 
8 in (c) 5.2 in (c) and (e) 
(33% in nurseries for 




(between 5h for 55% 
and 11h for 45%) 
Sources: (a) Eurydice (2002), data Eurybase (www.eurydice.org); (c) TSFEPS (2002); (d) OECD (2001a); (e) Eurostat 
(2002); (f) Gornick and Meyers (2000); (g) Rostgaard & Fridberg (1998); (h) Adema (2001); (i) Bradshaw and Finch 
(2002); (j) The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies (2003). 
Key to read the table: According to Eurydice (2002), in Belgium, 99% of children aged three to six are enrolled in a public 
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Table A.2.2. Share of costs covered by public funds and child : staff ratio 
according to different sources 
 
Country Share of cost covered by public funds Nb of children per staff 
 0-3 year olds 3-6 year olds 0-3 year olds 3-6 year olds   
Belgium 83% in (c) and (f) 100% in (a) 
 
9 in ONE and K&G 
2002 (weighted 
average of crèches, 
AM and school) 
18.5 in (a ) 
 
Denmark  75% in (f) and (h) 75% in (f) and (h) 3 in (d) and (j) 6 in (d) and (j) 
Germany  82% in (f) 82% in (h) 
 
7.5 in (k) 12 in (k) 
Greece  80% (see Spain and 
Italy) 
100% in (a) and (e) 13.75 in (e) (30:2 and 
25:2) 
30 in (e) 
Spain 80% in (c), (e) and (j) 100% in (a) and (j) 13.7 in (c) 25 in (c) 
France 77.6%  in (a), (f) and 
(j) (crèches & AM at 
75%, schools at 
100%) 
100% in (a) 
 
5.8 in (k) (5 in DC, 3 
in FDC, 10 in schools 
for 2y olds) 
12.75 in (a) (25.5 per 
group with 1 teacher 
and 1 qual. assist.) 
Ireland 100% in (e) 100% in (a) and 
(e)(primary school) 
3.3 (368:111) in Oasis 
website 
 
30 in (a) 
 
Italy 80% in (k) 100% in (a), (c) and  
(e) 
6 in (e) 12.5 in (a) (public + 
private subs.) 
Luxembourg 82.5% (see Belgium 
and Germany) 
100% in (a), (f) and 
(e) 
5 in (e) 14.3 in (a) 
Netherlands 64.5% in Berg-Le 
Clercq et al. (2002) 
 
100%  in (d) 
(basisonderwijs) 
5 in (c) and (j) 20 in (j) (basisschool)
Austria 82% (see Germany) 82% (see Germany) 4.5 in (a) 8.8 in (a) 
Portugal 80% (see Italy and 
Spain) 
 
100% in (e) 5.5 in (e) 16.4 in (a) 
 
Finland  85%  in (d) and (f) 85%  in (d) and (f) 4 in (d) and (j) 7 in (d ) and (j) 
Sweden 84.5% in (f) and (g) 84.5% in (f) and (g) 6 in (d) and (j) 6 in (d) and (j) 
UK 94% in (f) 100% in (d) and (f) 3.7 in (k) (3:1 <2y, 
4:1 2-3y) 
24.3 in (c) and (d) 
(13:1 in nurseries, 
30:1 in reception 
classes) 
Sources: (a) Eurydice (2002), data Eurybase (www.eurydice.org); (c) TSFEPS (2002); (d) OECD (2001a); (e) Eurostat 
(2002); (f) Gornick and Meyers (2000); (g) Rostgaard & Fridberg (1998); (h) Adema (2001); (i) Bradshaw and Finch 
(2002); (j) The Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies (2003); (k) 
Kamerman (2001). 
Key to read the table: According to TSFEPS (2002) and Gornick & Meyers (2000), in Belgium, 83% of the average 
childcare cost for children under three (crèche, AM or school) is covered by public funding; according to ONE and 
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Table A.2.3. Most prevalent full time formal pattern of childcare for children under 
three years old 
 
Country  
UK  Childminder 
Italy  Day nursery 
Luxembourg Childminder 
Belgium Day care families supervised by public authorities 
Finland  Municipal day care center 
Sweden Municipal financed day care center 
Germany  Day nursery 
Spain  Private day nursery 
Denmark  Kindergarten, childcare institution 
France  Childminder 
Netherlands  Subsidized childcare 
Austria  Crèche 
Greece  Low income : public childcare; high income :private 
childcare 
Ireland  Childminder 
Portugal  Private non profit kindergarten 
Source : Bradshaw and Finch (2002). 
Key to read the table: In the UK, a childminder is the most prevalent full time childcare system for children under 
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Parental leave provisions : Legal sources 
 
BE : Royal Decree of 29/10/1997 modified by Royal Decree of 20/01/1998, 10/08/1998, 
08/06/1999 and 24/01/2002. Additional information : http://www.onem.be/  
 
DK : Ministry of Employment in Wehner & Abrahamson (2003). 
 
DE : Gesetz zum Erziehungsgeld und zur elternzeit (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz-BErzGG) in 
der neufassung der bekanntmachung vom 09/02/2004, art.1-24. Additional information : Ostner 
et al. (2003) 
 
EL : art. 5 Act 1483/1984 as amended by art. 25 Act 2639/1998, art. 6 Act 1483/84, art. 53 (1) in 





ES : Code du Travail  (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), updated edition 23/04/2003 (based on 
1995 law) art. 37.4, 37.5 and 46.3.  
 
FR : APE : Hermange, M.-T. and P. Steck (2003) ; Parental leave and PAJE : art.L122-28-1 to 7. 
(code du travail on-line : http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/) 
 
IRL : Irish Parental Leave Act 1998. Additional information : Parental leave in Ireland 
(http://www.softworks-computing.com/apr_04/parentalleave_print.html); Communications 
workers’ union (http://www.cwu.ie/html/Parental.htm)  
 
IT : Law of 10/03/2000 (http://www.giustizia.it/cassazione/leggi/l53_00.html)  
 
LUX : law of 12/02/1999 (http://www.cnpf.lu)  
 
NL : Wet Arbeid en Zorg 16/11/2001. Additional info : Ouderschapsverlof in Nederland 
(http://www.kinderinfo.nl/Perioden/papierwinkel/juridisch/algemeen/) and Knijn (2003). 
 
AT : Kinderbetreuungsgeldgesetz of 07/08/2001. Additional information :  
(http://www.wif.wien.at/wif_site/wif_pages/se_ipol_13_down_en.html)  
 
PT : Dec.-lei n°70/2000 (04/05/2000), Dec.-lei n°230/2000 (23/09/2000), Dec.-lei n°154/1988 
(29/04/2000). (http://www.cite.gov.pt/legisnac.htm)  
 
FI : Ministry of Social Affairs and Health website (http://www.stm.fi) ; The Social Insurance 
Institution of Finland website (KELA) (http://193.209.217.5/in/internet/english.nsf/)  
Additional information : Forssén, Laukkanen & Ritacallio (2003) 
 
SE : Parental Leave Act (SFS 1995 : 584) including amendments up to 2001 and including SFS 
2001 : 144. Additional information : Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2003) and Björnberg 
& Dahlgren (2003) 
 
UK : The Maternity and Parental Leave (Amendment) Regulations 2002. 
Additional sources : GMB (Britain’s General Union) 
(http://www.gmb.org.uk/docs/ViewADocument_search.asp?ID=25); Department of Trade and 
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Industry (United Kingdom), section Employment Relations, Parental leave – A short guide for 
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Table A.2.4. Maternity and Paternity leave arrangements in EU-15 member states (2003) 
 Prenatal 
duration 
Postnatal duration Total duration Employment period to qualify for 
parental leave  
Indemnification rate or level Paternity leave Indemnification rate or 
level 
 weeks weeks weeks days % of earnings  days % of earnings 
BE 7 (1 compulsory) 8 15 182.5 (6 months) 82% without ceiling during 1st 30 days after 
birth (and mandatory week before) and 75% 
during the rest of the leave (100% for civil 
servants during the whole leave) 
10 82% (100% 1st 3 days) 
with ceiling around 102 
EUR/ day 
DK 4 14 18 21 (120h) 100%  of unemployment benefits 10 (2 weeks uninterrupted) 100%  of unemployment 
benefit 
GE 4 8 14 84 (12 weeks between 10th and 4th 
month before confinement) 
100% of average net wage 0 - 
EL 8 (56d) 9 (63d) 17 200 (during last 2 years) 100% 1 (private sector) 100% 
ES - 6 (+10 shared) 16 180 100% 2 (+ up to 10 weeks if mother 
transfers) 
100% 
FR 6 10 16 (26 if 3d 
child) 
304 (10 months) 100% 14 (3 + 11) 100% 
IE 4 compulsory 4 compulsory 18 273 (39 weeks) 70% 0 (some trade unions have 
negotiated a short leave 
around birth) 
n/a 
IT 1 or 2 months 3 or 4 months 21.7 (5 months) 0 80% (some collective agreements require 
employers to pay the remaining 20%; 100% 
for civil servants) 
0  -
LUX 8 8 16 182.5 (6 months) 100% 2 100% 
NL 4-6 compulsory 10-12 16 0 100% 2 100% 
AT 8 8 16 0 100% of net average income of the last 13 
weeks or 3 months 
0  -
PT 30 days 90 days (6 weeks 
reserved for the mother) 
17.1 (120 days 
uninterrupted) 
182.5 (6 months) 100% of average daily wage 5 (fractionable) during 1st 
month 
100% 
FI 30-50 days 
compulsory 
free choice 17.5 (105 days 
excluding 
Sundays) 
0 70% max. (income-tested, on average 66%) 18 (can be extended by 1 to 
12 weekdays if father takes 
last 1 to 12 weekdays at the 
end of the parental leave) 
100% 
SE 7 7 14 being employed  80% (pregnancy benefit for 50 days leave 
before birth) 
10 (2 weeks) 80% 
UK up to 11 free choice 18 (if worked for 
1 y, total is 29) 
No conditions (for 18w leave) and having 
worked 1 year before 11th week 
preceding birth (for 29w leave). 
90% for 1st 6 weeks, 115 EUR weekly for the 
remaining 12 weeks 
0  -
Source : MISSOC 2003 
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Table A.2.5. Parental Leave arrangements in EU-15 member states (2003) 








Job and pension 
guarantees 
Monthly benefit level 
BE 3 months for each parent if 
full-time leave (6 if PT and 15 
if 1/5 time) 
individual right (not 
transferable); no changes 
allowed in take-up mode 
FT leave in 3 times, half-time leave 
not fractionable or 1/5 leave in 5 
periods of 3 months 
FT leave for 3 months, PT 
leave for 6 months or 1/5 
leave for 15 months 
4 worked 12 months 
during the 15 months 
before leave (private 
sector); excluded are 
the public sector, 
apprentices and 
trainees 
Job guaranteed and social 
rights maintained  
FT : 547 EUR (gross 
and taxable), 
proportional to amount 
of working time 
reduction 
DK 32 paid weeks to be shared 
between parents (for the 
mother to be taken after the 
14 weeks of maternity leave, 
for the father after childbirth) + 
14 weeks unpaid but job-
protected leave 
Family right (transferable 
between parents); take-up 
together or one after the other 
possible to split in weeks PT leave with proportional 









being employed guarantee of tenure, social 
rights and return to the 
same or an equivalent job
1755 EUR (full 
unemployment benefit) 
during the 32 weeks 
that are to be shared 
up to 3 years (2 years paid at 
flat-rate) 
Family right, take-up together is 
possible 
3d year taken before the child's 8th 
birthday, 1st 2 years taken before 
the 3d birthday; If only 1 year is 
taken, the flat-rate benefit is 
higher; Possible to take a shorter 
period (multiples of 1 month) 
Possibility to work PT up to 
30h 
8 all employees,
persons in vocational 
training, those 
working at home and 
piece workers 
Job protection, right to 
resume previous working 
hours and social rights 
maintained during the 
leave 
300 EUR during 1st 2 
years, 450 EUR if only 1 
year (2004), paid only 
once per child (even if 
both parents leave) 
EL 3.5 months each but 7 months 
for lone parents 
individual right (not 
transferable); no changes 
allowed in take-up mode 
Civil servants: fractionable not possible 3.5 Both parents must 
work, the claimer for 
at least 1 year with 
the same employer 
right to return to the same 
or an equivalent job, 
pension and seniority 
rights suspended (unless 
employee pays all SS 
contributions)  
unpaid 
ES Up to 3 years following 
childbirth for each parent. Also 
1 h (or 2 half-hours) of 
breastfeeding leave each 
workday until the child is aged 
9 months 
Individual right (both can take 
leave at the same time); the 
right expires if another leave is 
claimed (for the 2d child e.g.) 
no compulsory duration ( less than 
1 year may be taken); if 1 year is 
taken, this can be done before the 
child's 3rd birthday 
PT leave until child aged 6 
(hours reduced between 
1/3 min and 1/2 max) 
3 being employed job guaranteed during 1 
year of leave (tenure, 
social rights and 
participation in training 
courses at return) 
unpaid 
1 year parental leave 
renewable twice for each 
child. Allowance: 3 years of 
APE (PAJE since 2004) from 
the 2d child and 6 months 
PAJE (since 2004) for 1st 
child 
Family right (APE) ; individual 
right (unpaid parental leave) 
which both can take up together 
or one after the other 
1 year renewable twice and 
transition from PT to FT leave or 
inversely is allowed; no changes 
during the year unless employer 
agrees 
Reduction of hours worked 
by at least 1/5 (but min 16h 
of work) 
3 seniority of at least 1 
year (parental leave 
& APE) 
right to return to the same 
or an equivalent job, 
guarantee of wage, half of 
leave counted for pension 
& seniority issues, right to 
training at return 
502 EUR (2004) paid 
only once per child or to 
each parent if PT take-
up but with a max equal 
to the FT benefit per 
family 
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Continued 








Job and pension 
guarantees 
Monthly benefit level 
IE 14 weeks each Individual right (not transferable) take-up as a continuous block or, in agreement with employer, 
spread over a max of 5 years: by means of reduced working 
hours or by breaking down the time into individual days/weeks 
or as a combination of the previous two; a max. of 14 weeks of 
parental leave per year except when employer agrees with a 
different scheme 
5  unpaid continuously
employed for at least 
1 year 
rights related to 
pay/pensions/ 
superannuation benefits 
are not legally guaranteed 
but left to the discretion of 
the employer; the right to 
return to one's job is 
guaranteed 
IT Mother max 6 months, father 
max 7 months, for a total of 
max 11 months; lone parents 
can take up to 10 months. 
Individual right, not transferable 
and not possible to take up at 
the same time 
No compulsory duration (if father 
takes at least 3 months, the total 
rises from 10 to 11 months). The 
whole leave is fractionable 
part-time take-up possible 
(1/2 or 1/4) 
8 excluded from the 






applicable during the 
whole leave period 
(employment guarantee + 
social rights) 
30% of earnings for 6 
months (remaining 
period unpaid, unless 
low-income); self-
employed women taking 
parental leave and who 
are replaced at work 
receive tax relief 
6 months each if FT or 12 
months each if PT 
Individual right but one parent 
has to take leave right after 
maternity leave, otherwise it is 
lost, exc. if other parent is not 
entitled (lone parents excl.) 
Whole leave to be taken in one 
draw 
PT possible for 12 months 
each 
5 (for 2d 
leave) 
same contract, type of job 
and earnings; pension 
rights not affected 
1693 EUR (2004) 
NL 13 times the amount of hours 
regularly worked per week 
Individual right for each parent 
and for each child 
Possible to split leave in 3 periods 
of at least 1 month; parents can go 
on leave together or one after the 
other; legally, leave can be taken 
over a max. period of 6 months but 
if there is an agreement with the 
employer, leave can be spread 
over a period >6 months 
the length of leave and the 
number of leave days per 
week (with a max. of half 
the number of weekly 
working hours) are fixed in 
advance in agreement with 
employer; full-time leave is 
possible if employer agrees
8 private and public 
sector (regular waged 
workers employed for 
at least 1 full year by 
the same employer) 
contract, seniority and 
pension guaranteed by 
some collective 
agreements only, 
especially in the social 
services sector 
Civil servants : 70-75% 
paid; Private sector: 
only 6% of collective 
agreements (in 2000) 
pay the leave (up to 
30%) 
AT 36 months if each parent 
takes 6 months, otherwise 30 
months 
Family right, 24 months 
transferable 
Parents can alternate twice at 
most (max. 3 blocks of at least 3 
months) 
part-time take-up possible 3 All parents providing 
they are entitled to 
family allowances 
18 months of the 
"kinderbetreuungszeit" 
enter into the calculation of 
pension entitlements; if 
part-time work during 




436 EUR for all (incl. 
self-employed, 
housewives, etc.)  
LUX continuously 
employed for at least 
1 year (min 20h/w) 
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End 
 Parental leave duration Transferability Compulsory duration and 
fractionability 






Job and pension 
guarantees 
Monthly Benefits level 
PT 3 months each if FT or 6 
months each if PT, up to 6th 
birthday (parental leave); 2 
years unpaid (special leave) 
or 3 years in case of a 3d 
child 
Individual right (not transferable) Take-up in one draw or in 3 blocks 
(or alternation between PT and FT 
leave periods) 
6 months (half-time) or 
alternation of FT and PT 
leave periods summing up 
to a FTE period of 3 months
6  both parents
employed 
Job-protected parental 
leave is recognised for 
pension calculations 
the father's 1st 15 days 
after mat. or pat. leave 
are fully paid, what is 
left for the father & the 
mother is unpaid as is 
special leave  
FI 158 weekdays (excl. 
Sundays) at a max. of 70% of 
earnings; afterwards, long 
leave up child's 3d birthday 
with flat-rate home care 
allowance 
Family right (transferable), take-
up only possible one after the 
other, min. take-up of 12 days 
for 1st leave. Childcare leave 
also transferable but taken up 
one after the other with a min. of 
1 month per child 
fractionable (see transferability) the long childcare leave can 
be taken up on a part-time 
basis (with proportional 
allowance) 
3 being employed Job security during both 
leaves and both are 
considered as time in 
employment (pensions, 
seniority, etc.) 
max. 70% of earnings 
(income-related, 
average 66%) for 158 
days; flat-rate allowance 
of around 252.28 EUR 
monthly during child-
rearing leave; 70 
EUR/month if PT leave 
SE FT leave until child aged 18 
months and FT leave as long 
as full-rate parental benefit is 
received (granted for 480 
days to be taken before child's 
8th birthday, including paid 
postnatal leave of 7 weeks) 
Of the paid leave, 60 days are 
for the mother and 60 for the 
father, what is left is transferable
Each leave can be split in blocks 
but only 3 periods max. can be 
taken per year. An employee may 
choose a number of FT leave days 
or can opt for part-time take-up 
spreading leave over all or some 
working days. An employee may 
return to work before the end of 
leave (min. 1 month's notice) 
Reduced hours to 1/2, 1/4, 
1/3 or 1/8 with 
corresponding benefit, or 
uncompensated reduced 
hours up to 1/4 (until child's 
8th birthday) 
8 being employed for 6 
months before leave 
or for a total of 12 
months during the 
last 2 years. 
job and social rights 
protected (no dismissal 
possible) 
80% for 1st 390 days 
(min. 16.5 EUR/day), 
flat-rate for 90 days (6.6 
EUR/day) 
UK 18 times the amount of hours 
regularly  worked per week 
Individual right (not transferable) leave can be taken up at once, by means of reduced working 
hours or in blocks depending on workplace agreement (if a 
parental leave is negotiated, blocks are multiples of 1 day; if 
not, a default scheme defines blocks as multiples of 1 week with 
a max. of 4 weeks per year) 
5  continuously
employed for at least 
1 year with the same 
employer 
guaranteed return to the 
same job if leave for max. 
4 weeks and to an 
equivalent job if for more 
than 4 weeks (mat. and 
par. leave counted 
together). In both cases, 
pension & seniority rights 
are suspended  
No statutory right to 
paid leave but left to 
employer's discretion 
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Table A.2.6. Take-up rates of parental leave by sex according to different sources 
 female take-up male take-up average female duration of 
leave 
average male duration of leave source 
BE 16720 (of which 80% in private 
sector) 
2398 (of which 80% in private sector) 48% take 1/5 leave 74% take 1/5 leave ONEM (2003) 
DK 93% 3%   Lourie (1999) ; http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
 42166 ('94) 3678 ('94) 1990-2000: 85% of women 
(47978) on par. leave leave for 7-
10 weeks, 2% for 1-6 weeks 
(1129) and 8% (4516) for more 
than 11 weeks 
1990-2000: 47% of men (713) on par. 
leave leave for 1-4 weeks, 17% for 5-
8 weeks (258) and 36% (546) for 9-10 
weeks 
Wehner & Abrahamson (2003) 
  around 48% panel 1993-99  around 28 weeks panel 93-99 1 week panel 93-99 Pylkkänen & Smith (2003) 
  58% (pat. leave) and 100% in public sector where pat. leave is fully paid; 10% for 10w of parental leave and 10% for child 
care leave 
Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998) 
  56% pat leave (2001) and 4% take whole 
leave (52 weeks) 
44.8 weeks (total leave : 
pregnancy, mat. and parental) 
2.2 weeks Eiro (2001a) 
   44.8 weeks or 59% of the total 
leave they are entitled to 
2.2 weeks of leave or roughly 7% of 
the total parental leave to which they 
are entitled 
Meilland (2001) 
GE 95% 1%   Lourie (1999) ; http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
   estimated duration 2001: West-Germany: 63% for 2-3 y, 12% up to 1y, 
15% for 1-2 y and 12% for more than 3 y, so average of 33 months; 
estimated duration 2001: East-Germany: 38% for 2-3 y, 25% up to 1y and 
37% for 1-2 y, so average of 24 months 
Ostner et al. (2003) 
  1-2% for some of the parental leave   Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998) 
EL na no fathers take leave na na Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998) 
ES 100%  na na http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
FR 555700 APE, nearly all women  na na Hermange et Steck (2003) 
 98% of leaves are taken by women    Clément et Strasser (2003) 
  100% for 3-day paternity leave and 59% for the 11-day leave  Drees (2003) 
  2% for parental leave na na Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998) 
IE Of the 6.74% of the workforce eligible, 20% used par leave of which 84% are women 
(2002) 
na    na Eiro (2002)
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 female take-up male take-up average female duration of 
leave 
average male duration of leave source 
IT  <5% take any of the leave offered na na Hennech (2003) (data 1998) 
LUX 1313 full-time; 760 half-time 243 full-time; 255 half-time whole leave compulsory  CNPF (2003) 
NL 40% 9%   Lourie (1999) ; http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
 25% of all parents (50% of women and 75% of men get paid while on leave) 8 months 11months (but women more hours per 
week) 
Knijn (2003) 
 take-up rates average 13% for PT leave The Netherlands is the only country in the EU where fathers do not take 
shorter leaves than mothers 
Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998) 
 44% 12%   NIDI (2003) (data 2000) 
 49% (public sector) 12% (public sector)    
AT 90% 1% na na Lourie (1999) ; http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
    1%  Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998)  
  2% (2002)   The Clearinghouse (2002) 
PT 100%  na na http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
99% 2% na na Lourie (1999)
 99% 64% (par leave)   http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
  64% (pat leave) and 3% for parental leave   Stancanelli (2003) (data 1998) 
 47000 take the 158-day leave 2500 take the 158-day leave   Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2002) 
 107500 families receive a home care allowance   Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2003) 
SE 90% 78%   Lourie (1999) ; http://www.childpolicyintl.org/ 
  75%  44 days which corresponds to 15% of 
the total leave available 
The Clearinghouse (2003) 
  77% (1st child) panel 1993-1999 40.2 weeks (1st child) panel 
1993-1999 
4.4 weeks (1st child) panel 1993-1999 Pylkkänen & Smith (2003) 
 295287 women and 210456 men receive parental leave allowance, i.e. fathers' share 
of 42% of beneficiaries but only 16% of the total claimed days; 75% of fathers take 
paternity leave (on average 9.6 days) 
109 days 28 days The National Social Insurance Board (2003) (data 2002) 
UK 20% (estimated in 1999) take full 3 
mo. unpaid leave 
9% (estimated in 1999) take full 3 mo. unpaid leave  Lourie (1999) 
 35% (estimated in 1999) of eligible 
women 
2% (estimated in 1999) of eligible men   Lourie (1999) 
 
FI      
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Table A.2.7. Main features of the child cash benefits in EU-15 member states (2003) 
  Age limit conditions Monthly amounts Variation with income Variation with age Child raising 
allowances 
(different from PL 
schemes) 
Birth and adoption grants Child care allowances Allowance for single 
parents 
- child 1st rank born since 
1st Jan 1991:  6-12y: 
+12.65 EUR, 12-18y: 
+19.26 EUR 
 1st rank
BE usual : 18 years / vocational 
training or education 25 years 
/ serious infirmity : 21 years 
1st child : 72.61 EUR / 2nd 
child : 134.35 EUR / 3rd 
child and subsequent: 
200.59 EUR 
no 
- child becoming 1st rank 
and born 91-96: 6-18y: 
+25.22 EUR, 18+: +38.54 
EUR 
no special 983.68 EUR for 1st birth and 
each adopted child / 740.10 
EUR for next births 
no special no special 
DK 18 years for all children each child 0-3 : 145 EUR / 
3-7: 131 EUR / 7-18: 103 
EUR 
no (special means tested 
allowance only if parents 
are retired) 
see monthly amounts education 
allowance 
multiple births or adoption: 
75 EUR per month until 
children's 7th birthday / 
adoption of foreign child: 
5159 EUR (one shot) 
no special +45 EUR per month 
per child and + 46 
EUR per month per 
household 
GE usual: 18 years / education or 
vocational training: 27 years / 
handicapped : no limit 
1st -3d child : 154 EUR / 4th 
and subsequent: 179 EUR
no no no special no special grants (see 
maternity benefits scheme) 
no special no special 
EL usual: 18 years / education: 
22 years / serious infirmity: 
no limit 
1 child- family: 5.87 EUR / 2 
children: 18 EUR / 3 
children: 40 EUR / 4c: 48 
EUR / more: +8.07 
EUR/child 
Employer provides 10% 
gross wage rise if married 
and 5% per child to 
husbands (or lone 
parent). Taxable benefit 
no no special no special grants (see 
maternity benefits scheme) 
no special +3.67 EUR per child 
for parent widow/er 
ES usual : 18 years / serious 
infirmity: no limit 
24.25 EUR/child household income ceiling 
to receive child benefits: 
8264.28 EUR per year 
(raised by 15% per child 
from the 2nd) 
no no special 451 EUR for 3rd and each 
subsequent child 
no special no special 
FR 20 years for all (at 55% SMIC 
max for child income) 
1 child: 0 /  2 children: 
111.26 EUR tot / each 
subsequent child: +142.55 
EUR 
no (only min guaranteed if 
lone parent with 1c+) 
11+: +31.29 EUR / 16+: 
+55.63 EUR (except for 1st 
child in families with less 
than 3c) 
no special APJE: 159.76 EUR (means-
tested) per month per child 
(also adopted) from 4th 
month of pregnancy until 3 
years of age or from adoption 
and for 21 months. Replaced 
by PAJE (from 2004): 808.31 
EUR Y-rel. 
AGED (child home care 
allowance): income tested 
and age variable benefit 
until child's 6th birthday / 
AFEAMA (private child 
care allowance) child 
aged less than 6 and 
income tested / all 
replaced by PAJE from 
2004 
API (single parent 
allowance) : monthly 
income of 521 EUR 
and 173.84 EUR per 
child <3y is 
guaranteed 
(allowance equal to 
this amount minus 
parent's income).  
- child  born before 
1st Jan 1991: 85-90: +25.22 
up to 18y, +27.09 older / 
before 85: +40.41 EUR 
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Continued 
  Age limit conditions Monthly amounts Variation with income Variation with age Child raising 
allowances 
(different from PL 
schemes) 
Birth and adoption grants Allowance for single 
parents 
IE usual: 16 years / education: 
19 years / serious infirmity: 
19 years 
1st & 2d child: 117.6 each / 
3rd and further: 147.3 EUR
no no n/a 635 EUR for all multpile 
births with further grants of 
635 EUR paid at ages 4 and 
12 
n/a income tested, max. 
124.8 EUR per week 
+19.3 EUR per week 
per child but seems to 
be min. income 
guaranteed for low 
income parents 
IT usual: 18 years / serious 
infirmity: no limit 
means-tested benefit and proportional to number of 
family members 
no no special families with 3+ children or 
adopting a child: 775 EUR 
per child, income related and 
taxed allowance 
no special increased family 
allowances for lone 
parent 
LUX usual: 18 years / education 
training: 27 years / serious 
infirmity: no limit 
1st child: 172.36 EUR / 
2children: 409.28 EUR / 3c: 
745.44 Eur / further: 335.99 
EUR each 




those not entitled 
to Parental leave 
schemes 
total amount of 1615.89 EUR 
per mother / maternity 
allowance in case of no loss 
of income during maternity 
leave 
no special no special 
NL usual: 17 years children born since 01/1995: 
0-5y: 58.11 EUR each / 6-
11y: 70.57 EUR each / 12-
17y 82.02 EUR and those 
born before 1995 it is 
according to the number of 
children (1c: 82.02 ; 2c: 
93.78; 3c: 97.36; 4c: 
105.25, etc., each per child 
aged 12-17, 85% of each 
amount if aged 6-11y) 
no see monthly amounts no special no special benefit no special no special 
AT usual: 18 years / education or 
tvocational training: 26 years 
/ earning incapacity: unlimited 
105.4 EUR/child < 3y / 
112.7 EUR if 3-10 / 130.9 
EUR if 10-19 / 152.7 EUR 
19+ / if 2c, amount 
increased by 12.8 each and 
from the 3rd child, amount 
increased by 25.5 EUR per 
child / + tax credit of 50.9 
EUR per child assimilated 
as benefit 
Income ceiling of 40320 
EUR to perceive 
supplement for large 
families of 36.4 EUR for 
3rd and each subsequent 
child 
see monthly amounts no special no special benefit no special no special / tax credit 
for single parent: 
annual tax reduction 
of 364 EUR 
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  Age limit conditions Monthly amounts Variation with income Variation with age Child raising 
allowances 
(different from PL 
schemes) 
Birth and adoption grants Child care allowances Allowance for single 
parents 
  income-related (4 earnings levels related to minimum wage) and according to age 
and number of children :  
1st level: income <1.5 min. 
W. : 
children <12 months: 
89.04 EUR for 1st-2d, 
133.65 EUR for next 
children >12 months: 26.76 
EUR for 1st-2d, 40.15 EUR 
for next 
2nd level: 1.5 min. W < 
income < 4 min. W. : 
children <12 months: 
77.74 EUR for 1st-2d, 
112.74 EUR for next 
children >12 months: 20.86 
EUR for 1st-2d, 30.58 EUR 
for next 
3rd level: 4 min. W < 
income < 8 min. W. : 
children <12 months: 
66.49 EUR for 1st-2d, 
89.39 EUR for next 
children >12 months: 17.86 
EUR for 1st-2d, 24.21 EUR 
for next 
PT usual: 16 years / education or 
vocational training: 24 years / 
serious infirmity: +3 years 
4th level: income >8 min. W. 
: 
children <12 months: 
41.16 EUR for 1st-2d, 
53.57 EUR for next 
children >12 months: 15.72 
EUR for 1st-2d, 20.45 EUR 
for next 
no special no special benefit no special no special, but since 
benefit is income 
related, it can change 
from 2 earnings 
FI 17 years for all children 1st child: 90 EUR /  2nd-5th 
child: + 20.5 EUR per each 
child / 6th and following: 
same amount each than for 
the 5th child 
no no no special maternity grant for pregnant 
woman whose pregnancy 
has lasted at least 154 days 
and with health examination: 
140 EUR per birth or adopted 
child / adoption grant for 
foreign child according to 
country of origin : form 1900 
to 4500 EUR 
child home care 
allowance (see parental 
leave schemes) / private 
child care allowance of 
117.73 EUR per month 
and per child paid to 
private cre provider 
directly (+ means tested 
supplement) / partial child 
care allowance (parent 
reducing hours max 30h) 
of 63.07 EUR per month 
per child<3y paid to the 
parent 
+33.6 EUR per child 
(supplement of the 
child allowance) 
SE 16 years for all children each child: 104 EUR / 
additional amount 3d child : 
+28 EUR / for 4th child: +83 
EUR / for 5th and 
subsequent: +104 EUR 
no no no special no special benefit in case of 
birth / adoption grant for 
foreign child: 4383 EUR 
no special no special 
UK usual: 19 years / education: 
19 years 
1st qualifying child: 105 
EUR / each other child: 70 
EUR. 
no no no special 767 EUR for each birth or 
adoption (born or expected)
 no special but some 
children under the 
scheme of Working 
families tax credits (now 
WTC) for low income 
workers 
higher benefit rate 
withdrawn from 1998, 
a few remain in 
payment 
Source : MISSOC, 2003 
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Table A.2.8. Main features of the child tax benefits in EU-15 member states (2003) 
Relie  Tax unit retained Relief for marital status Relief for children Relief for child care or education 
costs 
Household / earnings are taxed 
individually and application of marital 
quotient (if one's earnings less than 
30% of total earnings after deduction 
for social sec contributions and work-
related expenses) 
1c : 1180 EUR / 2c : 3050 EUR / 3c: 
6830 EUR / 4c: 11040 EUR / each 
subs. : +4220 EUR (also at the base of 
the tax schedule combined with 
previous relief, but refundable credit up 
to 340 EUR per child) 
1180 EUR (at the basis of tax schedule 
and combined with latter two reliefs, 
wastable credit) 
Child care tax allowance on taxable 
earnings up to 11.2 EUR per day 
(computed as 2464 EUR per year), 
relief applied to each parent according 
to share of hh earnings. Age limit of 3 
years 
DK Spouses are taxed separately for 
earned income 
no    no no no
GE Spouses are taxed jointly (option of 
separate taxation).  
Other specific reliefs are doubled. Tax 
schedule for spouses is applied on half 
joint taxable income and tax due is 
then multiplied by two 
Tax credit considered as cash benefit 
of 1848 EUR per child (non wastable). 
If relief from tax allowance (5808 EUR 
per child) > credit, then former applied 
to tax schedule instead of latter. 
Tax allowance of 2340 EUR no 
EL Spouses are taxed separately no 1st band of tax schedule (non taxable 
income) is raised by 1000 EUR for 
each of 1st and 2d child, 8000 EUR 
more for 3d child and 1000 EUR for 
each subs. child  
no  no
ES Spouses are taxed separately Basic allowance of 3400 EUR for each 
spouse or individual 
<25y : tax allowance of 1400 EUR for 
1st c, 1500 EUR for 2d c, 2220 EUR 
for 3d c and 2300 EUR for 4th c 
The basic allowance for individual is 
raised to 5550 EUR 
Additional tax allowance of 1200 EUR 
for each child <3y / Maternity credit 
(non wastable) up to 1200 EUR for 
working females with children <3y 
(limited by SSC due) 
Tax schedule is applied to joint taxable income divided by number of shares (1 per parent, 0.5 per dependent child, 0.5 
more from 3d child), then tax due is multiplied by the number of shares (quotient). For married couples, advantage 
from quotient is limited to 2086 EUR for each half share exceeding 2 shares (i.e. from 3d child) for married couples (or 
PACS). For lone parents advantage from first two half shares is limited to 3609 EUR  (i.e. from 2d child). 
FR Household (spouses are taxed jointly 
with dependent children).  
"Prime pour l'emploi" : Wastable tax credit for low earners with supplement for dependent children : 33 EUR/c for 
married/cohabitants couples / 66 EUR for 1st child for lone parents and 33 EUR/c from 2d. 
Tax credit (wastable) for children cared 
outside home or at school (under 7y) : 
25% of real costs up to a max. of 2300 
EUR per year. Costs for secondary or 
tertiary education are also deductible 
from tax : 61 EUR/c in college, 153 
EUR/c in lyceum and 183 EUR/c in 
higher education 
IE Spouses are usually taxed on joint 
income (option of being considered as 
singles). Here joint taxation retained. 
Wastable tax credit of 1520 EUR for 
singles and 3040 EUR for couples. 
Different tax schedule according to 
marital status : first bracket up to 
28000 EUR for single, 37000 EUR for 
one earner couple, 56000 EUR for two 
earner couple 
Supplementary taxable income 
exempted of 575 EUR for 1st and 2d 
child, and 830 EUR for each subs. 
child  
Lone parent wastable credit of 1520 
EUR (added to single credit). First 
bracket of tax schedule at 32000 EUR
Not for two earner families 
f for lone parent 
BE Tax rebate for single person : 5570 
EUR   /  married individuals : 4610 
EUR each, applied at the basis of the 
tax schedule (wastable credit) 
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  Tax unit retained Relief for marital status Relief for children Relief for lone parent Relief for child care or education 
costs 
IT Spouses are taxed separately Not for two earner couples (means-
tested wastable tax credit for 
dependent spouse) 
Wastable tax credit, means-tested up to 
3d child (3 income bands, min. 285 EUR 
per child, max. 516 EUR/c), 516 EUR/c 
from 4th c. 
no  no
LUX Spouses are taxed on joint income Basic tax schedule applied to single 
income (class 1) and to halved joint 
income of spouses (class 2) then tax 
due is multiplied by two. 
Wastable tax credit of 900 EUR/c Tax allowance of 1920 EUR  / basic tax 
schedule applied to reduced income 
(up to 29500 EUR) 
Tax allowance for child care costs 
equal to real expenses (not simulated 
here because no information on costs)
NL Tax unit is the individual but certain 
credits depend on joint income 
no Means-tested wastable child credit 
(independent of the number of children):  
575 EUR if joint Y <27438 EUR, 365 
EUR if joint Y <29108 EUR and 41 EUR 
over. Combination wastable credit if 
presence of children under 12 : 214 EUR 
if joint Y > 4206 EUR. Wasted credit can 
however be reported on spouse's tax due 
according to a certain scheme. 
Wastable tax credit of 1348 EUR + 
4.3% of earnings (latter limited to 1348 
EUR) 
no 
AT Spouses are taxed separately no 610.8 EUR per child but not related to 
income, fully refundable and paid 
together with child benefits, then 
considered as cash benefits 
Lone parents are applied a different tax 
schedule in order to take into account 
the application of the general tax credit. 
Moreover, they are granted a tax credit 
of 364 EUR, fully refundable 
no 
PT Spouses are taxed on joint income Wastable tax credit of 178.3 EUR for 
each taxable spouse, 213.96 EUR for 
each taxable single. Tax schedule is 
applied to halved joint income of 
spouses, then tax due is multiplied by 
two (before credits) 
Wastable tax credit of 142.64 EUR for 
each dependent child 
Wastable tax credit of 285.28 EUR for 
lone parent (instead of single person's 
credit) 
For own and dependent education 
costs : wastable tax credit of 30% of 
costs, up to a maximum of 160% min. 
wage, raised by 30% for each 
dependent child in education from 3d 
ch. Not taken into account here since 
own expenses are included (majority of 
cost influencing the limit). Moreover 
this credit is combined with other 
credits for long term care costs and 
limited to 710.97 EUR. 
FI Spouses are taxed separately for 
earned income 
no    no no no
SE Spouses are taxed separately no no no no 
UK Tax unit is the individual but credits 
depend on joint income (WTC and 
CTC) 
Means-tested non wastable "Working Tax Credit" (WTC) for workers, which includes a couples and lone parent element 
of max. 2169 EUR.This credit is combined with the means-tested non wastable "Child Tax Credit" (CTC). Max amounts 
for CTC elements are 788 EUR per family plus 788 EUR if child<1y (family element), and 2089 EUR/c (child element). 
Max amounts of WTC + CTC are granted for joint Y <7317 EUR, then WTC and child element reduced at a rate of 37% 
for joint Y<72300 EUR, then family element reduced to 0 at a rate of 15%. CTC is not conditional on being in work 
In the WTC, there is a child care 
element of 70% of max 10180 EUR for 
1c and 70% of max 15082 EUR for 2c+ 
for children under 3 cared outside 
home in registered facilities or 
childminders 
Source: own calculations based on OECD (2004), Bradshaw and Finch (2002), Inland Revenue (2004) for UK, Ministère des Finances (2004) for Belgium, Administration des 
contributions directes (2004) for Luxembourg, Ministère des Finances (2004) for France and  Law 46/2002 of January 18th for Spain.  
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3.1. Introduct on i
3.2. Review and Data on European Fertility 
 
In this chapter, we summarise the results on “motherhood choices” that have been studied 
within the framework of the MOCHO. More in specific, this chapter discusses empirical 
evidence from micro-econometric analyses in order to examine the relationships between 
motherhood choices, labour market conditions and public policies. The studies performed 
utilise the data base created from several data sources in a number of countries and largely 
benefited from the other MOCHO research, e.g. labour market conditions (Chapter I) and 
policy analyses (Chapter II). In Section 3.2, we present general data on recent European 
fertility development. In Section 3.3, we explain data base work performed within the 
MOCHO project. In Section 3.4, econometric estimations performed by MOCHO members 
on the influence of socio-economic and demographic factors on fertility are discussed. In 
Section 3.5, we present results on econometric analyses on timing of motherhood and 




In this section, we present some important figures on European fertility development. Table 
3.1 shows the total fertility rate (TFR), which is the most widely used measure for fertility, for 
a number of countries over the period 1960 through 2000. As can be seen from the table, 
almost all countries included had fertility rates above the replacement level or close to it from 
1960 to 1970. However, since the 1970s, fertility rates have decreased in most of the countries, 
and in 2000 not a single European country reached the replacement level of 2.1, although 
Iceland with 2.05 comes rather close. The lowest fertility rates in 2000 were found in South 
and East Europe with the Czech Republic at the bottom of the scale at 1.14. In these 
countries, fertility decline started relatively late and its recent decrease has been particularly 
rapid. The table also includes figures for the United States and Japan as a comparison to the 
selected European countries. Whereas in 2000, the low Japanese fertility rate was comparable 
to rates in the European countries, fertility in the United States was very near the replacement. 
 
3.2.1. Period and Cohort Fertility 
 
The period total fertility rate (TFR) has the interpretation of the total number of children born 
per woman over her life cycle if current fertility rates remained constant at each age. This is a 
hypothetical measure because it is not based on observed patterns but on age specific fertility 
rates of a particular year. On the other hand, the actual childbearing of cohorts of women is 
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Table 3.1. Total Fertility Rate in Selected Countries, 1960-2000. 
 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Austria 2.70 2.71 2.29 1.83 1.65 1.47 1.45 1.40 1.34 
Belgium 2.56 2.62 2.25 1.74 1.68 1.51 1.62 1.55 1.66 
1.39 
Czech Republic 2.12 2.18 1.90 2.40 2.10 1.96 1.90 1.28 1.14 
Denmark 2.57 2.61 1.95 1.92 1.55 1.45 1.67 1.80 1.77 
Finland 2.72 2.48 1.83 1.68 1.63 1.64 1.78 1.81 1.73 
France 2.73 2.84 2.47 1.93 1.95 1.81 1.78 1.70 1.89 
Germany 2.37 2.50 2.03 1.48 1.56 1.37 1.45 1.25 1.38 
FRG bef. unif. 2.37 2.51 1.99 1.45 1.45 1.28 1.45 1.34 1.38 
Former GDR 2.35 2.49 2.19 1.54 1.94 1.74 1.50 0.84 1.22 
Greece 2.22 2.25 2.40 2.32 2.22 1.67 1.32 1.29 
Hungary 2.02 1.82 1.98 2.35 1.91 1.85 1.87 1.57 1.32 
Iceland 4.27 3.79 2.83 2.65 2.48 1.89 2.30 2.08 2.08 
Ireland 3.76 4.03 3.87 3.43 3.24 2.48 2.11 1.84 1.88 
Italy 2.41 2.66 2.43 2.21 1.64 1.42 1.33 1.20 1.24 
Luxembourg 2.37 2.39 1.97 1.55 1.49 1.38 1.60 1.69 1.76 
Netherlands 3.12 3.04 2.57 1.66 1.60 1.51 1.62 1.53 1.72 
Norway 2.91 2.95 2.50 1.98 1.72 1.68 1.93 1.87 1.85 
Portugal 3.16 3.15 3.01 2.75 2.25 1.72 1.57 1.40 1.55 
Spain … 2.95 2.88 2.79 2.20 1.64 1.36 1.18 1.24 
Sweden 2.20 2.42 1.92 1.77 1.68 1.74 2.13 1.73 1.54 
Switzerland 2.44 2.61 2.10 1.61 1.55 1.52 1.58 1.48 1.50 
United Kingdom 2.71 2.89 2.43 1.81 1.90 1.79 1.83 1.71 1.65 
Japan* 2.00 2.14 2.13 1.91 1.80 1.76 1.54 1.42 1.36 
United States** 3.65 2.91 2.48 1.77 1.84 1.84 2.08 2.02 2.06 
Source: Council of Europe (2002), Recent Demographic Developments in Europe.  *: Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (2002), Vital Statistics. **: United States’ Bureau of Census: (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbconf.html). 
 
 
However, the CFR has the disadvantage that one has to wait until the woman reaches the end 
of her fecund age say 45 or 50 before one can measure it, whereas the TFR measures current 
fertility, by age of the woman. Therefore one can study recent trends by the TFR, whereas the 
CFR is a measure of fertility by those cohorts who have already reached age of infecundity. 
 99
                                                                                                                                Chapter III 
Table 3.2. : Completed Fertility of Female Births in Selected countries, Cohorts 
born 1930 or after. 
 
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 
Austria 2.32 2.45 2.12 1.96 1.87 1.76 1.61 … 
Belgium 2.28 2.27 2.16 1.93 1.83 1.83 1.84 … 
Czech Republic 2.14 2.12 2.07 2.03 2.10 2.07 2.02 1.92 
Denmark 2.36 2.38 2.24 2.06 1.91 1.84 1.89 1.92 
Finland 2.46 2.29 2.04 1.88 1.86 1.90 1.95 1.90 
France 2.63 2.57 2.41 2.22 2.11 2.13 2.10 1.99 
Germany 2.18 2.16 1.97 1.80 1.72 1.67 1.65 1.53 
FRG bef. unif. 2.14 2.17 1.97 1.78 1.69 1.62 1.59 1.48 
Former GDR … 2.12 1.99 1.87 1.79 1.81 1.79 1.57 
Greece … … … … 2.04 2.00 1.93 1.72 
Hungary 2.07 1.99 1.92 1.90 1.95 1.94 2.02 1.97 
Iceland … … … 2.87 2.71 2.57 2.49 2.34 
Ireland … … … … 3.04 2.67 2.41 2.19 
Italy 2.28 2.28 2.14 2.07 1.89 1.80 1.65 1.48 
Luxembourg … … … 1.82 1.72 1.69 1.75 1.80 
Netherlands 2.67 2.49 2.22 2.00 1.89 1.87 1.85 1.77 
Norway 2.48 2.57 2.45 2.21 2.09 2.05 2.09 2.06 
Portugal 2.94 2.88 2.66 2.42 2.08 2.04 1.90 1.82 
Spain … … … 2.43 2.10 1.90 1.75 1.59 
Sweden 2.12 2.14 2.05 1.98 2.00 2.03 2.04 1.97 
Switzerland 2.18 2.18 2.08 1.86 1.79 1.75 1.77 1.65 
United Kingdom … … … … … 2.02 1.96 1.87 
Source: Council of Europe (2002), Recent Demographic Developments in Europe.   
Note: Figures for 1960 and 1965 are based on estimates. 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows CFR or completed family size for cohorts of women born between 1930 and 
1965. In this table, generations for which completed fertility can be measured were born up to 
1955 and estimates for more recent cohorts involve an element of projection. As revealed by 
the table, the CFRs show more of a continuous downward trend than the wide variation that is 
observed in the TFRs of Table 3.1. The reason why the TFRs vary more widely than the CFRs 
is that there is a timing effect on fertility so that a couple who aspired to a completed family 
size of two children may decide to postpone having a child if they perceive times as being bad. 
In other words, the TFR can vary considerably depending on the timing of births. One 
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example is Sweden where the CFRs are close to 2 for all cohorts, but the TFR was for example 
2.13 in 1990 and only 1.54 in 2000. It is clear that each of the measures, TFR and CFR, 
capture different things and they are therefore not substitutable for each other. 
 
 




‘One of the determinants of the decrease in total fertility rates in developed countries is 
postponement of maternity. Based on earlier demographic studies, Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998) explain how total fertility rates can be divided into the quantum effect and tempo 
effect. The quantum effect is the total fertility rate that we would have observed, had there 
been no change in the timing of births. The tempo effect is the effect of changes in timing. To 
decompose fertility into the quantum and tempo effects, birth-order specific birth rates are 
needed for each one-year period and single year of age of the mother. The tempo-adjusted 
birth-order specific total fertility rate in that year, (adj)TFRi, then can be computed as:  
(adj) TFRi = TFRi/(1 - ri),                                                                  (1) 
where TFRi  is the observed birth-order specific total fertility rate, ri is the increase in the mean 
age of the mother at the birth of the i-th child. For example, if the mean age at first births 
increases from 27.0 to 27.1, then r1 = 0.1. In order to obtain a measure of tempo and quantum 
effects, the adjusted total fertility rates should be computed by birth order (i = 1, 2, ...) and be 
summarised over birth orders:  
(adj)TFR=∑i(adj)TFRi.                                                                      (2) 
 
The difference between the observed total fertility rate (TFR) and the adjusted total fertility 
rate (adj) TFR is then a measure of the tempo effect. 
The decomposition of total fertility rates into the quantum and tempo effect has been studied 
for a number of countries (Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002; Lesthaege and Willems, 2002; 
Kohler and Philipov, 2002). The main result from these studies is that postponement is 
responsible for some of the decrease in total fertility rates (TFR), but that there are also 
substantial quantum effects. As pointed out by Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002), it is a well-
established result that there is a correlation between tempo and quantum effects in the sense 
that later first births are correlated with smaller completed cohort fertility. Of course this is a 
mere correlation and the causality can be that a woman who decides to have two children does 
not have to start so early as a woman who wants to have four children. However, it is also 
possible that a woman who is a very late first-time mother will find that she is unable to realize 
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Table 3.3. Mean Age of Women at Birth of the First Child in Selected 
Countries, 1960-2000.  
 
                   1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Austria      24.3 25.0 25.6 26.3 
Belgium#                     24.8 24.5 24.3 24.4 24.7 25.5 26.4 26.993  
Czech Republic 22.9 22.7 22.5 22.5 22.4 22.3 22.5 23.3 24.9 
Denmark 23.1 22.7 23.8 23.9 24.6 25.7 26.4 27.4  
Finland 24.7 24.6 24.4 24.9 25.6 25.9 26.5 27.2 27.4 
France# 24.8 24.4 24.4 24.5 25.0 25.9 27.0 28.1 28.799 
Germany# 25.0 24.4 24.0 24.5 25.0 26.1 27.5 28.099 
FRG bef.unif. # 25.3 24.6 24.2 24.9 25.5 26.5 27.0 27.6 28.099 
Former GDR# 23.9 23.6 23.3 23.4 23.5 24.1 24.6 26.3 27.699 
Greece     24.1 24.5 25.5 26.6 27.3 
Hungary 22.9 22.9 22.5 22.4 22.8 23.1 23.8 25.1 
Iceland   21.3 21.8 21.9 23.1 24.0 25.0 25.5 
Ireland   25.872 25.5 25.5 26.1 26.6 27.3 27.8 
Italy 25.7 25.3 25.0 24.7 25.0 25.9 26.9 28.0 28.797 
Luxembourg   27.2 27.1 27.5 27.9 28.4 29.0 29.3 
Netherlands 25.7 25.2 24.8 25.2 25.7 27.6 28.4 28.6 
Norway      25.186 25.6 26.4 26.9 
Portugal     24.0 24.2 24.9 25.8 26.5 
Spain    25.1 25.0 25.8 26.8 28.4 29.1 
Sweden 25.5 25.2 25.9 24.4 25.3 26.1 26.3 27.2 27.9 
Switzerland 26.1 25.6 25.3 25.7 26.3 27.0 27.6 28.1 28.7 
#       27.3 28.3 29.1 
Japan* 25.4 25.7 25.7 26.4 26.7 27.0 27.5 28.0 







Source: Council of Europe (2002), Recent Demographic Developments in Europe.  *: Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (2002), Vital Statistics. **: United States’ National Center for Health Statistics (2002), ‘Mean Age of Mother, 
1970-2000,’ National Vital Statistics Reports, 51(1), (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm). 
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3.2.3. Postponement of maternity and ultimate childlessness 
Table 3.3 presents the mean age of the mother at first birth for selected countries. In most of 
the countries in the table, there is a U-shaped pattern over time with the bottom in 1970 or  
                                                
1975, i.e. the lowest age of motherhood in all these countries was realized around 1970 or 
1975. The age of the mother at first birth initially decreased for the births that occurred in 
1960 to the lowest level around 1970, and then it increased again to the highest level ever 
observed in 2000. The most recent pattern is that of increasing age at maternity. Not even in 
those countries where the trend towards older mothers started first, like the Netherlands, is 
there any tendency for this trend to level off. 
For example, the age of the mother at first birth in the Netherlands averaged 25.7 in 1960 after 
which it decreased to 24.8 years in 1970. In 1990, it had risen to 27.6 years and in 2000 the 
mean age of the mother at first birth was as high as 28.6 years. There are also clear differences 
between countries with the East European countries having the youngest mothers. The largest 
increase in the mean age of the mother at first birth is observed in former East Germany, from 
24.1 in 1985 to 27.6 in 2000. Interestingly, in 2000 the mean age of mothers at first birth was 
lower in the United States than in any of the European countries, presented in Table 3.3, 
whereas Japan has experienced the same recent trend of postponement of maternity as the 
European countries. 
Is there a reason to worry about this trend? Having a child at age 29 is well within the 
biological limit. Looking at the mean age of the mother, there could still be little to have 
concerns about, but there is a distribution around the mean with particularly old mothers 
among highly educated women. Furthermore, there are also a large number of them that 
ultimately remain childless. Beets (1997) shows the median, first and third quartiles of the age 
of the mother at first birth according to birth cohort of the mother. The age at first birth when 
75 percent of women have had a first birth had increased spectacularly comparing the cohort 
of women born in 1945 to that of women born in 1955.  
Among the 16 European countries analysed by Beets (1997)7, the third quartile is older than 
age 30 for seven countries namely Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, England and 
Wales, Finland and West Germany. For West Germany the third quartile for women born in 
1955 was as high as 34 years. This means that a large share of these 25 percent of women of 
this cohort will never give birth to a child, since very few first births occur after age 35 
(Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Wetzels, 2002). In another study, Beets (1998) presents figures split 
according to the education of the mother for a number of countries and on the proportion 
women still childless at age 35. Beets analyses two cohorts, namely women born 1948-1952 
and women born 1953-1957 and three educational groups high, medium and low between 
1948 and 1952 as many as 43.2 percent were still childless at age 35 and for the cohort born 
1953-1957 the proportion is 37.0 percent. Other countries that also have large numbers of 
childless women for the younger cohort are: Italy (33.0), Spain (35.3) and Canada (37.6). 
 
 
3.3. Data base work on motherhood  
 
In this section, we explain data base work on motherhood that has been performed for the 
papers with econometric analyses that examine the relationships between motherhood choices, 
labour market conditions and public policies. Partners 2 (the Amsterdam team) and 3 (the 
Turin team) are involved in this work: five papers from partner 2 and three papers from 
partner 3. Moreover, partner 4 (the Athens team) also provides one paper. Since every team 
 
7 The following 16 European countries are analysed by Beets (1997): Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England 
and Wales, Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden. 
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has made their own data base, namely reorganizing data and creating necessary variables for 
their papers, we explain data base work for each paper.  
We start by discussing the papers by the Turin team, followed by the paper by the Athens 
team, and then by the Amsterdam team. In the next section, we discuss socio-economic and 
demographic factors affecting maternity decisions and the results from micro-econometric 
estimations in these papers. In addition, Gustafsson and Kalwij (eds. forthcoming) also make a 
significant contribution to the current topic, ‘Motherhood choices’. We will discuss extensively 
the papers included in this forthcoming book in Section 3.5.  
Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri (2003) study ‘Child-care choices by Italian households’. This paper 
attempts to explain the small use of non-parental childcare and low labour force participation 
of mothers in Italy in an international perspective (see chapter I, Table 1.2 above). Del Boca, 
Locattelli and Vuri combine two different individual-level data sets for 1998: one is the Bank 
of Italy’s Survey of household and wealth (IT-SHIW) and the other is the Multiscopo survey, 
collected by the Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT). The latter survey includes information 
on family structure, everyday-life, past and present work experience, use of social services and 
use of childcare. In particular, detailed information on childcare is the advantage of this data 
set. However, the survey does not provide information on household earnings and income. 
Therefore, they obtain this information from the former data, IT-SHIW, applying a statistical 
matching method. Their empirical analyses are carried out for the sample of 1259 married 
women aged 18 to 45 with spouse present, and with children in the age range 0-3. 
Bratti, Del Bono and Vuri (2003), the second paper, is on ‘Work attachment of new mothers: the 
role of human capital, employment stability and job protection in Italy’. This paper analyses 
women’s employment after the birth of the first child. Bratti, Del Bono and Vuri use the 
Longitudinal Survey of Italian Households (LSIH), which has been conducted since 1997 by 
the University of Trento, Instituto Trentino di Cultura and the Italian Office of National 
Statistics. The first wave of 1997 is used for their analyses with retrospective information on 
women’s employment history. They use the information on characteristics of women’s work 
before marriage and first birth to investigate the effects of these variables on employment after 
first birth. Retrospective information allows constructing life histories on timing of births, 
education, work and occupation, social background, geographical area of residence. The 
sample includes 2,560 married women, of whom 12% without children.  
Del Boca, Pasqua and Pronzato (2003) the third paper from the Turin team is on ‘Analyzing 
women’s employment and fertility rates in Europe: differences and similarities in Northern 
and Southern Europe’. This paper examines the effect of labour market characteristics and 
availability on child-care on fertility and labour force participation in several European 
countries. Del Boca, Pasqua and Pronzato use the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) 1994-1999 for Italy, Spain, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. They include the 
information on income, which is made comparable across countries by using PPP, purchasing 
power parity translation rates. Regional unemployment rates and percentages of part-time jobs 
taken from REGIO (Eurostat) are included in the analysis. They construct labour force 
participation histories around first childbirth. They use the sample of women in the age rage 
21-45, married (or cohabitant) in five countries. The sample size for labour force participation 
estimation is 12,466 and for fertility equation is 16,764. 
Symeonidou and Mitsopoulpos’ study ‘The timing of the first, second and third childbirths in 
Greece’ (2003) is a contribution from the Greek team. The paper examines the effect of 
women’s work history and other socio-economic factors on childbirth timings. The data set 
they use is the 1999 Greek Fertility and Family Survey by the National Centre of Social 
Research, which is in the framework of the international Fertility and Family Survey, 
coordinated by the Population Activities Unit of the United Nations (PAU) in the 1990s. 
Using retrospective information in this survey, they create a database on Greek women’s 
fertility history. More in specific, they make variables on time duration in months from age 15 
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to first birth, first to second birth, second to third birth and analyse how predetermined 
variables shift the hazard, or conditional probability of having a birth of birth order 1,2 and 3, 
given that the event has not yet taken place. This paper analyses 1,852 women for the first 
births, 1,643 women for the second births, and 1,255 women for the third births.  
Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Worku (2003) in the first paper from the Amsterdam team discuss  
‘Human capital of women and men and the timing of parenthood’. The paper first analyses the 
connection between three related developments in European countries: decline in fertility, 
postponement of motherhood and extension of full-time education period. The paper then 
proceeds to a deeper analysis on the timing of parenthood and prospective mothers’ and 
fathers’ education. Using the data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1991-
1998, Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Worku construct first birth, union formation and education 
histories by searching backwards for couples of woman’s first child. The analyses include 6079 
women and 5593 men in Britain who give necessary information including the level of 
education.  
Kenjoh (2003) in the second paper of the Amsterdam team studies ‘Women’s employment 
around the birth of the first child in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Japan’. 
This paper examines the effect of family friendly policies on new mothers employment in 
these five countries, comparing births that occurred in the 1980s to those that occurred in the 
1990s. She employs the following household panel data from five countries: for Britain, BHPS 
1991-1998 (the same as Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Worku, 2003); for Germany, the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 1984-1998; for the Netherlands, the Labour Force Supply 
Panel 1985-1998 collected by the Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek (OSA, 
Netherlands’ Institute for Labour Studies); for Sweden, the Hushållens ekonomiska 
levnadsförhållanden 1984-1998 (HUS, Household Market and Non-Market Activities) and for 
Japan, the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers 1993-1997 (JPSC). Kenjoh constructs work 
histories of women around first childbirth in each of the five countries. She searches for 
information through different waves and retrospective information and reschedules monthly 
work information with birth month equal to zero. She selects the women who gave birth to 
the first child during the observation period of the 1980s and the 1990s. The number of 
women studied is between 300 and 1100 depending on countries. 
Wetzels and Tijdens (2002), the third paper from the Amsterdam team, studies ‘Dutch mothers 
return to work and the re-entry effect on wage’. The paper compares the information from 
three individual level data sources in the Netherlands. The first one is the FNV (the largest 
trade union confederation in the Netherlands) re-entrants survey (FNV, 2000), which gives 
information on women’s motives for re-entering to the labour market and the chances of re-
entry. For the analyses, 1,926 observations are originally included. The second one is OSA 
1996 and 1998 (above mentioned). Based on this data set, the sample of 907 women who did 
not participate in the labour market in 1996 is analysed to see whether these women (re-
)entered the labour market in 1998. The third data source is the Women’s Wages Indicator 
2000-2001 (WWI 2000-2001, or VLW 2000-2001 in Dutch), which includes the information 
on women’s wages. This data set provides the information on 15,508 women for the analysis 
on the impact of re-entry on women’s wages. The data set employs an interesting method to 
collect information on women’s wages through the Internet, initiated by Kea Tijdens at the 
University of Amsterdam. On the website of the project, the viewers can find out, from the 
information collected, how their own wage compares to that of other people with similar 
education, age and occupation. They are also asked to deliver their own data. This project has 
grown out to a European union sponsored project, WOLIWEB8, directed by Tijdens and 
indeed a worldwide project including non-European countries with additional sponsoring. 
Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) analyse ‘Wage effects of motherhood: A double selection approach’. 
                                                 
8 The full-title of the project is ‘The socio-economic determinants of citizens’ work life attitudes, preferences, 
perceptions, using the data from the continuous web-based European Wage Indicator Survey’. 
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This paper estimates wage differentials between mothers and childless women in the 
Netherlands, correcting for the selectivity bias resulting from two sources: 1) the motherhood 
decision and the employment decision and 2) the motherhood decision and the decision to be 
employed in a less demanding job.  They use Dutch Work and IT 2001 survey. This derives 
from the computerized ‘Telepanel’ collected by Tilburg University. This panel contains a 
representative sample of the Dutch population. The paper analyses 509 working and 210 non-
working women aged 16 to 64. 
Wetzels (2003) analyses ‘Women’s wages and double selection into motherhood and less 
demanding job: analysis of age groups in the Netherlands’. The paper employs the double 
selection approach but focuses on differences across age groups. It uses the above mentioned 
WWI 2000-2001 and selects a sample of 9337 working women born from 1940 to 1979. While 
this data set only includes employed women with wage information, the relatively large 
number of observations allows the author to divide the sample into three age categories. 
 
 
3.4. Results of Econometric estimations on the influence of socio-
economic and demographic factors on fertility 
 
In this section, we discuss the influence of socio-economic and demographic factors on 
fertility, for example, education, labour market experience before motherhood, family 
background of women on fertility. Institutional factors such as availability of affordable child-
care, generosity of parental leave, and part-time employment opportunity also play an 
important role in fertility decision. The nine papers we discussed in the previous section 
examine these issues (see also Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The information given in 
Chapters I and II form backgrounds for the econometric work. Chapter I identifies research 
questions related to labour market conditions, for example, which countries have low female 
labour force participation and low fertility, and which countries have little or much part-time 
work. Chapter II indicates the status of a country in international perspective as regards 
relative generosity and availability of parental leave, childcare and financial support to children.  
Note that most of the econometric studies reported below are based on data from one 
country. This means that the policy indicators developed in Chapter II cannot be directly used 
in the econometric analyses, since Chapter II delivers one value of the index for each country 
so that there is no variation to examine policy effects on motherhood choices. Similarly, for 
econometric studies using two countries Gustafsson and Worku (2004) or even five countries 
Kenjoh (2003), the index does not provide enough variation to use. However, an approach 
using directly measure values on policy variables is being developed by Del Boca, Pasqua, 
Pronzato and Wetzels. This study is an extension of Del Boca, Pasqua and Pronzato (2003) with 
more countries included from the ECHP. The work reported in Chapter II is therefore used as 
background information for econometric analyses in a similar way as the work reported in 
Chapter I. 
In Italy, where the female labour force participation rate is low (44%), only a very limited 
proportion of families with children under 3 use formal childcare (6%) (see Chapter I). Del 
Boca, Locatelli and Vuri (2003) examine why so few Italian households use public childcare and 
whether such little use of childcare explains the low participation rate. The first part of their 
paper presents simulation exercises based on their theoretical model on mothers’ decisions on 
market work and childcare use. The following cases are presented. First, increasing the 
eligibility criterion for public childcare (from 25 to 40 thousand euro of the family income 
upper limit) induces mothers to switch to use public childcare rather than private childcare and 
increase the number of hours supplied by mothers. The elasticity of hours of work is ε(H) = 
0.02. Second, increasing the price (parental fee) of public childcare (6.5 to 7.5 euro per hour) 
decreases female labour supply, ε(H) = -0.19. Third, extending opening hours for public 
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childcare (from 7 to 8 per day) increases female labour supply, ε(H) = 0.13. 
On the matched data as described in section 3.3 above, Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri estimate two 
econometric models. First, a bivariate probit model on being employed and purchasing child 
care (both private and public) is estimated to analyse the joint decision on labour force 
participation of mothers with young children and their use of formal childcare. The results 
show that mothers of a child aged 0-3 are more likely to work if their education is high and if 
household non-labour income is high. Both grandmother nearby and healthy, and husband’s 
hours of housework indicate positive effects on women’s employment. This result means that 
greater familial support is helpful for mothers to work in paid labour. They also find 
significant effects of policy variables and regional labour market conditions. High local public 
financial support, which is like welfare benefits, and high unemployment rate lower the 
probability of mothers to work, whereas larger opportunity to work in part-time employment 
increases this probability. The second econometric model estimated is a multinomial logit 
model on childcare choices among public, private and informal childcare for households 
where wives work. They find that the availability of public childcare increase the probability to 
use public childcare. Based on the estimations, they also present simulation results, which 
show that if availability of public child care increased to Danish standards (64%), mothers’ 
work and use of formal childcare would increase from 7% to 27%, whereas increase in 
childcare subsidies would not raise the mothers’ work and childcare use much. Their policy 
conclusion is to recommend increases the number of spaces in childcare for Italy. 
The main research question of Bratti, Del Bono and Vuri (2003) is how working conditions 
before first child determine labour force status after childbirth in Italy. Particularly, they 
examine participation behaviour of mothers at the time when the child is aged 12, 24 and 36 
months. They show that mothers’ labour force participation rate is almost the same when the 
child is 12, 24, and 36 months old. The variation is only 42, 42 and 40 per cent respectively. 
This contrasts widely with behaviour in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Japan, 
analysed by Kenjoh (2004) where labour force participation of mothers is shown to increase as 
the child’s age increases. They estimate three independent bivariate probits, which jointly 
estimate selection into having a child (by the end of observation period, namely by 1997) and 
being employed when the child is 1) 12 months, 2) 24 months, 3) 36 months. Subsequently, 
they estimate a probit model on having at least one career break in 36 months for women who 
were at work 9 months before having their first child.  
These empirical analyses find the connection between women’s pre-marital employment and 
motherhood employment in Italy. Having a regular job contract, and formal and informal 
childcare availability show positive effects on mothers’ employment 12, 24, and 36 months 
after childbirth. Women’s education, pre-marital work experience, work in the public sector 
increase the probability for women to work after having children and also reduce the 
likelihood for making a career interruption during the first three years after first childbirth.  
Del Boca, Pasqua, Pronzato (2003) examine whether the inter-country variation of labour force 
participation and fertility (see Table 1.2 in Chapter I) can be explained by differences in family 
policies and labour market conditions. They analyse the joint decision on fertility and labour 
force participation of women based on the pooled data set of five countries, namely Italy, 
Spain, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, and six waves. They estimate fixed effects logit 
models on fertility and participation separately, given the independence between these two 
decisions conditional on observable and unobservable (person-specific) characteristics. The 
dependent variables are as follows. Fertility is equal to 1 if the woman had a child in the last 
year and participation is equal to 1 if the woman is working at the time of the interview.  
They detect some statistically significant effects of policy variables on fertility decision and on 
labour force participation of women for five European countries. Part-time job opportunity 
has a positive effect and regional unemployment has a negative effect on women’s 
participation, whereas availability of childcare services has a positive effect on fertility. They 
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also present a graph on women’s employment around birth of the first child for some 
European countries. The graph shows that in Italy and Spain there are almost no swings in 
labour force participation around childbirth, which confirms the finding by Bratti, Del Bono 
and Vuri (2003) for Italy. A large dip of employment around childbirth is found for Britain in 
this study based on the ECHP, which is also found by Kenjoh (2003) using the BHPS (see 
below).  
Symeonidou and Mitsopoulpos (2003) show how incompatible childbearing and employment are in 
Greece. They examine whether timing of each birth is determined by 1) woman’s experience 
of ‘other’ pregnancies such as miscarriages, abortions, and still births, 2) education of woman 
and her husband, 3) woman’s labour force behaviour around birth, 4) age of the woman and 
her husband, and 5) the sex of the previous child.  They also control for the woman’s birth 
cohort, the number of siblings of the woman and the size of her childhood residential area. 
They estimate the duration from age 15 to first births, from first to second births, and from 
second to third births, using event history techniques. 
Their results are summarised as follows. First, Greek women either stick to a job or leave work 
permanently. For example, the percentage of women who withdraw from the labour market at 
having their first child and never resume market work afterwards is high, with 67% for fist 
birth and 77% for second birth. Also, women with stronger labour force attachment are less 
likely to make the transitions to have (more) children. Being in education has a negative effect 
on having children. They explain that these results are caused by the fact that policies towards 
the reconciliation of family and working life are inefficient and insufficient in Greece. Second, 
the situation in 1999 did not improved from that in 1983, for which a similar study was 
conducted. Third, younger cohorts postpone childbearing in comparison to older cohorts. 
Finally, third birth increases if previous births were girl, girl but not if boy, boy.  
Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Worku (2003) investigate how important own education and partner’s 
education are for the decision on birth of the first child. Their hypothesis is that since both 
men and women have education and career plans, the timing of couple formation and first 
childbirth depends on these plans. They estimate Cox proportional hazards of having the first 
child. Their dependent variable is duration from age 15 to the birth of the first child. The main 
explanatory variables are nine combinations of education level of husband and wife such as 
high educated husband and high educated wife, high educated husband and medium educated 
wife, etc.  
They analyse if the spouse has longer education, parenthood is delayed for a given educational 
level of the individual man or woman. The theoretical background of this argument is 
sequential determination of having a birth as discussed in Symeonidou and Mitsopoulpos. In 
other words, young people make a plan for a family size and they start family formation when 
planned education is finished. 
Kenjoh (2003) examines whether we can explain work behaviour around first birth by 
differences in institutional setting in five countries, namely Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Japan. She compares policy development and new mothers’ employment from the 
1980s to the 1990s. She analyses the following aspects of family friendly policies: length of 
parental leave, level of paid leave benefits, flexibility of leave arrangements, availability of 
affordable child care and availability of part-time employment (especially for Dutch and 
Japanese women).  
She presents detailed graphical analyses on monthly employment status of women from twelve 
months before first childbirth to sixty moths after for each of five counties and the 1980s and 
the 1990s. Employment status is distinguished between ‘out of the labour force, unemployed, 
on maternity leave, working part-time, working full-time and self-employed’. She then 
proceeds to estimate multinomial logit models on women’s employment status between 
working full-time, working part-time, and not working for the period after having children. 
The graphs show that in the 1980s the proportion women who worked 60 months after 
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childbirth was 70% in Sweden, whereas it was below 50% in the other four countries. Dutch 
and British mothers of 1990s worked much more than the 1980s mothers, whereas German 
mothers of the 1990s worked less. Swedish and Japanese women showed no significant change 
between the two decades. These results are also confirmed by the econometric analyses and in 
line with policy development in each of the five countries. 
Wetzels and Tijdens (2002) analyse what determines Dutch mothers re-entry to the labour 
market and whether career-breaks decrease subsequent wages. Their analyses are motivated by 
the following policy issue. In 2000, the European Council in Lisbon set a target for the net 
participation of women in the European Union of more than 60% by 2010 (see Chapter I). To 
meet this target, it is important to induce women to re-enter after a period of full-time 
mothering. Thus understanding the behaviour of female re-entrants and also their positions in 
the labour market is essential to draw adequate policy interpretation. 
They estimate a logit model on having a job in September 1998 given that a woman did not 
work in September 1996 (OSA). They also estimate a logit model on succeeding in finding a 
job among female job seekers, using the FNV 2000. Finally, they examine the effect of re-
entrant and career break on women’s wage, estimating hourly wage functions by OLS using 
the WWI data. The results show that women aged 45 or younger are five times more likely to 
re-enter than women older than 45 years. They also find that re-entry has a large negative wage 
effect.  
Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) investigate whether the motherhood pay gap to some extent is 
determined by mothers’ selecting themselves into non-demanding jobs. In other words, they 
analyse wage differences between mothers and childless women, correcting two double 
selection processes: firstly, the motherhood decision and the employment decision and 
secondly, the motherhood decision and the decision to be employed in a less demanding job. 
They use a cluster analysis to distinguish between a less demanding job and a demanding job. 
Then, they estimate wage equations separately and present wage decompositions between 
mothers and non-mothers depending on whether they have demanding or less demanding 
jobs.  
They detect that mothers in demanding jobs earn 4.5% more than non-mothers in demanding 
jobs, and that mothers in less demanding jobs earn 6.5% less than non-mothers. Wage 
decompositions dividing between ‘due to endowments’ and ‘due to discrimination’ show that 
when selectively is accounted for, the wage premium for mothers in demanding jobs is 20.5% 
due to discrimination and the wage loss for mothers in less demanding jobs is 37.1%.  
Wetzels (2003) further examines wage differences between mothers and childless women, 
correcting two double selection processes as Wetzels and Zorlu (2003), focusing on the 
differences between age groups, or cohorts of women. The motivation of this analysis is to 
examine the effect of change in Dutch policies on combining family and work since 1990. 
There are large cohort differences in labour force participation among Dutch women. 
Potentially wages for mothers have changed as an effect of policy changes. The question is 
then: do more mothers of the younger cohort select themselves into the more demanding jobs 
and is the wage penalty for motherhood then smaller for the younger cohort?  
Compared to the data used in Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) above, this paper takes an advantage 
of a large number of observations, which allows her to estimate separate analyses for three age 
groups. Wetzels show that wage difference results as in Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) are more 
pronounced for women aged 26-36 and aged 37-46 than for women aged 47-64. 
 
 
3.5. Education and postponement of maternity 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century, there has been an increase in the length of education in 
OECD countries. Both men and women spend much more of their young adult lives in full-
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time education9. An increased demand for skilled labour has resulted in educational expansion, 
which could be one of the major explanations of postponement of parenthood. In this section, 
we look at the relation between education and postponement of maternity. The papers 
discussed in this section are chapters included in the book volume edited by Gustafsson and 
Kalwij (forthcoming) (see also Appendix Table 3.1 and 3.2). To fill the gap on empirical 
studies on timing of maternity in Europe, Gustafsson approached the research community 
with a call for papers when the MOCHO project was started. The papers were accepted on the 
basis of abstracts and first drafts were presented at the Scholar Institute of the University of 
Amsterdam took place in October 2002. The editors have then read and commented on 
various versions and authors have made significant improvements.  
In this section, the following questions are discussed. Is the role of education in delayed 
motherhood the same in different countries? Is postponement of maternity caused by the lack 
of income during student life or is it due to competing time use? Or are future income 
prospects determining? Was it worth waiting to have a child until later in terms of career 
outcomes? Is finding a husband being delayed during student life or do higher educated 
couples wait longer to become parents? Do highly educated couples have fewer children than 
less educated couples?  
There is a vivid methodological debate on how one can identify causal effects in the area of 
fertility, since choices about education, marriage, labour force participation and motherhood 
are typically interrelated and perhaps simultaneously determined. Gustafsson and Kalwij 
(2004) review and evaluate this debate and show how the different papers included in the 
volume have dealt with methodological issues. There are two approaches in the econometric 
literature on fertility, which both claim to model the full fertility history. The system of hazards 
approach initiated by Heckman and Walker (1990) on the one hand and the structural discrete 
time method by backward recursion suggested by Wolpin (1984). Each of these methods 
requires programming and extensive computations by the researcher and cannot be estimated 
using available software. Only a handful of followers exist for either method. One review of 
econometric analyses on fertility, Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997) conclude that empirical 
work is much less developed than either the economic theoretical modelling or the 
econometric techniques. The papers included in Gustafsson and Kalwij (eds. forthcoming) 
focus on different aspects of the timing of maternity.  
Skirbekk, Kohler and Prskawets (2004) show that there is a special compulsory school cohort 
effect, at least in Sweden. Those who are born in January, because they are older at finishing 
school than those born in December, are also 4.9 months older when they have their first 
child. This effect remains although the latter event takes place 10 to 12 years later than 
completion of compulsory school. The conclusion is that age at finishing school rather than 
calendar age is important for timing of maternity. 
Competing time use for raising children with working in the labour market is emphasized in 
O’Donoghue and O’Shea (2004) on Ireland and in Bratti (2004) on Italy. The Irish study shows 
that the propensity of first births in 1994 in comparison to 1970 decreased mainly because 
female wages hade increased and the proportion time women spent in the labour market had 
increased but also because couples waited longer after marriage. Bratti (2004) finds that Italian 
women with higher education tend to combine work and family to a larger extent than less 
educated women and they also postpone motherhood more. Uncertainty about future income 
is emphasized in De la Rica and Iza (2004) on Spain. Fixed-term contracts rather than 
                                                 
9 Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Wetzels (2002) estimate that mean age at finishing full-time education for women born in 
the 1960s compared to those born in the 1930s increased between 1.2 to 2.8 years in a 30 year period in Britain, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. School life expectancy computed by UNESCO (2002) also presents a large 
extension in educational period. Since 1970, almost all countries that the data are available experienced the increase of 
this measure. For instance, the total year of a female child spent in school rose from 11.5 in 1970 to 13.5 in 1995. The 
corresponding figures increased 10.9 to 13.5 for Ireland, 12.3 to 16.8 for the Netherlands and 12.3 to 16.2 for the 
United Kingdom, respectively (see Gustafsson, forthcoming, Tables 1.3a, 1.3b and 1.3c). 
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permanent contracts have grown on the Spanish labour market particularly for young people. 
The results show that having a fixed-term rather than an indefinite labour contract delays entry 
into marriage for men, but not for women, whereas a fixed-term contract held by a woman 
makes her delay motherhood. 
Was it worthwhile career-wise to postpone maternity? This is the question asked in Amuedo-
Dorantes and Kimmel (2004) for college educated US women. The results show that women who 
delayed motherhood in comparison to equally educated mothers who had children earlier in 
life earn substantially higher wages, so it was worth waiting.  
In Kalwij (2004) the focus is on savings behaviour around births in the Netherlands. The main 
findings are that couples do save more before having a child than after, which is in line with a 
consumption smoothing hypothesis but they do not reduce savings enough to offset the 
reduction in income due to women leaving employment. Couples with children consume less, 
not more than childless couples. 
Timing of maternity in transition economies is analysed in Kreyenfeld (2004) and Kantorova 
(2004). Both for East Germany after unification and for the Czech Republic after the fall of 
the Soviet Union postponement of maternity has increased. One of the major effects is that 
educational differences in timing of maternity have increased in both countries during 
transition to market economies. This suggests that career planning has become more 
important in comparison to the state socialist period when child care and maternity leaves 
were more abundant and individual choices were less important to earnings. Kreyenfeld (2004) 
and Kantorova (2004) show that the institutional setting plays a role. In Gustafsson and Worku 
(2004) the institutional setting is also in focus in comparing timing of couple formation and 
timing of first birth in Britain and Sweden. It is well known that Sweden has had potentially 
pronatalist family policies since the early 1970s and such policies are also today compared to 
the British situation more favourable to becoming a parent (see Chapter II above). Yet, 
Swedish women of a given education are not younger mothers than British women. In 
Gustafsson and Worku (2004) it is shown that Swedish women are older at finishing education, 
older at entering a marriage or cohabitation, but once the couple is formed they are quicker to 
have their first child. They may have identified the pronatalist effect, which in cross 
tabulations is not visible because of an opposing effect from the fact that Swedes are older 
than British when leaving shcool.  
The Norwegian completed family size is analysed in Naz, Nilsen and Vagstad (2004). This paper 
shows that higher educated married couples in Norway have more children than less educated 
couples and that this effect is primarily driven by husband’s education rather than by wife’s 
education. This is not a contradiction to other findings that higher educated women have 
fewer children than less educated women. The difference instead comes from lower 





Econometric work of the MOCHO project has pointed to some important explanatory factors 
for the combination of work and motherhood or for the lack of opportunities for combining 
work and motherhood in some of the countries we studied. One of the conclusions is that 
whereas we observe a pattern of almost universal full-time labour force participation among 
women who are not yet pregnant with their first child in countries like Sweden, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Britain, this is not yet the case in countries like Italy and Spain. In Japan there 
is a high pre-motherhood labour force participation that drops to a much lower level, around 
40 per cent, after childbirth, which increases very little as the child approaches 5 years of age. 
By contrast employment of new mothers drops sharply at the time of the birth of the first 
child in Britain, Germany and Sweden to be resumed, when the child is 5 years old, almost 
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completely in Sweden and to a large degree in Britain and Germany (about 60 per cent). In 
Italy on the other hand the same proportion of new mothers are working when the child is 12 
months old as when the child is 24 and 36 months old:  about 40 per cent of the new mothers 
are working. In Greece women have to either stick to their job or leave it permanently. These 
observations about women’s labour force participation around the birth of the first child 
suggest that public policies that facilitate the combination of work and family affect women’s 
labour force participation not only in the short run around childbirth but also in the long run 
after children have entered school. 
Much econometric modelling effort has been focused on the issue how to identify causal 
effects on women’s labour supply and fertility. Since the decisions are often taken 
simultaneously, it does not seem right to explain fertility by labour market behaviour and 
labour market behaviour by number of children as has often been done in the past. Therefore 
the simulation policy analysis of Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri (2003) gives some independent 
policy effects by analysing effects on labour supply of women by changing the price of public 
childcare, the upper family income level and the opening hours of public childcare in Italy. 
This analysis shows that the last two policy changes will increase female labour supply, while 
decreasing the price of public childcare will only make families switch from private to public 
childcare.  
The help of extended family is important in Italy and Japan. In Italy having a healthy 
grandmother who lives nearby will increase labour supply of the new mother. In Japan it is not 
uncommon to live together in a three-generation family. In such families the young mother is 
more likely to work in a regular job, other things equal. In the Netherlands we have witnessed 
a large cohort effect in female labour force participation. Whereas in the 1980s it was still 
uncommon for new mothers to be employed in the labour market it has become common to 
do so in the 1990s. The probability to reenter the labour force from having been in a work 
interruption, comparing 1996 to 1998, was about 4 times larger for someone under the age of 
45 in comparison to an older woman. It means that the probability that an older woman re-
enters is very low. 
This is another indication that the long labour force interruptions for mothers advocated by 
traditionalists are damaging to overall labour force participation. However, the view on how 
long is a long interruption varies between countries. For example, almost all Swedish women 
take 12 months parental leave after giving birth, even when they have career ambitions (Kenjoh, 
2003 and Gustafsson and Kenjoh, 2004). This suggests that mothers do not see the 12 months 
of leave period as being too long in Sweden. Indeed, in this country career interuption due to 
taking parental leave does not have a negative influence on women’s wages (Albrecht, et al., 
1999).   In other countries, long career breaks may be more damaging as the literature on so-
called family wage gap i.e. the wage difference between mothers and non-mothers indicates 
(Chapter I).  
Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) and Wetzels (2003) are extending our knowledge of the sources of the 
family wage gap. Their idea is that women may either select themselves into demanding jobs 
or into non-demanding jobs and they model this selection. Their analysis shows that mothers 
who had chosen for demanding jobs actually earn more than women who are not mothers, 
other things equal, by 4.5%, whereas in non-demanding jobs the wage differential is reversed. 
Such a positive wage gap for mothers compared to non-mothers is also found for American 
college educated women (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2004), who have postponed their first 
birth. It is likely that the reason for postponement is career planning which explains the result 
that college educated women who postponed first birth earn more than college educated 
women who did not postpone first birth and even more than childless college educated 
women.  
These high earning mothers are the high achievers or in words of Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) and 
Wetzels (2003) the ones who select themselves into demanding jobs. Those women who are 
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able to do both the mothering and the demanding jobs are efficient above average and they are 
rewarded for that on the labour market. This result is also promising because it suggests that 
mothers are not discriminated against on the Dutch labour market if we agree on the 
assumption that being in a demanding or non-demanding job is their own choice. However, 
the selection may be a source of discrimation if employers discriminate against mothers when 
hiring for demanding jobs.   
Finally, the papers in Gustafsson and Kalwij (eds., forthcoming) show that institutions matter 
because although education postpones motherhood in all the countries studied, the size of the 
effect differs between the countries. In order for there to be an effect from education on 
postponement of maternity there has to be a labour market that demands skilled female labour 
and skills have to make a difference for the sort of career a woman can expect. Both past 
incomes and savings, labour market career in the past, current and expected future situation 
matter for both the woman and for the man, for their decisions on when to form a couple and 
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when 1st child is 
12, 24, 36 months 
old 
De la Rica, S. 
and A. Iza 
(2004) 
Spain Timing of 
marriage and 
first birth for 
men and 
women 
 College educated mothers do 
not experience a motherhood 
wage penalty.  
 Women who delayed 
motherhood in comparison to 
equally educated mothers who 
had children earlier in life earn 
substantially higher wages. 
Thus it is worth postponing 
having a child.  
Multinomial logit 
model on fertility 
and participation  
 Italian women with higher 
education tend to combine 
work and have children to a 
larger extent than less educated 
women. They also postpone 
motherhood more. 

Having a regular job contract, 
and formal and informal 
childcare availability show 
positive effects on mothers’ 
employment. 
Women’s education, pre-marital 
work experience, work in the 
public sector increase the 
probability for women to work 
after having children and reduce 
the likelihood for making a 
career interruption during the 
first three years after first birth. 
Probit model on 
having at least one 
career break 
during the 36 
months after first 
childbirth 
Fixed-term contract rather than 
permanent contracts have grown 
on the Spanish labour market 





Logit models on 1) 
getting married 
and 2) having a 
first birth 
Hazard 
estimations on 1) 
getting married 
and 2) having a 
first birth 
Having a fixed-term rather than 
an indefinite labour contract 
delays entry into marriage for 
men, but not for women, 
whereas a fixed-term contract 
held by a woman makes her 
delay motherhood. 
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 High local public financial 
support and high unemployment 
rate lower the probability of 
mothers with children aged 0-3, 
whereas larger opportunity to 
work in part-time employment 
increases this probability.  

Increasing the upper family 
income level and the opening 
hours of public childcare have a 
positive effect on female labour 
supply, while decreasing the 
price of public childcare will 
only make families switch from 
private to public childcare. 
Simulation based 
on theoretical 






 Multinomial logit 
model on childcare 
choices among 
public, private and 
informal childcare 
where wives work 
The availability of public 
childcare increases the 
probability to use public 
childcare. 
Part-time job opportunity has a 
positive effect and regional 
unemployment has a negative 
effect on women’s participation, 
whereas availability of childcare 
services has a positive effect on 
fertility.  
 Using pooled data 
from the 5 
countries, fixed 
effects logit 
models on fertility 
and participation  

 Cox proportional 
hazard models of 
having a first child 
The educational investments of 
husband and wife have 
independent effects on the 
timing of parenthood so that a 
low educated woman will take 
more time to have a first child if 
her husband has a high 
education than she will if he has 
a low education. . 





Compared to Swedish women, 
British women are on average 
younger at finishing education, 
younger at entering a marriage or 
cohabitation. Once the couple is 
formed, however, British women 






for income growth 
and consumption 
growth 
Couples save more before 
having a child than after, which 
is in line with a consumption 
smoothing hypothesis but they 
do not reduce savings enough to 
offset the reduction in income 
due to women leaving 
employment.  
Couples with children consume 
less, not more than childless 
couples. 
 118
                                                                                                            Appendix to Chapter III 

















Germany Timing of 
motherhood 
Naz, G., Ø. 
Anti-Nilsen 
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studies completion and entry 
into motherhood prolonged, 







age of mother as 
piecewise linear 
spine Greater education differentiation 
of labour market opportunities 
and constraints brought about 
greater education differentiation 
in the timing of entry into 
motherhood. 
Mothers in Britain and the NL 
work more in the 1990s than 
1980s for the 5 years after first 
birth, whereas West German 
mothers work less in the 1990s 
than 1980s and Swedish and 
Japanese mothers do not show a 
significant difference between 
these two decades. These 
changes reflect the policy change 









time, not at work 
for each country 
Higher education has strong 
positive effects in the UK and 
the NL, whereas no significant 






In the former GDR, educational 
participation and parenthood 
was more compatible than in the 
West and there was little 
variation in the timing of fertility 
by educational attainment. 
Compared to the situation 
before unification, parenthood 
and educational participation is 
less compatible in present day 
East Germany. The variation in 
the timing of first birth by 
woman’s education attainment 
has substantially increased after 







Higher educated married couples 
have more children than less 
educated couples. This effect is 
primarily driven by husband’s 
education rather than by wife’s 
education.  
For unmarried women, the 
relationship between education 
and fertility is negative. This 
suggests that these women suffer 
a more detrimental impact of 
motherhood on their careers 
than do married women. 
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Greece Timing of 
first, second 
and third birth 
for women 
Wetzles, C. 





The propensity of first births in 
1994 in comparison to 1970 
decreased mainly because female 
wages had increased and the 
proportion time women spent in 
the labour market had increased 
but also because couples waited 
longer after marriage. 


Logit models of 
first, second, third 
or higher order 




in female fertility 
propensity 1970-
1994  
 Regression on the 
age at first birth 
with birth month 
dummies  
School leaving age has a strong 
effect on the timing of the first 
and second childbirths. For 
example, women born in 
December enter and leave 
compulsory school when they 
are 11 months younger than 
women born in January the next 
calendar year. However, the 
former women have their first 
birth at an age which is 4.9 
months younger than the latter 
women.  
Greek women either stick to a 
job or leave work permanently. 
Women with stronger labour 
force attachment are less likely 
to make the transitions to have 






duration from age 
15 to first birth, 
first to second 
birth and second 
to third birth. 
Younger cohorts postpone 
childbearing comparison to 
older cohorts.  
Women aged 45 or younger are 
5 times more likely to re-enter 






Logit model on 
having a job in 
1998 given that a 
woman did not 
work in 1996. 
Logit model on 
succeeding in 
finding a job 





Re-entry has a large negative 
wage effect. 
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Mothers in demanding jobs earn 
4.5% more than non-mothers in 
demanding jobs, whereas 
mothers in less demanding jobs 




Cluster analysis to 
distinguish 
between a less 
demanding job 
and a demanding 
job 
Estimating hourly 
wage for  mothers 
and childless 
women separately  




Wage difference results as in 
Wetzels and Zorlu (2003) above 
are more pronounced for 
women aged 26-36 and aged 37-
46 than for women aged 47-64. 
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Appendix Table 3.2. Main results from micro-econometric analyses according to 
country  
 
DE <Fertility> In the former GDR, educational participation and parenthood was more 
compatible than in the West and there was little variation in the timing of fertility by 
educational attainment. However, compared to the situation before unification, 
parenthood and educational participation is less compatible in present day East 
Germany. The variation in the timing of first birth by woman’s education attainment 
has substantially increased after unification in East Germany. (Kreyenfeld, 2004) 
 
 <Employment> West German women who gave birth to the first child in the 1990s 
worked less after first childbirh than those who had their first child in the 1980s, 
reflecting the extension of German maternity leave period to three years. (Kenjoh, 
2003). New rules since 2001 may again increase participation of new mothers.  
 
EL <Fertility & Employment> Greek women either stick to a job or leave work 
permanently. Women with stronger labour force attachment are less likely to make 
the transitions to have (more) children. Younger cohorts postpone childbearing in 
comparison to older cohorts. (Symeonidou and Mitsopoulpos, 2003). 
 
ES <Fertility> Fixed-term contract rather than permanent contracts have grown on the 
Spanish labour market particularly for young people. Having a fixed-term rather than 
an indefinite labour contract delays entry into marriage for men, but not for women, 
whereas a fixed-term contract held by a woman makes her delay motherhood. (De la 
Rica and Iza, 2004). 
 
IE <Fertility> The propensity of first births in 1994 in comparison to 1970 decreased 
mainly because female wages had increased and the proportion time women spent in 
the labour market had increased but also because couples waited longer after 
marriage. (O’Donoghue and O’Shea, 2004).  
 
IT <Fertility> Italian women with higher education tend to combine work and family to 
a larger extent than less educated women. They also postpone motherhood more. 
(Bratti, 2004). 
 
 <Employment> The same proportion of new mothers are working when the child is 
12 months old as when the child is 24 and 36 months old: about 40% of the new 
mothers are working. Women’s education, pre-marital work experience, work in the 
public sector increase the probability for women to work after having children and 
also reduce the liklihood for making a career interruption during the first three years 
after first childbirth. (Bratti, Del Bono and Vuri, 2003). 
 
 <Employment> Increasing the upper family income level and the opening hours of 
public childcare have a positive effect on female labour supply, while decreasing the 
price of public childcare will only make families switch from private to public 
childcare. Having a healthy grandmother who lives nearby will increase labour supply 
of the new mother. (Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri, 2003). The latter point is also 
found by Bratti (2004). 
 
NL <Wages> Mothers who had chosen for demanding jobs actually earn more than 
women who are not mothers, other things equal, by 4.5%, whereas in non-
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demanding jobs the wage differential is reversed. This suggests that mothers are not 
discriminated against on the Dutch labour market if we agree on the assumption that 
being in a demanding or non-demanding job is their own choice. (Wetzels and 
Zorlu, 2003 and Wetzels, 2003). 
 
<Employment> Women who gave birth to their first child in the 1990s (re-)enter in 
paid work much quicker than those who gave birth in the 1980s. Similar to the 
Netherlands, after first childbirth high educated women work significantly more, 
particularly in full-time employment, than low educated mothers. (Kenjoh, 2003). 
 <Employment> Women’s employment after first childbirth has increased significantly 
from the 1980s to the 1990s. Educational difference in employment rate for new 
mothers is very large (i.e. high educated women are much more likely than low 
educated women to be labour force participants) in this country compared to 
Sweden or Germany.  (Kenjoh, 2003). 
 
 <Fertility & Consumption> Couples save more before having a child than after, 
which is in line with a consumption smoothing hypothesis but they do not reduce 
savings enough to offset the reduction in income due to women leaving 
employment. Couples with children consume less, not more than childless couples. 
(Kalwij, 2004). 
 
SE <Fertility> Compared to British women, Swedish women are on average older at 
finishing education, older at entering a marriage or cohabitation, but once the couple 
is formed they are quicker to have their first child (Gustafsson and Worku, 2004). 
 
 <Fertility> Those who are born in January, because they are older at finishing school 
than those born in December, are also 4.9 months older when they have their first 
child. This effect remains although the latter event takes place 10 to 12 years later 
than completion of compulsory school. In conclusion, age at finishing school rather 
than calender age is important for timing of maternity. (Skirbekk, Kohler and 
Prskawetz, 2004). 
 
 <Employment> Proportion of women who are at work 60 months after the first 
childbirh is more than 70%, which is the highest among the 5 countries under study 
(Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Japan) both in the 1980s and 
the 1990s. Women’s behavior in paid work during the 60 months after first 
childbirth does not significantly differ across women in different educational groups, 
other things being equal (Kenjoh, 2003).  
 
UK <Fertility> Compared to Swedish women, British women are on average younger at 
finishing education, younger at entering a marriage or cohabitation. Once the couple 
is formed, however, British women are slower to have their first child.  (Gustafsson 
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Jérôme de Henau, Danièle Meulders, Síle O’Dorchai 
 
 
4.1. Introduct on 
The three main topics of research that were studied in the framework of the MOCHO project 
have been extensively presented and discussed in the three chapters of this final report 
alongside with the main results of all the work packages.  
Chapter one presented the compared situation of mothers and women without children on 
Europe’s labour markets. Special attention was given not only to the effects on women’s 
participation when children enter the picture but also to potential wage penalties that derive 
from parenthood. Finally, the chapter included some rich information and results on the 
gender differentiated time allocation of women and men with respect not only to general 
household chores but also to childcare tasks.  
The results of a profound cross-country analysis of three types of social policies were 
summarised in the second chapter. More precisely, it presents the country classifications that 
result from the comparison of public childcare systems, child cash and tax benefits and 
maternity leaves. Although no typology of parental leave schemes was constructed given the 
difficulty involved in evaluating their features correctly, the chapter does present an in-depth 
analysis of the different features and organisational charts of parental leaves throughout the 
former EU-15. 
Finally, chapter three sketches recent fertility trends and summarises micro-econometric 
analyses on motherhood choices in a subset of European countries. More specifically, it 
examines the effect of different factors on fertility decisions such as education, prior labour 
force status, childcare availability, etc. Moreover, women’s labour participation after childbirth 
is compared and analysed in the countries studied. 
The aim of this final chapter is to establish links between the three previous chapters. How is 
women’s labour market attachment interacting with their fertility choices and how do public 
policies intervene? It is important to point to the opposite role of two types of effects: a 
substitution effect and an income effect. According to the substitution effect, we would 
assume that women’s increased labour market participation negatively affects their fertility 
choices. Indeed, an increased involvement in paid work leaves less time available for child-
rearing and therefore encourages women to postpone or completely refrain from having 
children. Moreover, labour market participation provides women with their own wage so that 
the opportunity cost of spending time out of the labour market to raise children becomes 
more important. On the contrary, according to the income effect, increased labour market 
participation should exert positive pressure on fertility rates. Indeed, paid work is a source of 
income and as income rises it becomes easier to raise children. Therefore, an increase in 
income makes children more affordable and is expected to pull up fertility rates. The income 
effect is generally found to determine men’s, and more particularly fathers’, choices whereas 
for women, it is much less clear to what extent both effects interact in their employment and 
fertility decisions. These two effects play in opposite directions and their relative strength will 
determine how women’s labour market situation and their fertility choices interact in each of 
the countries of the former EU-15. In other words, there is no unique link between women’s 
labour participation and fertility patterns. 
Before we try to evaluate the role of the substitution and income effects and establish the set 
of relationships that inter-tie the three main study domains of the MOCHO project (see 
section 4), it is important to summarise results by theme and by country. The next section will 
therefore be dedicated to the presentation of country-specific overviews of our results. In 
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section 3, an outline and discussion is presented of the different types of employment costs 
induced by motherhood. Following the general description of adjustment mechanisms 
regarding fertility and labour market activity in relation to public policies in section 4, we 
continue in section five with a country-specific sketch of the adjustment processes taking 
place. In section 5, a new country classification is proposed based on the analysis of the 
generosity of public policies towards dual-earner families with children throughout the former 
EU-15. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
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4.2. Country-specific overviews 
 
 
 Labour market conditions Social policies Fertility 
Belgium Belgium has a medium employment rate for women 
aged 25-54y (68%) and a quite high part time rate 
40%) in 2003, but the motherhood penalty is not 
that strong compared to other countries with an 
adjustment based on part time rise. Occupational 
gender segregation is small and does not rise much 
for parents 
The upper medium ranking on the child care indicator is 
explained by a fairly high coverage rate for 0-3 around 
30% but with low public spending for 3-6 illustrated by a 
low staff:child ratio. Maternity leave is not that generous 
(short and paid 77%) although generous paternity leave 
(10 days paid 87%). Cash and tax benefits are very 
generous. Parental leave is short individual and flat rate 
(27% AFE) 
Fertility behaviour has remained stable for 20 years 
with medium Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and 
Completed Fertility Rate (CFR) (respectively 1.61 in 
2003 and 1.79 for females born in 1964). Age at 
first birth has risen like in other countries but one 
of the lowest in EU-15. 
Denmark The female employment rate for those aged 25-54 
is one of the highest in the EU-15 (79%) while part 
time rate is medium (27%). Occupational 
segregation has fallen through recent years although 
still high. There is a positive effect of being a 
mother in terms of both participation and full time 
job (in 2000). 
Denmark performs very well on both child care 
indicators with highest scores on almost all criteria. Its 
maternity leave system is less generous with replacement 
rate around 60% but with 10 days paid paternity leave 
(51% of AME). Cash benefits are not the most generous 
and there is no child-related tax relief. Its parental leave 
system is family-based with one year available paid also at 
full unemployment benefit, quite flexible but very 
gender-biased.  
Fertility (TFR) has recovered from below 1.5 in the 
mid-1980s, pushing DK to high levels of TFR 
(1.76) and CFR (1.93) 
Germany Germany has a high female employment rate (72%) 
mainly due to a high part time rate (43% with 12% 
less than 15h a week). German labour market is not 
suitable for mothers since the employment penalty 
is very strong (-0.44) (male breadwinner model), 
with a loss in participation but mostly with a rise in 
part time work for mothers. Segregation – not that 
high in general -  rises by 12% for parents. 
Moreover,  West German women who gave birth 
to the first child in the 1980s worked less after 
childbirth than those who had their first child in the 
1980s (Kenjoh, 2003) 
Germany is characterized by a very poor system of child 
care for both 0-3 and 3-6, mainly due to part time 
opening hours and fees for 3-6 and low coverage for 0-3. 
Is also has a short maternity leave followed by a long 
family-based and flat-rate paid parental leave, taken 
almost only by mothers (period extended since the 1980s, 
explaining lower participation). GE is quite generous for 
cash benefits and grants tax relief only for wealthier 
families (regressive) 
GE has very low TFR (1.34) and CFR(1.56). In the 
former GDR, educational participation and 
parenthood was more compatible than in the West 
and there was little variation in the timing of fertility 
by educational attainment. However, compared to 
the situation before unification, parenthood and 
educational participation is less compatible in 
present day East Germany. The variation in the 
timing of first birth by woman’s education 
attainment has substantially increased after 
unification in East Germany. (Kreyenfeld, 2004). 
Greece Its low female employment rate (57%) and part 
time frequency (7%) are combined with high youth 
unemployment rate but low segregation. The 
motherhood penalty on employment is very small 
Greece is characterized by very low scores on all criteria 
of child care, particularly for  3-6, on all criteria of birth 
leave (no paternity leave and maternity leave paid 50%) 
and grants cash benefits related to husband’s wage in the 
TFR is very low (1.27) and CFR medium (1.76), this 
since the 1990s. Econometric evidence have shown 
that Greek women either stick to a job or leave 
work permanently. Women with stronger labour 
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although segregation increases by 11% : women 
with children have to work as it is the case in 
Portugal and can only find a full time job (cfr third 
column) 
presence of children. Parental leave is short, unpaid and 
individual. 
force attachment are less likely to make the 
transitions to have (more) children. Younger 
cohorts postpone childbearing in comparison to 
older cohorts. (Symeonidou and Mitsopoulpos, 
2003). 
Spain Spanish labour market has the same characteristics 
for women as Greek one, although gender 
segregation is one of the highest and motherhood 
penalty is somewhat higher (both part time and 
participation ). Moreover, fixed-term contract 
rather than permanent contracts have grown on the 
Spanish labour market particularly for young people 
(De la Rica and Iza, 2004) 
Spanish child care system is almost inexistent for 0-3 and 
although more extended for 3-6, provides only part-time 
coverage. However, its maternity leave is very generous 
(100%) but only 2 (full paid) paternity days. Cash benefits 
are granted only to very low income families but tax relief 
are more wide spread although very regressive system. 
Fertility indicators show some difference with 
Greece, with low TFR (1.29) but also low CFR 
(1.64) and very high age at first birth (29.1 in 2000). 
Spanish people leave parents’ household quite late, 
due to high youth unemployment rate, longer 
education, etc. Moreover, a fixed-term contract held 
by a woman makes her delay motherhood. (De la 
Rica and Iza, 2004). 
France Female participation is quite high (72%) with a 
medium part time expansion (29%) mainly designed 
for fighting unemployment, gender segregation is 
small and motherhood penalty is limited (medium), 
with mainly part time rise, but also increase in 
gender segregation (12%). Employment policies 
have been more designed to fight against 
unemployment than to help mothers work (parental 
leave policy). 
France performs quite high on child care scores (fairly 
high coverage of 0-3, long opening hours, extended and 
generous system of public free preschool) alongside with 
FI. Its maternity leave is very generous but requires 
longest qualification period while it offers 14 full paid 
paternity days. Parental leave is family-based and 3 years 
long, low flat rate paid. There is little cash support (not 
for 1st child) but very generous tax benefits although very 
regressive tax system. 
France has with Ireland the highest TFR (1.89 in 
2003) and CFR (2.04) close to the reproduction 
threshold, recovering from lower (but still high) 
TFR in mid-1990s. Age at first birth is nevertheless 
quite high (28.7). 
Ireland Irish female employment rate is no longer one of 
the lowest (65% of 25-54y), close to LU and BE, 
thanks to a medium part time frequency (29%, 10% 
less than 15h), but resulting to a high level of 
segregation. Motherhood penalty is however the 
highest (with UK), equally due to participation and 
working hours 
Public child care in Ireland is almost inexistent for 0-3 
and preschools starts only at five years.  Maternity leave 
are not that generous (paid 70%) and there is no 
paternity leave, while parental leave are unpaid (short and 
individual). 
Fertility remains the highest in EU-15 but has 
dramatically decreased with TFR from 3.24 in 2003 
to 1.98 in 2003 while the CFR is 2.23 for those 
born in 1964. However, first-time mothers were 
always relatively old. The propensity of first births 
in 1994 in comparison to 1970 decreased mainly 
because female wages had increased and the 
proportion time women spent in the labour market 
had increased but also because couples waited 
longer after marriage. (O’Donoghue and O’Shea, 
2004). 
Italy Like Spain, female employment rate is low (55%, 
the lowest) part time is rare (18%), youth 
unemployment rate is high and motherhood penalty 
is medium, mainly due to increase in part time work 
but segregation  remains very low. 
Italy is characterized by a well developed public 
preschool, although child care for infants is almost 
inexistent. Maternity leave re long and quite well paid 
(80%) followed by a complex parental leave system (paid 
30% for 6 months but lasting 10 months, family-based). 
TFR and CFR are both low (1.29 and 1.52), and 
have decreased since the early 1980s. Moreover, 
Italian women with higher education tend to 
combine work and family to a larger extent than 
less educated women. They also postpone 
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The same proportion of new mothers are working 
when the child is 12 months old as when the child 
is 24 and 36 months old: about 40% of the new 
mothers are working. Women’s education, pre-
marital work experience, work in the public sector 
increase the probability for women to work after 
having children and also reduce the liklihood for 
making a career interruption during the first three 
years after first childbirth. (Bratti, Del Bono and 
Vuri, 2003). 
Increasing the upper family income level and the 
opening hours of public childcare have a positive 
effect on female labour supply, while decreasing the 
price of public childcare will only make families 
switch from private to public childcare. Having a 
healthy grandmother who lives nearby will increase 
labour supply of the new mother. (Del Boca, 
Locatelli and Vuri, 2003). The latter point is also 
found by Bratti (2004). 
 
There is no paternity leave. Cash benefits are means-
tested and very few while tax credits (wastable) are much 
more generous 
motherhood more. (Bratti, 2004). 
Luxembourg Female employment rate is medium (65%), as is 
part time frequency (32%) but motherhood penalty 
is one of the highest, in terms of participation, part 
time but also gender segregation with a 21% 
increase for parents. Labour market is then not 
suitable with motherhood. 
Luxembourg scores medium on both child care indices, 
although coverage rate for infants is very low. Maternity 
leave is fully paid but requires 6 month of previous work 
and there is no paternity leave while parental leave are 
individual and quite well paid (flat rate of 62.5 % of AFE, 
52% of AME) but quite inflexible (whole to be taken). 
Cash (mainly) and tax benefits are among the most 
generous for families with children. 
Financial support for families in the absence of 
facilities helping mothers work can explain why 
Luxembourg has maintained medium TFR (1.63) 
and CFR (1.81), recovering from the early 1980s 
(TFR of 1.38 in 1985. Moreover age at first birth is 
the highest (29.3 in 2000). 
Netherlands The high female employment rate (74%) is 
explained by an extremely wide-spread use of part 
time work (73% with 16% less than 15h), especially 
by mothers (see parental leave) and the employment 
penalty is then huge almost only due to decrease of 
working hours. Women’s employment after first 
childbirth has increased significantly from the 1980s 
to the 1990s. Educational difference in employment 
rate for new mothers is very large (i.e. high 
educated women are much more likely than low 
NL has low scores on both child care indicators (almost 
no coverage before 4 years) while its birth leaves is the 
same as in LU but with no qualification period. However, 
very limited parental leave is offered, individually, on a 
part-time basis and unpaid. Cash benefits are being 
decreased and there is no emphasis on tax relief. 
High TFR (1.79) may be explained partly by the 
wide spread use of part time work, although CFR is 
medium (1.79). Age at first birth is in the upper part 
of the ranking. 
Couples save more before having a child than after, 
which is in line with a consumption smoothing 
hypothesis but they do not reduce savings enough 
to offset the reduction in income due to women 
leaving employment. Couples with children 
consume less, not more than childless couples. 
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educated women to be labour force participants) in 
this country compared to Sweden or Germany.  
(Kenjoh, 2003). 
As far as wages are concerned, mothers who had 
chosen for demanding jobs actually earn more than 
women who are not mothers, other things equal, by 
4.5%, whereas in non-demanding jobs the wage 
differential is reversed. This suggests that mothers 
are not discriminated against on the Dutch labour 
market if we agree on the assumption that being in 
a demanding or non-demanding job is their own 
choice. (Wetzels and Zorlu, 2003 and Wetzels, 
2003). 
(Kalwij, 2004) 
Austria Austria looks like Germany in terms of female 
employment patterns, high head count rate (77%) 
with wide spread use of part time (38%), but with a 
higher gender segregation. The motherhood penalty 
is however much smaller, closer to Italy, but almost 
only due to working hours adjustment. 
Austria stands in the lower medium part of the ranking 
for both child care indicators and provides a very 
generous maternity leave (no qualification period) 
although no paternity days, but its parental leave system 
is very gender biased, long and flat rate paid (25% of 
AFE). The emphasis is more on very generous cash 
benefits, while there is no child related tax relief. 
Since the employment model is that mothers should 
be at home to take care of the children, and since 
employment rate is very high, a low TFR (1.34) is 
not surprising, as well as a low CFR (1.56), although 
age at first birth is relatively low (26.3) 
Portugal Female employment rate is very high (74%) and 
based on full time work (88%), although gender 
occupational and inter-industry segregation is one 
of the highest. However motherhood gap is 
positive due to an increase in participation 
(although more segregated), illustrating an income 
effect in absence of cash generosity (2nd column) 
Portugal is characterized by a very poor system of child 
care especially for 3-6 due to short opening hours of 
public facilities. However, it offers 5 full paid days of 
leave for the father (and first 15 working days of parental 
leave) while maternity leave is also very generous. 
Parental leave is unpaid for mothers. Portugal does not 
grant important cash benefits neither tax relief compared 
to other countries. 
TFR and CFR look like other Southern European 
countries although somewhat higher (1.44 and 1.82 
respectively), with the possibility of investing in the 
children for future intergenerational assistance. 
Finland Female employment rate is very high (79%) and 
also based on full time work (88%), much more 
than DK or SE, leading to highest scores on the 
gender segregation indices. In 2000 motherhood 
penalty was very limited. 
Finland provides the choice between a place in child care 
facilities up to school age and parental leave. Child care 
coverage is relatively high for 0-3 but the lowest for 3-6, 
although other criteria are very performing. Parental 
leave are very long and family-based with low 
replacement rate at the end. Maternity leave and the first 
period of the parental leave are paid 66% on average 
(means-tested) while there is a so-called “father’s month” 
of fully paid leave. Finland is generous for larger families 
(cash benefits) and does not grant child related tax relief. 
TFR is high (1.76) as well as CFR (1.92) while age at 
first birth is relatively young 
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Sweden Sweden is characterised by a high female 
employment rate (78% for 20-54 year olds). Full-
time employment is not only the norm for men but 
concerns also 70% of women.  Moreover, part-time 
working women frequently work hours long 
enough to be classified as full-timers. More 
importantly, the employment effect of motherhood 
is negative but the penalty is very small. Finally, 
gender occupational segregation has decreased in 
recent years but remains high. 
Proportion of women who are at work 60 months 
after the first childbirh is more than 70%, which is 
the highest among the 5 countries under study 
(Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Japan) both in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Women’s behaviour in paid work during the 60 
months after first childbirth does not significantly 
differ across women in different educational 
groups, other things being equal (Kenjoh, 2003) 
The emphasis is on the provision of services rather than 
on granting financial support to families. As a result, 
public childcare services are very well developed, 
especially for 3-6). However, this relatively better score 
for 3-6 is artificial. Indeed, the system guarantees a place 
in childcare for each child from 1-6. However, given that 
birth leave is commonly taken during the first year 
following childbirth, obviously coverage rates for 0-3 
year olds drop compared to those for 3-6 year olds. 
Public childcare arrangements are accessible to a very 
large population, affordable and tuned in with full-time 
employment. On the contrary, Sweden has a very weak 
system of family support in cash or through the tax 
system compared to the other former EU-15 countries. It 
has a unique system of birth leaves. There is no clear 
distinction between maternity and parental leave but 
instead both form part of an integrated system of leave 
that covers most of the first year of life of a child. The 
length of the leave has been shown to have a negative 
impact on women’s subsequent wages (cfr. Albrecht et 
alii, 1999). The fact that it is granted as a family right 
instead of as an individual right entails a substantial risk 
with respect to gender equality. Therefore, policy 
measures should focus on increasing fathers’ take-up 
(after their 10 paid paternity days). 
Fertility indicators show no evidence of a trade-off 
taking place. Compared to British women, Swedish 
women are on average older at finishing education, 
older at entering a marriage or cohabitation, but 
once the couple is formed they are quicker to have 
their first child (Gustafsson and Worku, 2004). 
Moreover, CFR is stable (2.00) close to the 
replacement rate. 
UK Female employment rate is also very high (74%) but 
with a much more wide spread use of part time 
(41%) as in Nordic countries or Portugal, closer to 
Dutch and Austrian patterns. This part time work is 
mainly taken by mothers since the employment 
penalty is very high, both in terms of participation 
and working hours. Moreover, as in Luxembourg, 
compared to workers without children, parents are 
much more segregated in occupations (25% rise). In 
this country the cost of having a child is very huge 
on all accounts. 
Women who gave birth to their first child in the 
1990s (re-)enter in paid work much quicker than 
UK is characterised by a very poor public child care 
system and only 60% of 3-6 attend a public facility. The 
maternity leave has a low replacement rate (less than 
50%), there is no paternity leave. Parental leave is short, 
flexible, unpaid and individual. The emphasis is put on 
poor working families with very generous tax relief also 
for child care expenses) but with few cash benefits. 
Despite labour market conditions unsuitable for 
mothers, TFR and CFR remains fairly medium, 
although have decreased. Compared to Swedish 
women, British women are on average younger at 
finishing education, younger at entering a marriage 
or cohabitation. Once the couple is formed, 
however, British women are slower to have their 
first child.  (Gustafsson and Worku, 2004). 
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those who gave birth in the 1980s. Similar to the 
Netherlands, after first childbirth high educated 
women work significantly more, particularly in full-
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4.3. Employment costs of having children, building a motherhood gap. 
.
 
In this section, we assess the employment cost of motherhood from four angles: the 
employment-to-population ratio, the part-time frequency, indices measuring gender 
dissimilarity in occupations and wage differentials. 
 
We have measured employment penalties using 2003 Labour Force Survey data, except for the 
Nordic countries and Ireland. Data concerning motherhood for the latter four countries are 
taken from the OECD’s Employment Outlook for 2002 (2000 data). 
 
4.3.1  The gap in full-time employment  
As far as the employment rate is concerned, firstly, recall that overall employment rates differ 
considerably across countries, as do full-time equivalent employment rates. Therefore, the 
penalty induced by the presence of children must be appreciated in terms of both headcount 
employment (participation gap) and working hours (part-time gap), or, in other words, a 
measure of the full-time employment gap. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the standardised employment penalty measured in full-time equivalent. It is 
defined as the difference between the FTE employment rate of mothers (fathers) and that of 
women (men) with no child under 15 years of age, expressed in percentage of the overall FTE 
employment rate of women (men) aged between 25 and 54 years. The figure shows that 
fathers are more likely to work (and on a full-time basis) than their childless counterparts – 
especially in Finland, Belgium, Italy and Spain. However, the gain in fathers’ employment rate 
is not sufficient to compensate the more important loss in mothers’ employment. The 
employment penalty is related to the full-time equivalent employment rate of women (r=0.64, 
significant at 0.01 level). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Standardised parenthood gap in full-time equivalent employment 









DK PT SE FI EL BE FR ES IT AT LU NL DE UK IE
gap w omen
gap men
FTE empl. rate w omen
 
Note: The standardised gap is defined as the difference between the FTE employment rate of mothers (fathers) and 
that of women (men) with no child under 15 years of age, expressed in percentage of the overall FTE employment 
rate of women (men) aged between 25 and 54 years. 
Source: own calculations based on LFS 2003, and OECD 2002 for DK, SE, FI and IE (figures 2000). 
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As a result, we found it interesting to decompose the motherhood gap in two parts. Indeed, to 
measure the loss in full-time participation of women with children, the employment gap 
should be broken down in a part that is due to a loss in participation on the one hand and a 
share that is accounted for by a reduction in working hours (measured as the proportion of the 
labour force that does not report to work full-time) on the other hand. The participation and 
working hours effects of motherhood are presented in figures 4.2 for women aged 25-54 in all 
EU-15 countries and for women aged 20-49 with a child under 6 years of age in all countries, 
except Ireland and the Scandinavia countries. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Absolute full-time employment gap of motherhood, with the 
contribution of participation and part time, by age of children (2003) 
children < 15y


































Note: Decomposition of the first difference in full-time employment rate between mothers (child<15) and non 
mothers, aged 25-54y on the on hand, and between mothers (child<6)and non mothers (or mothers of older 
children), aged 20-49y 
Source: own calculations based on LFS 2003, and OECD 2002 for DK, SE, FI and IE. 
 
 
The first figure shows full-time employment penalties of different sizes for mothers aged 
between 25 and 54. The Danish and the Portuguese labour market seem to favour mothers’ 
full-time employment, mostly via an increase in the participation rate. In the other Southern 
European countries and in Ireland and Finland, the penalty mainly takes the form of a loss in 
participation, while in countries such as Belgium, Sweden and to a lesser extent, Austria and 
the Netherlands, women seem to reduce their working hours more often than that they 
completely withdraw from the labour market. 
Moreover, Germany, Ireland and the UK illustrate cases in which the labour market is not at 
all adjusted to motherhood as indicated by the difference between the full-time employment 
rate of mothers and that of non mothers which amounts to more than 30 percentage points. 
In the UK, 57% of women without children and aged between 25 and 54 years of age work in 
full-time jobs while for mothers of the same age with children under 15 years, the full-time 
employment rate is only 23%. 
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The employment penalty associated with the presence of a child aged under 6 years for 
younger women is illustrated in the second figure. It opposes mothers of young children (1 or 
more aged less than six) to mothers of older children of childless women. This helps us target 
a more precise effect of motherhood a few years after birth, more related to the time during 
which women have to find solutions for the care of their children. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data for Scandinavian countries nor Ireland. This second figure shows that, except for 
the UK, Portugal and Greece, the full-time employment penalty is smaller for mothers of very 
young children than for others. The major part of the reduction in the full-time employment 
rate is due to mothers’ withdrawal from the labour market, except in Austria where the part-
time adjustment prevails (at least for first child). Moreover, the participation rate regularly 
decreases with the number of children, except in France. In this latter country, there is no loss 
in full-time employment for mothers of one child, the loss in participation occurs with the 
second child. This can be explained by the fact that parental leave was only available from the 
second child on (until 2004). In Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, there is a greater 
balance between adjustments in terms of working hours and of participation. Note that in all 
countries, the participation penalty is greater in this case than in the first figure, except for Italy 
and Luxembourg. This may be due to other factors than the sole age of the youngest child, 
that have not been controlled for, such as education, the number of children, etc. Indeed, note 
that the penalty in terms of participation is strengthened or weakened by prevailing cultural 
values as well as by the economic characteristics of women and their husbands. A widely 
studied hypothesis is that better-off economic characteristics of the wife tend to increase their 
participation whereas those of the husband work in the opposite sense (decreasing the 
opportunity cost of having children). For example, in Spain, mothers’ employment is marked 
by a strong degree of polarisation: only very educated women are able to minimise the 
employment penalty induced by motherhood and they are much more likely to return to work 
after childcare-related career interruptions (González-López, 2001). In France, Meron and 
Widmer (2002) have shown that a young woman living with a partner with no children and 
who finds herself faced with a period of unemployment will temporarily abandon any potential 
plans of having a child. The period during which a partnership remains childless has been 
shown to be longer in case the woman has experienced periods of “intermittent employment” 
and having known spells of unemployment before significantly postpones the arrival of the 
first child. This effect is most pronounced amongst the least qualified and the youngest 
generations. On the contrary, women having experienced periods of inactivity remained a 
shorter time in a partnership without a child. In sum, in terms of fertility unemployed women 
should not be considered in the same way as housewives (Meron and Widmer, 2002). In 
Flanders, mothers’ labour participation is influenced by their husband’s unemployment record 
but not by his level of education which only seems to have an impact on the wife’s rate of 
transition between full-time and part-time employment (Corijn, 2001). In the Netherlands, the 
higher the husband’s earnings potential, the less likely the wife is to re-enter the labour market 
once she has children, which parallels the results for Germany but contradicts, for example, 
the Swedish case (Hendrickx et alii, 2001; Blossfeld et alii, 2001; Henz and Sundström, 2001). 
On the contrary, his level of education nor his religion was not found to have a significant 
influence on Dutch wives’ labour market choices. Furthermore, time-related factors such as 
the family cycle and the period play an important role. In Italy, for example, the process of exit 
from the labour market has two critical phases: women tend to become housewives more 
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4.3.2. The gap in full-time employment according to level of education  
It is well-known that low-educated women are relatively less present in the labour force than 
high-educated women. It is interesting to examine differences in the behaviour of these groups 
in terms of participation and working hours when children enter the picture. Figure 4.3 
contributes to the analysis of the impact of the presence of children aged less than 15 years of 
age on women’s employment rates and working hours (for those aged 25-54). This figure is 
identical to the first graph in figure 4.2. except for the fact that gaps have been split between 
low- and high-educated women. It shows that more educated mothers more frequently adapt 
their labour market situation towards a larger use of part-time work than lower-educated 
women do. Moreover, part-time employment is a solution more often chosen than a complete 
withdrawal from the labour force (except in Spain and Luxembourg). Indeed, the total loss in 
full-time employment is less pronounced among low-educated mothers (note that overall 
employment rates of low-educated women are much lower than those of women with a higher 
level of education), they more often withdraw totally from the labour market than that they 
adjust their working time, except in Belgium and the Netherlands. This finding holds 
particularly true for the UK, France and Germany. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Absolute full-time employment gap of motherhood, with the 
contribution of participation and part time, by level of education (2000) 
low  educated w omen















high educated w omen
















Note: Decomposition of the first difference in full-time employment rate between mothers (child<15) and non 
mothers, aged 25-54y, respectively low and high educated.  
Source: OECD (2002) and own calculations. 
 
 
4.3.3. The gap in occupational and inter-industry segregation  
Gender segregation in occupations has been widely discussed in numerous studies (Emerek et 
alii 2002, Sissoko 2004, etc.). “One standpoint is that gender segregation reveals real gender 
differences, as it indicates discrimination towards women in the male-dominated labour 
market. As the same time, segregation is argued to be one of the causes of wage differences 
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and the theory is that equal wages will be an illusion as long as barriers into the different 
labour markets divide women and men and assign them to female and male work tasks. The 
mechanisms through which the separation of genders is upheld and reshaped also contribute 
to form gender differences and discrimination in relation to working conditions.” (Emerek et 
alii 2002, p.35). 
We are interested in analysing the effect of motherhood on the degree of segregation between 
men and women: is segregation higher among parents than among non-parents? Using 2003 
LFS data, we have gathered information that has allowed us to compute different segregation 
indices for ten of the EU-15 countries. For DK, SE, FI and IE, no data on the presence of 
children is available so that the analysis was limited to segregation between all men and all 
women. For the NL, a total lack of data broken down by sector or occupation (not even 1-
digit ISCO occupations or 1-digit NACE industries) has made an analysis of segregation 
simply impossible. 
 
Different Duncan dissimilarity indices (ID) were computed for different types of workers at 
different ages. They measure on a scale from 0 to 100 to what extent men and women are 
evenly distributed among the occupations (industries). A zero indicates that each occupation 
(industry) has the same “weight” in both male and female distributions, while 100 means that 
women and men do not share any of the occupations (industries). This index can be 
interpreted as the proportion of men or women that have to be removed from their actual 
occupation (industry) in order to better equalise the distribution of workers. We have also 
computed indices to measure segregation between part-time and full-time female workers, as 
well as between mothers and non-mothers or confronting fathers to non-fathers. 
 
a) gender segregation 
Since our aim is to assess the penalty in terms of job prospects and career opportunities, we 
have first focused on occupational segregation (analysing occupations at the 3 digit-level). 
Occupational segregation is also responsible for some part of the gender wage gap, up to 30% 
in Spain for private sector (Sissoko, 2004). Similarly to other labour market indicators, we have 
analysed segregation within the population of workers aged between 25 and 54 years of age 
(Table 4.1). 
In the 1st column, Italy and Greece show a very low level of gender segregation while Portugal 
and Finland present the worst scores on the general index for the 25-54 age bracket. Sweden 
and Denmark were but are no longer among the countries with the highest segregation index 
(see Emerek et al. 2002). In the previous section, Portugal, Finland and Austria came out as 
countries with a low penalty for women (in terms of both the use of part-time and the overall 
employment rate) but there seems to be a greater penalty in terms of job segregation. Indeed, 
we have computed the linear correlation coefficient between female participation and gender 
segregation. It has turned out strongly positive (r=0.68). Spain does not conform to this 
positive relationship: the female employment rate is low while the segregation index is 
tremendously high, contrary to Greece and Italy. A possible explanation might be that over the 
last 15 years the employment rate has grown much more steeply in Spain than in Italy or 
Greece and that a rise in segregation has been the result of the labour market’s attempts to 
absorb this rapidly increasing number of entrants, similarly to what occurred in the 
Scandinavian countries a few decades earlier. The same pattern applies to Ireland although 
growth in female employment has been far more steady in this country (see table 4.3 infra). 
When children enter the picture (2nd, 3rd and 4th columns), although we have information for 
ten countries only, the penalty of being a mother comes out differently. The 2nd column 
presents the ID of men and women without any children under 15, the 3rd  shows the ID of 
parents while the 4th column is the relative change in the Id between 2nd and 3rd columns. 
Austria and Portugal remain at the bottom of the ranking. Note, however, that the effect of 
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motherhood (measured as the relative increase in the ID, shown in 4th column) is stronger in 
Portugal than in Austria. For parents, Portugal obtains a score of merely 62 on the index scale 
(3rd column). In the high part of the ranking, Italy and Greece hold on to their top positions 
although in Greece the relative situation of parents is worse than in Italy. But the most 
interesting results are found for Luxembourg and the UK. In those countries, gender 
segregation is not that high in general, and even very close to the positions of Italy and Greece 
in the case of non-parents (2nd column). But once children are considered, these two 
countries fall to the bottom of the ranking to join Portugal, with relative increases in the index 
of more than 20%. Recall that this occupational hindrance for mothers exists alongside the 
employment penalties measured in terms of participation and working hours. In the 
Netherlands and Ireland we do not have data to confirm this effect although some 
computations from the OECD (2002) tell us that for Ireland, 2-digit ISCO gender ID is 20% 
higher for parents than for non parents (16% in the Netherlands) while in the UK and 
Luxembourg, these figures amount for 23% and 19% respectively. 
 
We have also computed indices for inter-industry segregation, with the same restrictions 
concerning data available for NL, IE, FI, DK and SE. Industrial segregation can also be seen 
as responsible for a part of the gender wage gap ranging from 0 in Denmark to 29% in Ireland 
in 1995 in the private sector (Gannon et al. 2004). We dealt with less disaggregated data than 
for occupations (around 55 industries compared to around 105 occupations).  
Roughly same rankings are obtained in this case also as far as general ID are concerned as well 
as index of segregation between full time and part time female workers. However, results 
differ for the analysis of parents versus non parents: the ID of parents (compared to non 
parents) is raised by about 15% in Germany, Austria and Greece and up to 23% in the UK. 
 
b) Segregation between part time and full time female workers 
Finally, we found interesting to show indices for working women according to their working 
hours: segregation of full time versus part time female workers (5th column). Results show 
that in countries where part time is not very widespread, occupational segregation seems to be 
higher (r=-0.58) as it is the case for Finland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and especially Portugal. 
However, Italy remains as an exception with low part time rate and lowest index of 
dissimilarity. 
 
c) Segregation between mothers (fathers) and childless women (men) 
The segregation indices that were computed comparing mothers (fathers) and childless women 
(men) turned out very close to zero, indicating a balanced distribution over occupations (last 
two columns of table 4.1). Luxembourg again shows higher levels of segregation among 
mothers (and fathers) compared to the other countries (around twice as high for women’s 
index). 
 
In sum, the motherhood cost for working women is strengthened in the UK and Luxembourg 
because of the additional penalty in terms of segregation. Note that in Germany – a country 
with very high penalty for working mothers in the form of increased part-time work and a 
drop in participation – the occupational effect for mothers is not as strong as in the latter two 
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Table 4.1. Occupational segregation (3-digit ISCO) according to different types 
of workers (2003) 
 Gender ID  Working hours ID  Parenthood ID
all at work 25-
54
all at work 25-
54 (no child)






men at work 25-
54
 ID rank ID rank ID rank
diff. rel.
1child + / no
child  ID rank  ID rank ID rank
IT 47.7 1 46.6 2 49.6 1 6% 22.0 1 7.3 1 8.4 2
EL 47.9 2 46.5 1 51.6 2 11% 35.7 13 11.4 6 11.9 6
FR 52.9 3 50.4 5 56.5 3 12% 29.8 6 8.1 2 9.5 3
LU 53.3 4 49.4 4 59.7 8 21% 29.6 5 19.7 10 16.8 10
UK 53.7 5 48.7 3 60.9 9 25% 30.9 8 11.8 7 12.4 8
BE 54.1 6 52.5 6 56.9 4 8% 29.6 4 12.4 8 12.0 7
DE 54.9 7 52.8 7 58.9 6 12% 24.6 3 9.0 3 7.9 1
SE 55.1 8 - - - - - 31.7 9 - -
DK 55.7 9 - - - - - 34.8 12 - -
ES 55.8 10 53.7 8 58.8 5 9% 34.4 10 10.1 4 11.2 5
IE 55.8 11 - - - - - 30.8 7 - -
AT 56.4 12 54.8 10 59.4 7 8% 22.0 2 10.7 5 10.9 4
PT 57.9 13 54.7 9 61.9 10 13% 44.7 14 13.3 9 14.6 9
FI 59.8 14 - - - - - 34.6 11  -  -  
 
Note: ID is the Duncan Index of Dissimilarity. It can range from 0 – no segregation, there is an equal proportion of 
men and of women in each occupation – to 100 – complete segregation, each profession is either fully female either 
fully male. Id is here measured between men and women (gender), between female working part time and full time 
(working hours), and between women (men) with and without children (parenthood). 
Source: Eurostat LFS 2003. 
 
 
4.3.4. The wage cost of motherhood  
In their study of wage gaps between mothers and childless women aged 21 to 45 years in 
seven European countries, Del Boca et alii (2004) find no large differences across countries in 
gross hourly wages according to motherhood. The countries studied are Denmark, the UK, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. No “child gap” in pay is found, except for 
the UK, the only country where having a child has a significant and negative effect on 
women’s wages. 
In a previous study on wage gaps between mothers and childless women, OECD (2002) has 
found roughly the same findings. Using same data set but for 1998, they have studied wages of 
women aged 20 to 54 in 13 countries (all EU-15 but Luxembourg and Sweden). Relative gross 
hourly wage gap in favour of childless women is found only in the UK and Austria, and the 
gap remains positive after controlling for observed characteristics. On the opposite, negative 
gross gaps amounting to more than 10% are found in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and 
especially Greece and Spain. These gaps remain in favour of mothers after controlling for 
observed characteristics only in the latter two countries. 
The lack of evidence of an existing “child wage gap” in most countries does not prevent us 
from concluding that mothers are disadvantaged. In the OECD study, if mothers seem to be 
endowed of more rewarding personal characteristics, it can be explained by the fact that they 
are more often older, hence more experienced or better located in the hierarchy, in other 
terms, over-selected. Indeed, when the same analysis is made on smaller cohorts of women 
(ten year age brackets), the contribution to the gap of both observed and unobserved 
characteristics turn out positive in most countries, especially regarding occupation, allowing 
them to conclude that  childless women work in better-paid occupations than mothers of the 
same age (see supra). 
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Hereinafter, the main findings of Del Boca et al. (2004) are summarised (see chapter I). 
Characteristics of the labour market and human capital have a different impact on mothers’ 
than on childless women’s wages and effects vary across countries. It is found that in all 
countries, the effects of education and job characteristics (such as having a permanent 
contract, a job with supervisory responsibilities or a job in the private sector) are much 
stronger for mothers than for childless women. 
Furthermore, the effect of the type of employment contract is stronger in the Southern 
European countries than elsewhere. There is a strong wage effect for mothers who obtain a 
permanent employment contract. However, the proportion of mothers who are not in a 
permanent job is highest in Spain compared to the other seven countries. The wage effect 
associated with having supervisory duties in one’s job is strongest for mothers in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. The effect of a prior dismissal (be it initiated by the employer 
or simply a consequence of an employment contract that came to term) is detrimental for 
mothers’ wages in France only. 
An alternative specification of the model included a variable measuring the degree of 
satisfaction with the distance to work. A negative effect of the distance to work on mothers’ 
wages was observed in Denmark, Belgium, France and Italy. So, it appears that women pay for 
being at an acceptable distance from work. 
 
Summarising by country, it appears that in Denmark mothers’ wages are positively affected by 
working in the private sector and having a supervisory post, those effects being much stronger 
than for childless women. In the UK, tertiary education and supervisory responsibility have a 
positive influence which is stronger than for childless women, while short part-time work 
affects mothers’ wages less negatively than childless women’s. In the Netherlands, experience, 
having a permanent contract and supervision responsibilities play a stronger positive role with 
respect to mothers’ wages while tertiary education and having a job in the private sector affect 
their wages respectively less positively and less negatively than childless women’s. We do not 
observe very different effects between childless women and mothers in Belgium, although 
tertiary education has a more marked impact for mothers’ wages. In France, the difference in 
the effect of education is much greater than in Belgium, the same holds for the effects of 
having a permanent contract or a supervisory position (positive impacts) and of being married 
(negative impact). Italy and Spain are similar cases as far as education, having a permanent 
contract and supervision (stronger positive effect) and private sector employment (a negative 
but less strong effect) are concerned. If working part-time positively affects women’s wages 
with or without children, the effect of short hours is stronger for childless women than for 
mothers in both countries, while longer hours play a stronger role for mothers only in Italy. 
 
 
4.3.5. Cost in terms of job security and quality 
The aim is to investigate whether type of job and of employment contract affects childless 
women differently than mothers. We have analysed differences with respect to the impact of 
work status (employee, self-employed and family worker), contract type (permanent job versus 
other types, such as temporary jobs or fixed-term contracts) and the presence of women in the 
public sector, generally a signal of better employment protection. Note that alongside these 
characteristics, part time employment is maybe the best signal of lack of employment quality 
since it prevents from job career prospects etc. (Jepsen et al. 2004). We have discussed the part 
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a) Work status (employees versus self employed and family workers) 
Work status does not differ considerably between childless women and mothers regardless of 
the child’s age. The effect of the presence of children on the proportion of employees is 
generally close to zero but positive in Portugal and Luxembourg and negative in Spain, the UK 
and the Netherlands. If we only consider children under six years of age, the effect remains the 
same, except for Spain where it becomes positive and for Italy where the presence of children 
under 6 negatively affects the proportion of employees. 
Since there are only very few family workers in the female work force, it is not of great interest 
to study the impact of children: in those countries where the impact is positive, the overall 
workforce contains less than 3% of family workers. 
 
b) Type of contract (permanent job versus other types) 
Permanent employment is a more interesting indicator to evaluate the motherhood cost for 
working women, especially for mothers who have to provide for their children. Indeed, we 
expect to find a positive correlation between the presence of children and the proportion of 
mothers with permanent contracts since mothers will only work if they can rely on a secure 
employment contract. However, it seems that the impact of the presence of children on the 
proportion of permanent contracts is very small, though slightly positive as expected (without 
controlling for any other characteristics). The effect is more strongly positive in Portugal and 
Spain for young children, both of which are countries with a lower proportion of permanent 
contracts among women. 
 
c) Public versus private sector 
As far as the proportion of women who are employed in public administration and education 
is concerned, we would also expect mothers to be more likely to work in those fields (used as a 
proxy for the public sector) than their childless counterparts. Indeed, the public sector often 
offers a higher degree of employment security thanks to stronger regulations, more powerful 
unions and a less heterogeneous work force. For example, for Italy, it has been shown that 
women employed in the public sector more frequently keep their jobs after childbirth and 
career breaks (Bernardi, 2001). However, the proportion of women who work in those two 
industries decreases with the presence of children in all ten countries but Italy, Spain (very 
positive) and Greece. This is particularly true for Luxembourg and Portugal. If we look at 
mothers of children under 6 years of age, the effect remains the same, except for Italy and 
Greece (balanced proportion). We should investigate in greater detail the reasons for this 
difference, especially for Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg. 
 
 
4.4. Adjustment mechanisms 
 
Starting out from the MOCHO hypothesis that women work, we want to examine the effect 
of labour market conditions and public policies on fertility decisions. In the specific country 
context, working women evaluate the cost associated with childrearing in terms of their career 
and wage perspectives. A spell out of the labour market when the child is young closes off 
some future labour market options (cfr. supra): 
First of all, in a given country it might be very unlikely for young mothers to have the 
possibility to ever re-enter the labour market at all. The cost of a child is thus one in terms of 
participation. 
Secondly, young mothers re-entering the labour market might be confined to part-time jobs or 
to more family-friendly industries. It is well-known that part-time employment typically 
involves a wage penalty and limits promotion opportunities (Jepsen et al. 2004). 
Gender segregation because of young mothers’ concentration in certain industries or 
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occupations that, although more family-friendly, pay lower wages and offer jobs of a lesser 
quality and security, remains to be a severe problem in numerous European countries. 
To sum up, depending on the country considered, the cost of a child may take different forms: 
a drop in the participation rate, an increase in part-time employment, increased labour market 
segregation to the disadvantage of re-entering young mothers, a price in terms of employment 
quality and long-term wage effects of spells out of the labour market , as shown for example 
by Beblo and Wolf (2002) for Germany or Albrecht et al. (1999) for Sweden. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Main indicators of the female labour market and cost of motherhood 
(2003) 
 













1c+/0c child ID expl. unexpl.
FI 74% 79% 12% -0.06 -3% -3% 59.8 - - 3.2 0.4
SE 73% 82% 31% -0.04 0% -7% 55.1 - - - -
PT 70% 74% 12% 0.04 3% -1% 57.9 13% 13.3 3.7 0.0
DK 70% 79% 27% 0.07 4% 4% 55.7 - - 3.4 -0.3
AT 64% 77% 38% -0.22 -5% -25% 56.4 8% 10.7 8.0 5.9
FR 63% 72% 29% -0.15 -7% -14% 52.9 12% 8.1 3.8 -1.0
UK 58% 74% 41% -0.45 -16% -34% 53.7 25% 11.8 3.4 5.4
DE 54% 72% 43% -0.44 -14% -32% 54.9 12% 9.0 2.4 1.8
BE 54% 68% 40% -0.10 0% -16% 54.1 8% 12.4 7.1 -1.6
LU 53% 65% 32% -0.35 -13% -23% 53.3 21% 19.7 - -
EL 53% 57% 7% -0.08 -3% -2% 47.9 11% 11.4 -9.1 -6.1
IE 52% 65% 29% -0.53 -24% -25% 55.8 - - -6.1 -0.6
ES 51% 56% 16% -0.19 -9% -7% 55.8 9% 10.1 -12.2 -6.0
IT 48% 55% 18% -0.21 -8% -11% 47.7 6% 7.3 -2.3 -1.3
NL 47% 74% 73% -0.41 -6% -30% - - - -0.8 -3.5
Note: FTE stands for Full time equivalent, HC for Headcount, PT for part time and isco3D for 3-digit ISCO-88 
classification of occupations 
Source: Eurostat LFS 2003, and OECD (2002) for wage gaps and motherhood gaps of FI, SE, IE and DK. 
 
 
Women can respond in two ways to the specific employment costs associated with 
motherhood in their country: 
Either they consider existing costs to be unacceptably high and refrain completely from having 
children or they postpone maternity until labour market conditions change to the better  
(risking of course not to ever have children or a number smaller than originally wished for). 
Alternatively, women decide that they are willing to bear the costs and consequences of 
motherhood and carry out their unmodified fertility choices. 
Another key issue is the timing of partnership formation which might be postponed due to 
prolonged education or financial constraints. As a result, first births occur at a later point in 
time and completed fertility may drop (Gustafsson, Kenjoh and Wetzels, 2002). 
 
However, public policies may play a more or less important role to reduce the cost of children 
and weaken negative labour market effects. In this chapter, we focus in the first place on 
public childcare systems, but attention is also given to systems of birth leave and child cash 
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4.4.1  Satis actory public policies. f  
 
If the overall female headcount employment rate is high or increasing, we expect mothers’ 
employment rate to follow the same pattern and the fertility rate to be high in case the country 
implements efficient public policies to facilitate the work/family balance. In other words, 
working women do not adjust their labour market situation or fertility choices, they continue 
working full-time and do not postpone or refrain from having children. 
 
4.4.2. Unsatisfactory public policies
If instead public policies are unsatisfactory, the high (or increasing) level of headcount female 
employment is bound to affect the fertility rate which decreases and/or to induce a larger use 
of part-time employment among mothers. However, at this stage, it is important not just to 
look at the general level of female employment in a given country to estimate the possible 
effect of the cost of a child on young mothers’ labour market participation and fertility but 
also at the level of GDP per capita in the country. Indeed, it may be the case that female 
employment is very high (or increasing) in a given country but that no motherhood gap in 
employment is worth mentioning despite the fact that public policies are unsatisfactory. The 
deficiency of public support will inevitably affect the fertility rate but those women who decide 
to have children necessarily remain active on the labour market for financial reasons. In other 
words, women’s choices are guided by the same principle as men’s, that of a dominating 
income effect. Note that in countries of this type as well as in those where young mothers are 
most likely to re-enter the labour market on a part-time basis, the price they pay for wanting to 
raise children may still be very high, that is in terms of professional segregation. 
 
These two hypothetic adjustments are detailed in the next section which presents specificities 
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4.5. The specific situation of each of the former EU-15 member states 
 
 
Table 4.3. Main indicators of the labour market conditions, public family 
policies and fertility (2003) 
 






















tax ben. 2003 1964
FI 74% 79% 85% -7% 12% 46.3 78.1 34.0 1.76 1.92
SE 73% 82% 90% -8% 31% 69.1 63.7 27.8 1.71 2.00
PT 70% 74% 65% 14% 12% 22.1 73.9 25.5 1.44 1.82
DK 70% 79% 80% -2% 27% 91.1 43.9 26.0 1.76 1.93
AT 64% 77% 70% 10% 38% 33.4 66.5 67.1 1.39 1.65
FR 63% 72% 65% 11% 29% 45.5 80.8 36.6 1.89 2.04
UK 58% 74% 69% 8% 41% 24.3 16.7 43.3 1.71 1.89
DE 54% 72% 60% 20% 43% 30.0 49.9 50.6 1.34 1.56
BE 54% 68% 55% 24% 40% 36.9 49.8 64.0 1.61 1.79
LU 53% 65% 49% 34% 32% 36.7 61.0 80.3 1.63 1.81
EL 53% 57% 47% 20% 7% 14.0 12.7 47.2 1.27 1.76
IE 52% 65% 39% 66% 29% 6.8 31.2 47.6 1.98 2.23
ES 51% 56% 37% 51% 16% 16.4 61.1 16.8 1.29 1.64
IT 48% 55% 44% 27% 18% 37.6 56.9 28.4 1.29 1.52
NL 47% 74% 52% 43% 73% 28.0 71.0 30.3 1.75 1.79
 
Note: FTE stands for “ Full time equivalent”, HC for “Headcount”, TFR for “total fertility rate” and CFR for 
“Completed fertility rate” 




i4.5.1. H gh score on child care policies 
In the Scandinavian countries, motherhood does not, at first sight, seem to have a price in 
terms of labour market situation and career prospects thanks to the generosity of public 
support to families with children. Female employment is very high in these countries (and 
converging towards men’s) and the motherhood gap in employment is weak. Full-time 
employment appears to be the norm both for men and women regardless of the presence of 
children. The labour market transition Swedish women are least likely to make is the one of 
interrupting work (Henz and Sundström, 2001, p. 259). Moreover, fertility rates are amongst 
the highest in Europe. There has been a continued postponement of marriage in Denmark 
since 1980 but the trend has been less pronounced in recent years. Also the mean age of 
women at first birth has been increasing, particularly among women in higher occupations. 
The high degree of compatibility of family and professional responsibilities as well as of 
gender equality is made possible by the system of childcare that is organised primarily by the 
state via public-sector provisions that are available at comparatively low costs. For Finland, it 
has been shown that the extension of maternity leave has had a positive impact on fertility, 
especially for higher-order births (Rønsen, 2004, p. 160). In the Scandinavian countries, there 
is a sharing of roles and a corresponding low degree of dependence between spouses. The 
social security and tax system in Sweden, for example, is completely individualised: individual 
tax assessment and no derived eligibility for social benefits. Denmark has had an almost 
independent income taxation system for married couples for a long time as well. 
Individualisation has had a very favourable effect on female employment (Apps and Rees, 
2001). However, the increase in female employment has had its price: having been made 
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possible by an expansion of the public sector, it has triggered a growth in occupational 
segregation. In recent years, Denmark and Sweden have had some success in reducing 
occupational segregation although inter-industry segregation remains troublesome in Sweden. 
Moreover, the former taxable allowance for families with children has been replaced in 
Denmark by a system of family allowances that are paid to all families regardless of income 
and with slightly higher amounts for children aged 0-2 years.  
 
Another country with a rather high score regarding child care policies is France. Moreover, 
this country has one of the highest female employment rates measured in full-time equivalent. 
This leads us to expect that similar adjustments might be occurring in France and in the 
Northern European countries. However, in France the employment penalty of motherhood is 
more pronounced. A possible explanation for this might derive from the peculiarities of its 
parental leave system, compared to the Finnish one for example. Both leaves are long and 
family-based although in Finland replacement rate is proportional to the wage (up to 70%) for 
the first ten months (combined maternity and parental leave) after childbirth while in France 
persons in leave receive a flat rate payment amounting to around 25% of the average female 
earnings. This difference is important in terms of participation rates according to LFS 
definition: employed persons going on a leave exceeding three months remain to be 
considered employed only if the replacement rate amounts to more than 50% of one’s 
previous wage. If not, then he/she is considered inactive. Therefore, lower employment 
penalty in Finland than in France might partly be due to this statistical effect. In sum, the bad 
parental leave system in France puts pressure on mothers’ employment causing an adjustment 
of the participation decision rather than of working hours. On the other hand, the low level of 
maternal labour market participation might at least partially derive from the high rate of 
unemployment that characterises the French labour market. The very high level of the French 
fertility rate (and rising in recent years) has been shown to derive from the quality of state 
support for families (Cfr. Letablier, 2003). Ekert-Jaffé et alii (2002) find a clear effect of 
French family policy on the progression to third births and the timing of births. 
 
 
4.5.2. Medium score on child care policies 
Female employment rates, expressed both in headcount and in FTE, are very similar in 
Belgium and Luxembourg (slightly below the European average). In Belgium, the quality of 
public policies to support the combination of professional and family responsibilities prevents 
there from being an employment penalty for mothers and thus a decreasing fertility rate. 
Public support for 0-3 years olds appears to be more generous in Belgium than in 
Luxembourg, i.e. mainly because the coverage rate is much higher in Belgium whereas 
financial support to families with children is higher and child:staff ratios in childcare facilities 
better in Luxembourg. The same holds true for older children: Belgium provides a system of 
free and universally accessible nursery schools so that coverage is almost complete whereas 
Luxembourg scores better as far as financial aspects (and therefore child:staff ratios) are 
concerned. These differences might explain why the employment penalty of motherhood in 
terms of participation and segregation is much more pronounced in Luxembourg than in 
Belgium : while working mothers in Belgium are more numerous to find a place for their 
children, in Luxembourg, policies focus more on offering adequate financial support to 
families (a more generous leave replacement rate, child benefits, child-rearing allowances, etc.) 
without necessarily being in favour of mothers’ continuous labour market attachment. Besides 
these employment penalties, the very generous level of financial support to families with 
children in Luxembourg is likely to sustain fertility while in Belgium relatively a high fertility 
rate is maintained thanks to policies that are supportive of dual-earner families. As a last 
remark, note that other explanations besides motherhood must be found for the low 
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employment rate in Belgium whereas in Luxembourg it might be precisely due to motherhood 
that overall female employment is so low. 
 
 
4.5.3. Low score on child care policies 
Austria and Germany are countries where the high level of female employment has reflected 
into a decrease in the fertility rate because public policies lack adequacy in alleviating the cost 
of children. Moreover, an adjustment by young mothers often takes place in the form of an 
increased use of part-time employment. In other words, there is a substantial motherhood gap 
in FTE employment. In these countries, an important share of childcare is provided at the 
household level through kinship care networks. Childcare organised through the educational 
system allows parents to work only very short hours in Germany given that schools end at 
lunchtime. National policies in Austria and Germany are traditionally familialistic favouring the 
economic dependence of wives on their husbands and stimulating mothers to choose 
inactivity rather than part-time work and part-time work rather than full-time jobs. A 2001 
study of employment transitions in Germany has provided unambiguous evidence for their 
very gender-specific nature. Indeed, among all married West-German spouses identified in the 
sample, only 25 full-time employment episodes for husbands ended up in housemaking 
whereas no less than 1243 events of this type were recorded among wives (Blossfeld, Drobnič 
and Rohwer, 2001, p.60). Full-time working German dual-earner couples are punished by the 
household-based tax system which privileges wives’ non-work or part-time work (Blossfeld 
and Drobnič, 2001, p.42). The rise in part-time employment is particularly worrisome in terms 
of segregation. Indeed, the part-time workforce faces rising occupational segregation. 
However, given that labour markets are highly regulated in Germany and Austria, most part-
time jobs tend to be better protected and the share of marginal jobs tends to be lower 
compared to countries such as the UK where the unregulated, market-driven structure of 
employment has generated a huge population of low-earners, mostly active in the service 
sector, and a decreasing wage rate for ‘middle-class’ workers. 
Given the inadequacy of public policies supportive of dual-earners in the UK, it is remarkable 
that the high level of female employment has not brought about a decrease in the fertility rate. 
However, in the UK fertility is sustained by an extremely high rate of teenage births. Indeed, 
completed fertility has been declining (starting with the 1995 cohort of women). Evidence 
does suggest there to be an adjustment in terms of working hours with mothers making much 
more use of part-time options. In general, the increase in women’s participation in the post-
second-World-War period should not be interpreted as an increase in labour supply, since 
women’s total hours of work remained unchanged and the FTE employment rate stable. 
Moreover, part-time jobs offer very poor employment protection and often take the form of 
marginal jobs. Indeed, the unregulated, market-driven structure of employment has generated 
a huge population of low-earners, mostly active in the service sector. In the 1980s, married 
women’s full-time participation grew and women with young children were becoming more 
present on the labour market so that a pattern of continuous employment gained ground along 
with a polarisation at the upper and lower ends of the occupational ladder due to the take-up 
of maternity leave around childbirth. Indeed, the group of highly educated, short break 
maternity leavers returning to full-time jobs is opposed to that of young mothers returning to 
part-time jobs after longer spells out of employment. The latter has been and still is the most 
common pattern among British mothers although it has been declining since the mid-1980s. 
The reason why childcare provisions are unsatisfactory in the UK is because they are mainly 
organised via the market and no direct policy measures exist to stimulate mothers’ labour 
market participation. In 1991, the tax system was reformed so that taxes are computed based 
on an individual assessment of revenue. Moreover, the tax allowance associated with marriage 
or with having children was reduced, if not dropped altogether, over time. Also, the direct tax 
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burden on singles relative to couples has gradually been brought down. To sum up, we quote 
McCulloch and Dex (2001, p. 198): “Combining the low priority given to men’s participation in 
childrearing with the relatively short periods of maternity leave offered to women, it is perhaps not surprising to 
see growing polarisation between British women (and possibly couples) in the way they plan their family 
responsibilities and employment participation, although it is not necessarily desirable”. Similar trends and 
motherhood costs are found in Ireland although female employment is at a much lower level 
than in the UK. Note, however, that female employment rates have been rising over recent 
years. Ireland has experienced the most rapid decline in fertility of any industrialised country at 
the same time as it has been able to improve its child benefit package (thanks notably to the 
decline in fertility along with the Celtic Tiger economy). 
 
The Netherlands deserves being treated apart from the other countries. Female employment is 
comparable with the EU-average in this country. However, the FTE employment rate of 
young mothers is particularly low in the Netherlands. Despite its progressive view on a lot of 
matters, the division of labour between spouses remains extremely conservative. The modal 
pattern is a full-time working husband and a non-participating wife (49.6%). The second 
highest frequency occurs for the male breadwinner/female part-time carer model (32.6%) 
(Hendrickx et alii, 2001, p. 80). Given that the fertility rate remains relatively high, the 
mediocrity of childcare provisions puts pressure on mothers’ employment and leads to an 
adjustment in working hours. Indeed, a high proportion of married women holds part-time 
jobs. To quote Hendrickx et alii (2001, p. 77): “Until the 1970s, most women stopped working after 
they became married. Later, many women stayed in the labour force until the arrival of children. More recently, 
it has also become an option to reduce the number of working hours, rather than stop working completely. In 
addition, many women who decide to stop working on the arrival of children re-enter the labour market once the 
children start going to school, often in part-time jobs. The family cycle is therefore a key factor affecting 
transitions between full-time work, part-time work, and outside the labour market.” 
In the Netherlands, the concentration of part-time jobs in the secondary segments of the 
labour market is less marked than in other countries. They are not necessarily associated with 
low wages and unsatisfactory social security. Nevertheless, they do entail the same negative 
effects on women’s careers than elsewhere. Indeed, women in part-time employment tend to 
accumulate less human capital and employers tend to view them as a less motivated workforce. 
So, indirectly, part-time work does bring about a wage penalty as well as women’s under-
representation in the higher occupational groups. 
The fact that women are assumed to be at least part-time available for childcare matters is 
reflected in the system of public policies. The coverage rate of the public childcare system is 
extremely low for under-four year olds. Parental leave is universally offered as an individual 
right but has to be taken up on a part-time basis and is unpaid. These two features of the 
parental leave make it rather ridiculous. Recall that the great majority of mothers work part-
time in the Netherlands (if they are active at all). In other words, they are part-time available to 
assume their childcare tasks and thus there is really no incentive or sense whatsoever to take 
an unpaid, part-time “parental leave”. The Dutch parental leave thus only seems to be helpful 
to parents who decide to reduce their work hours below the usual part-time hours.  
 
In the Southern European countries of Spain, Italy and Greece, female employment is 
relatively low. However, in recent years it has been on the increase. It follows that given the 
low degree of supportiveness of public policies with respect to dual-earner families, the fertility 
rate has witnessed a steep decline. This ‘baby bust’ should be interpreted as the combined 
effect of the postponement of marriage, a postponed arrival of the first child and a longer spell 
between the first and the second child. The most prominent choice made by dual-earner 
couples is for both partners to continue working full-time and to refrain completely from 
having children. Women who nevertheless decide that they want to raise children are forced to 
 146
                                                                                                                                Conclusion 
withdraw totally from the labour market. Indeed, in the Southern European countries, very 
few part-time options are available. Moreover, married women of childbearing and 
childrearing ages are a minority among part-timers (Drobnič, 1997). Thus, these women have 
to become inactive. The small number of part-time jobs that do exist are associated with low-
level unskilled occupations with no training and promotion opportunities (Meulders et alii, 
1994, p. 10). Moreover, half of the people working part-time are employed on a temporary 
basis and involuntary part-time is significantly higher than in other countries: one woman in 
three working part-time is doing so because she has not been able to find a full-time job 
(Meulders et alii, 1994, p. 30). In addition, a combination of factors such as the crucial welfare-
provider role of the family, the deficient housing markets that encourage adolescents to stay 
on living in the parental home as well as the high rate of youth unemployment has reinforced 
the trend towards both low female employment and low fertility (Bettio and Villa, 1998; 
González-López, 2001). However, the major fact explaining the low level of fertility in Italy 
and Spain is the low level of unions. Young people’s material well-being appears to be 
preventing them from getting into partnerships. As regards Spain, González-López notes: “The 
dramatic fall in fertility levels and the pattern of delayed marriage seem difficult to interpret today. Nevertheless, 
these patterns may simply be the result of the transition towards a modern egalitarian society where women’s 
aspirations have changed, while at the same time they have not found parallel institutional support” (2001, 
p.146). Public childcare provision is extremely low (except for pre-school aged children in 
Italy), direct family benefits are truly insufficient and there is only a limited focus on social 
assistance. Families are the relevant locus of social aid. In Italy, for example, public childcare 
provisions for infants, and particularly under-two’s, are almost non-existent given that they are 
the non-compulsory responsibility of local authorities. Access tends to be expensive and 
rationed given that inter-generational solidarity is assumed. However, it is worth drawing 
attention to the very efficient organisation of maternity leave in Italy which is long but very 
well compensated. The downside is that many women are employed in the irregular economy 
and thus do not benefit from any maternity protection at all. Moreover, particularly in small 
firms, an informal regulation of employment relations risks harming women’s maternity. “In 
practice, punishments at the time of re-entry after maternity leave, in the form of job downgrading, or the 
obligation, at the time of hiring, to sign an undated dismissal letter that the employers will use at their discretion 
in case of maternity, are by no means rare events.” (Bernardi, 2001, p.126). The same risks are faced 
by many Spanish women. Moreover, in Italy women’s and mothers’ employment conditions 
are to a high degree regionally determined, the North of the country being at a clear advantage 
compared to the South (in Spain also, national studies tend to conceal complex and regionally-
specific patterns). Therefore, for this country, it is crucial in order to enhance continuity in 
women’s careers while stimulating the fertility rate that childcare arrangements for under-two’s 
be developed. 
A Spanish peculiarity is the tremendous share of the workforce that holds temporary 
employment contracts. In 1995, 53% of part-time working women and 29% of full-time 
working women held fixed-term employment contracts (Jepsen et al. 2004). Moreover, it has 
been shown in chapter III that women with fixed-term employment contracts were more 
likely to refrain from having children. So, women’s increasing participation in the labour 
market has occurred at the expense of their job quality and stability.  
 
Finally, at first sight Portugal presents a somewhat special case. Women’s decisions be it in 
terms of labour market participation or fertility are guided first and foremost by financial 
considerations. In other words, the income effect dominates. Indeed, female employment rates 
are very high in Portugal and the employment effect of motherhood is negligible simply 
because mothers have to work to contribute to family income. But Greece too has a somewhat 
lower penalty than the one observed in Italy or Spain. Note, however, that the necessity for 
women to work does not mean that the quality of female employment is high as well. Indeed, 
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the Portuguese labour market is very gender segregated, just as we have shown it to be the 
case in the fast-growing female labour market in Spain. On the fertility plan, the trend in 
Portugal has been the same as in its neighbouring countries although the decline has not 
lowered fertility rates to a level as worrisome as in Greece, Italy and Spain. In sum, Portugal 
does not really present an exception compared to the other Southern European countries in 
terms of the adjustment mechanisms that take place: in order to maintain (and to raise) female 
employment rates, on the one hand, the labour market is marked by segregation and on the 
other, fertility is decreasing despite a substantial income effect that ties Portuguese mothers 
more closely to the labour market than their Mediterranean counterparts. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion: proposal for a country classification 
 
In light of the discussion in the previous section, a typology that ranks countries according to 
the type of adjustment mechanisms that take place in response to the different levels of public 
support for families can be derived in a more or less straightforward manner. Three main 
aspects are looked at to classify countries: the level and quality of female employment, the 
level of and trend in fertility rates and the generosity of family policies towards the dual-earner 
model. Roughly three main groups can be distinguished (table 4.4). 
 
The Scandinavian countries, France and to a lesser extent, Belgium, can be grouped together 
as far as adjustments in the fertility behaviour of working women are concerned. Indeed, these 
countries share the same combination of public policies in favour of dual-earner families, high 
(or increasing) female employment rates (in FTE), a small employment penalty for mothers 
and high fertility rates. 
 
Another group of countries includes Luxembourg, Austria and Germany on the one hand and 
the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands on the other hand. In this group, relatively high female 
employment rates contrast with large motherhood gaps in employment and a lack of public 
policies for families with children. Nevertheless, in the first three countries, relatively generous 
level of financial support is guaranteed almost universally through a system of child benefits. 
Note that such policies are more appropriate to fight child poverty than to encourage the dual-
earner model. The main difference between the two groups concerns the level of and trend in 
the fertility rate. In the Netherlands and in the UK, women do not appear to decrease their 
fertility rate in response to employment penalties induced by motherhood. Note that in 
Luxembourg, the very high level of financial support main partly explain why fertility has 
remained high compared to Austria and Germany. In Ireland the level of fertility remains high 
as well but has been decreasing sharply over the last decades. 
 
A third group of countries includes the four Southern European countries of Spain, Italy, 
Greece and Portugal. Similarly to those in the second group, these countries are also 
characterised by a low level of public intervention in terms of child care, especially for 0-3 
years olds. On the contrary, the employment penalty for mothers is much lower than in the 
former group for several possible reasons. Firstly, this may be so because participation is lower 
so that the small minority of women who do decide to work are expected to have greater job 
attachment. Secondly, the penalty might be smaller precisely because more women work 
(Portugal), even if they are concentrated in specific jobs. Working women are driven by 
financial reasons and it is absolutely crucial to them that they hold on to their jobs in order to 
contribute to family income in the presence of children, regardless of the price this implies in 
terms of time allocation. Finally, the small penalty might be associated with the fact that in the 
Southern European countries, working mothers can count on extended family ties, more so 
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than in German-speaking countries where mothers are subject to social pressure to take care 
of their children themselves whilst they are very young, or in the UK where family networks 
are generally much looser. Moreover, postponed partnership formation due to high youth 
unemployment rates and prolonged studies has put downward pressure on fertility rates which 
are amongst the lowest in the world. 
 
 
Table 4.4. EU-15 classification according to fertility responsiveness to public 
policies and employment conditions (2003) 
 
 Sub-group a Sub-group b Sub-group c 
First group 
 
 DK, SE, FI, FR BE  
Second group 
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5. Dissemination and/or exploitation of results 
 
 
5.1. MOCHO Newsletters 
 
Intermediate results have regularly been disseminated by way of the MOCHO web site. 
Indeed, every six months a newsletter was made available as well as a rich set of news and 
announcements related to the project or its members. Also, the full text of all deliverables has 
been available electronically as soon as these were finished and due to the EC. 
 
Dialogue Workshop “Researching Family, Employment and Welfare Issues in Europe: the 
quantitative approach”, joint conference: MOCHO, DynSoc, Fenics 
 
On February 18-20, 2003 a joint conference took place in Brussels. The starting point for this 
working conference was that several of the research projects commissioned under Improving 
the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base have been studying closely related issues within the 
broad areas of family, employment and welfare. Within the theme labelled ‘Family and 
Welfare’, three projects, DynSoc, FENICS and MOCHO, were all using quantitative analysis 
of existing large-scale data sets to investigate a series of linked issues around family formation, 
men’s and women’s employment, poverty and deprivation, and so on. The conference directly 
involved all the national teams associated with the projects and provided them with the 
opportunity to meet each other and exchange detailed results and work in progress. There was 
also time for technical discussion. The MOCHO team was well represented at this conference. 
We presented some of our most interesting results. Contact was made with some potential 
partners for future research. 
 
 
5.2. The publication of a special issue of 
TRANSFER 
 
TRANSFER is a publication of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI). The aims and 
scope of the journal are the following: 
It stimulates dialogue between the European trade union movement and the academic and 
research community; 
It helps to foster understanding of significant developments in the field of European trade 
union policy and industrial relations; 
It contributes research findings of practical relevance to the trade unions. At the same time, it 
enables the academic research community to gain access to the world of industrial relations; 
It contains contributions from a wide range of disciplines (sociology, economics, politics, law 
and history). 
The Belgian coordinator of the MOCHO project, Danièle Meulders, has coordinated the 
edition of a special issue of this journal on the subject of "Work and the Family". It has been 




Author: Danièle Meulders 
 
Article on future policy aspects of ETUC in the field of motherhood and work  
Author: Sinead Tiernan, ETUC’s Women’s Committee 
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« The role of welfare state typologies in analysing motherhood » 
Authors: Danièle Meulders and Síle O’Dorchai 
 
« New evidence on work among new mothers. What can trade unions do? » 
Authors: Siv Gustafsson and Eiko Kenjoh 
 
« Parenthood and time allocation in the countries of the EU » 
Author: Haris Symeonidou 
 
« The relative generosity of the EU countries’ childcare systems » 
Authors: Jérôme de Henau, Danièle Meulders, Síle O’Dorchai and Hélène Périvier 
 
« Motherhood and wages » 
Author: Cécile Wetzels  
 
« Labour supply of Italian mothers. A comparison with other EU countries: facts, data and 
public policies » 
Authors: Daniela Del Boca  and Silvia Pasqua  
 
 
5.3. Special MOCHO session at the IAFFE 
conference in Oxford 
 
The 13th Annual Conference on Feminist Economics sponsored by the International 
Association for Feminist Economics was held August 5-7th 2004, at St. Hilda’s College, 
Oxford, England. Our special MOCHO session was entitled “Balancing motherhood and 
employment” and included two MOCHO papers, one by the Brussels team and one by the 
Amsterdam team: 
 
« New evidence on work among new mothers. What can trade unions do? » 
Authors: Siv Gustafsson and Eiko Kenjoh 
 
« The relative generosity of the EU countries’ child policies » 
Authors: Jérôme de Henau, Danièle Meulders, Síle O’Dorchai and Hélène Périvier 
 
 
t5.4. Publication of the S ate of the Art in book-format 
 
The MOCHO State of the Art has been published by the EC following the first 12 months of 
research. However, the information contained in the State of the Art turned out so rich that it 
was decided to be worthwhile restructuring and rewriting it so as to make it appropriate for 
publication in book format. 
This publication is being edited by Daniela Del Boca and Cécile Wetzels. It will probably be an 
Oxford University Press publication. The book will have the following outline: 
 
Introduction  
Daniela del Boca & Cécile Wetzels 
 
Part 1. Public policies, labour markets and motherhood: 
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Chapter 1: short introduction on welfare state typologies (based on Transfer) 
Danièle Meulders and Síle O’Dorchai 
 
Chapter 2: The family-friendliness of public policies across Europe: building synthetic 
indicators: child care 
Jacques Le Cacheux, Danièle Meulders, Hélène Périvier, Jérôme de Henau and Síle O’Dorchai 
 
Chapter 3: To what extent do labor markets across Europe accommodate to new needs and 
realities of women and families? Part-time and leave (parental leave / maternity leave) 
Jacques le Cacheux, Sile O’Dorchai, Hélène Périvier, Jérôme de Henau & Danièle Meulders 
 
 
Part 2. Fertility, Participation, Wages and Time allocation of Mothers  
  
Chapter 5: Fertility trends in Europe 
Siv Gustafsson and Eiko Kenjoh 
 
Chapter 6: Motherhood and labor force participation  
Daniela del Boca & Marilena Locatelli 
 
Chapter 7: Motherhood and Wages  
Cécile Wetzels 
 
Chapter 8: Motherhood and Time Allocation  
Haris Symeonidou 
 
Part 3. Empirical analyses: Fertility, Participation, Wages and Time Allocation of Mothers in 
the European Union  
 
Conclusion 
Daniela del Boca & Cecile Wetzels 
 
The book will be targeted at three main reader categories: researchers in Economics and 
Demography, Undergraduate students at senior level and graduate students and last but not 
least at policy-makers. For the time being, it is entitled : “The rationale of motherhood” but 
this might still be changed.  
 
 
5.5. MOCHO Conference at Pau in March 2005 
 
As  a follow-up to the project, the following conference will be organised: 
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